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APPENDIX A
Effective and Ineffective Jury Instructions on Cross-Racial Identification

A jury instruction on cross-racial identification should adhere to established principles of
psycholinguistics, such as the use of logical structuring and the avoidance of uncommon words,
passive constructions, and /or compound sentences. See Edith Greene, Judge's Instruction on
Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and Revision, 18 J. OF APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 252, 261-62
(1988). Sufficient specificity of information also is critical to inducing meaningful
understanding. Id. at 262. In addition, recognizing that eyewitness confidence is not strongly
indicative of reliability is critical to understanding the phenomenon of cross-racial
misidentification. The same study finding substantial juror understanding of cross-racial
misidentification after a clearly worded instruction also included a clear instruction on
confidence, and found a similar associated effect on juror comprehension. See Gabriella
Ramirez et al., Judges' Cautionary Instructions on Eyewitness Testimony, 14 Aim J. OF FORENSIC
PsYCHOL. 31, 55 (1996).
With these principles in mind, the Korematsu Center proposes the following jury
instruction on cross-racial identification as an effective model for trial courts and drafters of a
needed pattern instruction:
The testimony given by an eyewitness is an expression of his or her beliefs,
and those beliefs may or may not be accurate. You should take into account
whether the defendant and the witness are of the same race, as people tend to
have trouble identifying persons of another race, although this is not always
the case. You should also take into account that the confidence displayed by
an eyewitness does not necessarily indicate that the testimony is accurate. It
is possible for eyewitnesses to be confident and still be wrong. Or,
eyewitnesses may be unsure and still be correct in their identification. If
after examining the testimony you have reasonable doubt that an accurate
identification was made, you must find the defendant not guilty.

Cf. Ramirez, 14 Aim J. OF FORENSIC PSYCHOL. at 55, 60-62 (finding that a similar instruction
was effective at inducing juror understanding of cross-racial misidentification and insignificance
of eyewitness confidence).
In contrast, the Korematsu Center presents the following jury instruction on cross-racial
identification as a relatively ineffective instruction, to be avoided:
It is not essential that the witness himself be free from doubt as to the
correctness of his or her statement, however, you the jury must be satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the
defendant before you may convict. Identification testimony is an expression
of belief or impression by the witness, and in appraising the identification
testimony of an eyewitness, you should scrutinize the identification with great
care. You may take into account whether the defendant and the witness are
of the same race.

A-1

Cf. id. at 55, 58-60 (finding that an instruction similar to the instruction above was not effective
at inducing juror understanding regarding eyewitness identification).
In this case, Mr. Allen proposed two alternative instructions that generally adhere to the
principles outlined above. The instructions are fairly concise and straightforward, specific, and
relatively easy to understand. Unfortunately, neither instruction addresses the issue of
eyewitness confidence. But either instruction qualifies as a reasonably clear and effective jury
instruction on cross-racial eyewitness identification.
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Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases:
An Archival Analysis1
Bruce W. Behrman2,3 and Sherrie L. Davey2

This study analyzed 271 actual police cases in order to address several prevalent issues in the eyewitness literature. Suspect identification (SI) rates were obtained for 289
photographic lineups, 258 field showups, 58 live lineups, and 66 lineup identifications
preceded by earlier identifications. SI rates were assessed for 3 levels of extrinsic evidence: no extrinsic evidence, evidence of minimal probative value, and evidence of
substantial probative value. The SI rates for the photographic lineups were assessed
as a function of delay, same vs. cross-race conditions, witness type, and weapon presence. SI rates declined significantly over time; SI rates were significantly greater for the
same-race condition. SI rates were much greater for field showups than photographic
lineups, 76% vs. 48%. The SI rates for the field showups did not vary as a function
of eyewitness conditions. The relation between confidence and suspect/foil identifications for the live lineups was significant and moderately high. The utility of archival
identification studies for eyewitness testimony research is discussed.

The research base in the field eyewitness testimony has been growing steadily for
years, but there have been few studies that delve into real police cases. Because research in eyewitness memory has scarcely been tested against actual cases, it has been
criticized for lacking external validity (Tollestrup, Turtle, & Yuille, 1994; Yuille, 1993).
The scarcity of archival studies has led to the recognition of a need for a diversity of
approaches to the problems of eyewitness memory, and in particular a need for studies that investigate real crimes. Archival work provides a complexity of variables not
possible to simulate in the laboratory, but of course laboratory experiments afford
specific controls that cannot be duplicated in real life. Thus, archival work should not
be considered a standard against which experimental studies should be evaluated,
1 Portions of this research were presented at the meetings of the American Psychological Society, June 1999,

Denver, CO; and June 2000, Miami, FL.
of Psychology, California State University, Sacramento, California.
3 To whom correspondence should be addressed at Department of Psychology, California State University,
6000 J Street, Sacramento, California 95819.
2 Department
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but rather as a valuable additional approach to the study of eyewitness issues. Several
archival studies have been published that assess descriptions provided by witnesses in
criminal cases: Kuehn (1974), Sporer (1992), and Tollestrup et al. (1994). Gonzalez,
Ellsworth, and Pembroke (1994) assessed identifications made by witnesses to actual crimes as an adjunct to an experimental study on the suggestiveness of showups,
but to date only one large-scale investigation has examined real-life identifications
made under a variety of witnessing conditions (Tollestrup et al.). The present study
investigates identification data from actual police cases in order to build upon the
few archival studies already done.
A review of the literature indicates that several of the eyewitness issues examined here have been studied in great detail by means of experimental methods: the
effect of delay, cross versus own-race effects, weapon focus effects, and the relation
between confidence and accuracy. A large number of laboratory studies indicate
that delay is an important factor in determining identification accuracy, and that
the number of correct identifications declines as the interval between the crime
and the identification procedure increases. (Deffenbacher, Carr, & Leu, 1981; Egan,
Pittner, & Goldstein, 1977; Malpass & Devine, 1981a, 1981b; Shepherd & Ellis, 1973).
The cross-race effect has been replicated in a large number of studies. These studies
indicate that recognition memory is better for culprits of one’s own race than for
those of a different race (Anthony, Cooper, & Mullen, 1992; Meissner & Brigham,
in press). One of the most widely studied eyewitness phenomena is that of weapon
focus. Several studies have found that the presence of a weapon negatively affects
a witness’s ability to recognize the perpetrator of a crime. (Kramer, Buckhout, &
Eugenio, 1990; Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987). Summarizing this research, Steblay
(1992) conducted a meta-analysis of various experimental studies of the weapon
focus effect and found a difference between weapon-present and weapon-absent
cases, with the weapon-present cases resulting in fewer accurate identifications than
the weapon-absent cases. The literature in general indicates that the correlation between confidence and accuracy is low (Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987;
Cutler & Penrod, 1989). However, more recent studies have found that substantial correlations may occur under certain conditions. For instance, Sporer, Penrod,
Read, and Cutler (1995) have shown that moderate correlations may be obtained
when only choosers (those witnesses who choose either the suspect or a foil) are
included in the analysis. Some recent work by Lindsay, Read, and Sharma (1998)
indicated that accuracy–confidence correlations were substantial when they were
based on data collapsed across a variety of witnessing conditions. To date only
the two issues of retention interval and weapon presence have been assessed by
archival work and that too in only one study: Tollestrup et al. (1994). Tollestrup
et al. examined both the effect of delay and weapon focus on the rate of suspect
identification and obtained data consistent with the general thrust of the laboratory
findings. In the present study we extended the Tollestrup et al. study and assessed
suspect identification rates as a function of delay, and weapon focus; in addition, we
examined same-race bias and the relation between suspect/foil identifications and
confidence.
Tollestrup et al. (1994) have argued that the results of most laboratory studies pertain primarily to unaffected witnesses to a crime. These researchers argue
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that victims of crimes and some witnesses to a crime have different personal and
emotional levels of involvement in the crime than subjects in a laboratory experiment. Consequently, although laboratory results may apply to unaffected witnesses
to a crime, it may be that crime victims are more accurate in their descriptions and
also more likely to identify the suspect. Tollestrup et al. found that victims of robbery
identified the suspect more often (46.5%) than did witnesses of robbery (33.3%). In
a 1982 experimental study, Hosch and Cooper researched the relative accuracy of
witnesses versus victims. However, the findings of their laboratory work indicated
that being the victim of a crime does not significantly improve or decrease the ability
to accurately identify a perpetrator. In light of the Tollestrup et al. arguments that
unaffected witnesses may process information about the crime differently than victims who are more directly involved, we examined identification outcomes for both
victims and witnesses to the crimes.
An important variable affecting eyewitness behavior focuses on the type of
procedure used to identify suspects. Two basic types of identification procedures
can be found in the literature, lineups, and field showups. A showup refers to the
observation of a single suspect by a witness in the field, typically at the crime scene,
whereas a lineup refers to the presentation of the suspect and several foils, either
live or via photographs. Most of the controversy in this area of research has focused
upon the suggestiveness of field showups. Some researchers have found that single
suspect identification procedures (showups) result in more false identifications than
lineups (Wagenaar & Veefkind, 1992; Yarmey, Yarmey, & Yarmey, 1996). Wagenaar
suggests that witnesses in real life may trust the police to have arrested the correct
person, resulting in an increased false alarm rate. The author warns against oneperson identification procedures. A third study echoes the concerns of Wagenaar
and Veefkind regarding showups (Malpass and Devine, 1983). Although Malpass and
Devine do warn against biasing practices in lineups and photospreads, the authors
believe that if a lineup is constructed fairly, with several foils that are similar looking
to the suspect, it may be the preferred method of identification. The authors suggest
that these procedures “. . . distribute the probability of identification of an innocent
suspect across the lineup foils, reducing the risk of an identification error” (p. 83).
In contrast to the previously discussed findings, Gonzalez et al. (1993) show that
witnesses at a lineup are less likely to say “not there” than are witnesses at a showup.
The study found that police suggestion is no greater for showups than for lineups.
The study by Gonzalez and his colleagues is an important one in that currently
showups are the more typical and preferred method of identification used by police
departments (Gonzalez et al.). The current study distinguished between several types
of identification procedures, and in particular assessed the differences between field
showups and photographic lineups. In addition, we investigated the SI rates for singlephoto presentations and live (physical) lineups.
Finally, we compared identification rates of suspects at lineups conducted after
a previous identification procedure, either another lineup or a showup, with lineups administered with no prior identification. Courts have acknowledged that prior
identifications may affect later identifications (Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
386 n. 6, 1968). Generally, if an earlier identification is considered to be biasing, the
later identification will be considered tainted unless the witness states that he can
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distinguish between his memory of the perpetrator and that of the suspect in the
earlier identification (People v. Orozco, 1981). One commentator has noted that it is
difficult to determine whether the viewer is identifying the perpetrator or the person
observed in the earlier identification procedure (Sobel, 1971). Sobel is referring to
the influence of photographs on later identifications, but the same reasoning applies
to the earlier observation of a live person. Sobel has suggested that “there will be few
instances where the witness will fail to identify the person most recently viewed . . .”
(p. 296). However, no real-life evidence has been gathered that indicates that earlier
identifications do indeed affect later ones.
A major problem with archival work is that a certain percentage of real world
lineups do not include the perpetrator of the crime. Tollestrup et al. (1994) generated
various evidentiary levels and asserted that such a procedure provided a solution to
the problem of perpetrator-absent lineups. Like Tollestrup et al. we have attempted to
alleviate the problem through the use of various categories of extrinsic incriminating
evidence.4 In this study we used three categories of evidence. In a large proportion
of cases no evidence was recorded. A number of cases contained evidence that was
incriminating but not particularly strong (e.g., the suspect has been implicated in
prior cases with similar methods of operation). Finally, a number of cases included
evidence that strongly implicated the suspect (e.g., a confession). Of course, one
cannot be sure that the culprit is in the lineup or showup, even when the case includes
highly incriminating evidence. Consequently, suspect identification rates should not
be interpreted as measures of accuracy. Inferences regarding the convergence of
archival and laboratory work should be drawn with caution. Archival identification
research may be used to provide various measures of the choosing behavior of real
witnesses and, viewed as such, may be used to explore areas of convergence with and
divergence from laboratory results.
An additional problem may limit archival work. Tollestrup et al. (1994) noted
that the police (the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in this case) did not distinguish
between misidentifications and rejections of lineups. Either response was noted as a
failure to identify anyone. We were able to gather only a small number of misidentifications for our photographic lineups, probably for the same reason. The Sacramento
police officers generally note in their reports either that a witness identified the suspect, that the witness rejected the lineup (or showup) or was simply unable to make
an identification. In several cases involving photographic lineups, detectives did note
that a witness had chosen a foil and which one he had chosen, but these cases were
comparatively rare. We were able to tabulate and record all false identifications for
live lineups. Physical lineups are more formal procedures. Here the police recorded
each pick made whether it was a suspect or one of the foils. In sum, most of the analyses reported in this paper were based on suspect identification rates; the analyses
of live lineups included the calculation of misidentifications.

4 Extrinsic incriminating evidence in this paper refers to incriminating evidence extrinsic to the identifica-

tion of the person. In some cases suspects were identified not only by facial features but also by voice or
body type, such identification evidence was not considered extrinsic. The identification of clothing was
considered extrinsic to the identification, as were other more obvious forms of incriminating evidence,
for instance, confessions or fingerprints.
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METHOD
Descriptive Information
This archival analysis used files from the Sacramento City Police Department
and a group of police reports from crimes committed in several counties in Northern
California, including Sacramento County. A total of 271 cases were analyzed.5 The
total number of crimes was 349; the vast majority were armed robberies (n = 261).
The remaining crime types included a variety of felonies: residential burglary, assault
with a deadly weapon, car jacking, and attempted homicide. The crimes were committed between 1987 and 1998. Several types of eyewitness identification procedures
were analyzed including 258 field showups, 289 photographic lineups, 58 live lineups,
and 18 single photo showups. Most photographic lineups in our sample contained
five photographs. All of the live lineups consisted of six people. We also analyzed
66 identifications that had been preceded by an earlier identification procedure. In
addition to gathering demographic data on both the witnesses and the perpetrator,
including gender, race, and birth date, each file was also assessed for date, time, and
type of crime committed, weapon used, and whether the identifier was a victim or
witness to the crime. Information on the identification type (including time and date),
the number of suspect identifications, and confidence level (for the live lineups only)
of the identification was gathered.
As already noted, the data for this study is based on 271 police cases. There were
374 perpetrators (µ = 1.38; range: 1–7 per case), 282 victims (µ = 1.09, range: 1–2),
and 224 witnesses (µ = 0.83; range: 0–6) . The average age of the male perpetrators
was 27.24 years; the range was 18–68 years. Only three perpetrators were female;
their ages were 23, 34, and 43 years. There were 161 female and 91 male victims.6 The
average age of the female and male victims was 33.15 and 35.36 years respectively;
the range was 16–74 years for males and 15 to 70 years for females. There were
102 male witnesses and 84 female witnesses. The average age of male witnesses was
28.56; the range was 16–51 years. The average age of female witnesses was 34.10
years; the range was 15–67 years.
Evidence Categories and Booking Rates
We classified the cases in terms of extrinsic evidence levels in order to evaluate
the validity of the lineup and showup identifications. These categories of evidence
are listed in Table 1. We have divided the cases into two major groups: cases for
which there is incriminating extrinsic evidence and cases for which no extrinsic evidence was recorded in the police reports. The cases containing extrinsic incriminating
evidence were divided into two groups: those that included evidence of substantial
5 The first author was consulted in 130 of these cases (These cases included cases from Sacramento County

and several other counties in Northern California). The remaining 141 cases were researched at the
Sacramento Police Department. The SI rates for these two groups of cases were not significantly different,
either for field showups or photographic lineups. Seventy-three of the cases on which the first author was
consulted proceeded to trial. The police reports themselves did not contain information regarding the
further disposition of the cases. Conviction rates of the cases that proceeded to trial are not available.
6 Gender data for 68 eyewitnesses was not recorded in the files. The age of 121 eyewitnesses was not
recorded in the files.
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Table 1. Extrinsic Incriminating Evidence Categories

Minimal probative value (MPV)
Concurrent identification of clothing,
weapon, or Vehiclea
Anonymously provided information;
Information provided by cofelonb
Similarities of MOc
Previous familiarity with suspectd

Substantial probative value (SPV)
Suspect on surveillance tape
Independent identification of weapon, clothing, or vehicle
Stolen items, weapon(s), drugs found in suspects possession
(on person; in residence or vehicle)
Physical evidence: Ballistic evidence, fingerprints,
electronically marked bills
Confessions
Vehicle at scene registered to suspect
Identification of unique characteristics (tattoos)

Note: Reasons for classifying evidence as MPV are as follows: a Evidence identified at the same time and
place as the suspect; subject to suggestion, b Subject to bias, c Relevance, d Subject to expectations.

probative value (SPV) and those that contained only evidence of minimal probative
value (MPV). The first category (SPV) contains evidence that is of substantial probative value and is highly incriminating (e.g., confessions or fingerprint evidence).
The second category (MPV) contains evidence that is minimally probative of guilt.
We consider this a weaker form of evidence because it either suffers from relevance
problems (e.g., similar MOs) or is subject to bias, suggestion, (e.g., identification of
the clothing at a field showup while the clothing is still on the suspect), or the expectations of the witness (e.g., familiarity with the suspect). If a case contained both
MPV and SPV types of evidence, we placed it in the SPV category. An MPV + SPV
group was created by combining the MPV and SPV cases. The largest group of cases,
the no extrinsic evidence (NEE) group, contained no evidence extrinsic to identifications of the suspect. We included in this group cases containing single or multiple
identifications of the suspect, but excluded cases with extrinsic evidence as defined
in Table 1.
We also noted the percentage of suspects booked for each class of evidence, as
stated in the police reports. In California, arrest and booking for a felony is based
on probable cause (California Penal Code, 1999), thus booking rates provided an
independent measure of evidence level. We found that 92% of the suspects who
were identified from photographic lineups and whose cases fit into the first category
of evidence (SPV) were in fact booked into jail, whereas 71% of such suspects in the
second category (MPV) were booked. The difference disappears for field-showups:
96% of the suspects whose cases fall into either class of evidence, SPV or MPV, were
booked. Booking rates for all evidence categories for the photographic and field
identification procedures are shown in Table 2.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
A total of 689 identification attempts from police cases ranging from homicide
to nonviolent theft were analyzed. These included 258 field showups, 284 photographic lineups and 58 live lineups. A breakdown of suspect identification (SI) rates
for various evidence and identification categories are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
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Table 2. Booking Rates by Identification Procedure and Evidence Category
NEE

MPV

MPV + SPV

SPV

Total

ID type

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

Photo
Field

57
77

188
184

71
96

41
23

92
96

55
51

83
96

96
74

66
83

284
258

Note: NEE denotes cases with no extrinsic evidence, MPV indicates cases with
evidence that is of minimal probative value, and SPV indicates cases with evidence that is of substantial probative value.

Approximately 48% of the witnesses who observed a photographic lineup identified
the suspect as the perpetrator. Delay of identification was a major factor affecting
SI rates for the photographic lineups. Overall, 55% of the witnesses picked the suspect from a photo lineup if the identification attempt was within a 0–7-day delay
period, whereas only 45% did so after a delay of greater than 7-days. The disparity between delay groups was particularly evident when the cases included hard
(SPV) extrinsic evidence, 64 and 33% for the 0–7-day and 8+-day delay groups
χ2 (1, N = 55) = 4.89, p < .05, φ = .30. When the two extrinsic evidence categories
(MPV and SPV) were combined, the differences between the delay groups were
significant, χ2 (1, N = 96), = 5.48, p < .05, φ = .24.
Two hundred and thirty-one witnesses participated in cross-race versus
same-race identifications from the photographic lineups. The overall SI rate for the
cross-race cases was 45%. In same-race identifications the SI rate was 60%. This
difference was significant, χ2 (1, N = 231) = 4.50, p < .05, φ = .14. The extrinsic evidence categories (with the exception of the SPV category) exhibited similar trends,
but the differences were not significant. The presence of a weapon did not reduce
identification rates. Overall, the percentage of witnesses who selected the suspect in
Table 3. SI Rates and Evidence Categories for Photographic Lineups
NEE
Condition
Days delay
0–7
8+
Race
Cross-racial
Intraracial
Victim vs. witness
Victim
Witness
Weapon focus
Weapon used
No weapon used

MPV

MPV + SPV

SPV

Total

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

49
47

55
133

75
48

8
33

64a
33

22
33

66a
41

30
66

55
45

85
199

42
61

117
41

64
80

14
15

46
37

28
16

52
58

42
31

45b
60

159
72

48
44

85
79

57
62

21
16

50
38

18
29

54
47

39
45

50
45

124
124

45
61

170
23

61
20

36
5

44
48

34
21

53
42

70
26

48
51

240
49

Note: NEE denotes cases with no extrinsic evidence, MPV indicates cases with evidence that
is of minimal probative value, and SPV indicates cases with evidence that is of substantial
probative value.
a For SPV, χ2 (1, N = 55) = 4.89, p < .05; for SPV + MPV, χ2 (1, N = 96) = 5.47, p < .05.
b For Total, χ2 (1, N = 231) = 4.50, p < .05.
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Table 4. SI Rates and Evidence Categories for Field Showups
NEE

MPV

MPV + SPV

SPV

Total

Condition

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

Across conditions
Race
Cross-racial
Intraracial
Victim v. witness
Victim
Witness
Weapon focus
Weapon used
No weapon used

78

184

71

51

78

23

73

74

76

258

81
71

129
49

66
72

30
18

76
100

77
3

70
76

47
21

78
73

176
70

73
80

86
89

76
60

29
20

67
82

9
11

74
68

38
31

73
75

124
120

74
96

155
27

74
67

38
15

81
71

16
7

76
68

54
22

75
82

20
49

Note: NEE denotes cases with no extrinsic evidence, MPV indicates cases with evidence that
is of minimal probative value, and SPV indicates cases with evidence that is of substantial
probative value.

crimes in which a weapon was involved was 48%, but in crimes without a weapon
the percentage was 51%. None of the weapon/no-weapon differences for the various
evidence categories was significant.
Victims performed slightly better than witnesses when the identification attempts were assessed as a whole, 50% versus 45%, but this difference was not statistically significant; nor were the differences for the various evidence categories.
We collected a total of 258 field showups. The average delay was less than a
day. Ninety-three percent of the field showups were administered within a day after
the crime. The SI rates are given in Table 4. Overall the SI rate was 76%. None
of the differences in the race, weapon, or victim/witness categories were significant. The difference between the SI rates for the photographic lineups and the field
showups (76% vs. 48%) was significant, χ2 (1, N = 542) = 45.19, p < .001, φ = .29.
The difference between the SI rate for the photographic lineups administered
0–7 days after the crime and the field showups (76% vs. 55%) was significant,
χ2 (1, N = 343) = 13.81, p < .001, φ = .20.
We collected data for a total of 58 live lineup identification attempts. All of
the identification attempts for the live lineups reported here were administered by
the Sacramento Police Department. Witnesses to live lineups administered by the
Sacramento Police Department, fill out a standard identification form. The witness
was asked to check one of three response options: (1) “I am sure that number
was the person who . . . [committed the crime],” (2) “Although I am not positive,
was the person who . . .,” and (3) “I did not recognize anyone in
I think number
the lineup as being the person who . . .” Consequently, for the live lineups we were able
to count the SI rate, the false alarm rate, and the percentage of witness who marked
“I did not recognize anyone . . .” The SI rate was 50%, the false alarm rate was 24%;
26% of the witnesses were not able to make a choice. We computed χ2 statistics
and φ coefficients for the relationships between two dichotomous variables: (1) the
choice of suspect or the choice of a foil versus (2) the statement that the witness was
sure that the person was the culprit or the statement that the witness thought that the
person was the culprit. A relatively high correlation was found between the degree of
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confidence and whether a witness selected the suspect or a foil when all categories of
evidence were combined, χ2 (1, N = 43) = 11.55, p < .001, φ = .52. Of the witnesses
who expressed a moderate degree of confidence (“I think . . .”), the number of those
who selected the suspect was 24, the number who picked a foil was 13. However,
all but one of the witnesses who expressed a very high degree of confidence (“I am
sure . . .”) picked the suspect (19 picked the suspect, 1 picked a foil). We also computed
the correlation between confidence and suspect/foil identification using the data from
the combined extrinsic evidence categories (MPV + SPV). Here, the correlation was
moderately high, χ2 (1, N = 34) = 8.09, p < 01, φ = .49. In this case, 15 of those who
were “sure” of their pick chose the suspect, 1 chose a foil. Of those who expressed a
moderate degree of confidence (“think”) 19 chose the suspect, 10 chose a foil. Finally,
we computed the correlation between confidence and suspect/foil picks using the
data only from the highly incriminating evidence category (SPV). For this data, the
correlation was again moderately high, χ2 (1, N = 27) = 6.07, p < .05, φ = .47. A
very similar pattern of responses was evident: Twelve of the “sure” witnesses picked
a suspect, only 1 chose a foil; 15 of the “think” witnesses chose the suspect, 8 chose
a foil.
Our data contained 18 single-photograph identifications. These are analogous to
field showups, yet we thought them to be sufficiently different to warrant a separate
analysis. The SI rate for the single photos was .83. The average delay was less than a
day. The SI rate is consistent with that of the field showups.
We computed the SI rates for 66 identifications that were preceded by earlier
identification procedures. The later lineups were either photographic or live lineups. The earlier identifications were based on either field showups or photographic
lineups. The average delay period for the earlier identifications was 11.43 days. The
average delay for the later identification was 28.18 days. The SI rate for the later identifications was 62%. This rate was compared with an SI rate computed from a group of
live (n = 26) and photographic (n = 199) lineups that had not been preceded by earlier identifications, 225 identification attempts in all, and that had occurred 8 or more
days after the crime. The SI rate for this control group was 45%. The difference between the control group and group that had observed the suspect at an earlier identification procedure was significant, χ2 (1, N = 291) = 6.06, p < .05, φ = .14. We also
assessed the number and type of responses for both the earlier and later identifications. Of the 33 witnesses who identified the suspect at the earlier procedure, 24 again
identified him at the later one and 9 were not able to identify anyone at the later
identification.7 Of the 31 witnesses who were not able to make an identification at
the first identification procedure, 17 were not able to make an identification later,
but 14 did identify the suspect at the later identification. This means that 27% of
the witnesses who made a positive earlier identification did not make a later identification, whereas 45% of the witnesses who did not identify the suspect at the
earlier identification procedure did so at the later one. Finally, we computed the
7 Some

police reports did indicate that a witness had picked a foil from a photographic lineup. However,
only a few reports indicated that a foil had been chosen. Consequently, we placed foil choices in a
“no identification” category for the purpose of this analysis. Thus, responses in the “no identification”
category were of three types: lineup rejections, choosing of foils, and responses indicating that the witness
was not sufficiently certain to make a choice.
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correlation between the SI rate and the length of delay between the first and second
identifications.8 The delay was divided into two intervals, delays from 0 to 30 days,
and delays greater than 30 days. Of the 43 later responses that occurred 30 or fewer
days after the first identification, 60% were positive identifications of the suspect; of
the 23 later responses that followed the first identification by 31 or more days, 65%
were positive identifications of the suspect. The correlation between the SI rate and
delay was not significant, χ2 (1, N = 66) = .14, p > .05, φ = 05.

DISCUSSION
As expected, delay of identification was a major factor affecting SI rates for the
photographic lineups. Our results indicate that the SI rate drops substantially after
7 days. This is true of all extrinsic evidence categories, MPV, SPV, and MPV + SPV.
Thus, our findings converge with the laboratory evidence, which has, with few exceptions, indicated that the rate of identifying the culprit declines with time (Shapiro &
Penrod, 1986). The decline in SI rate over time may invite the conclusion that recognition memory degraded over time, but it would be wrong to draw such a blanket
conclusion from these data. A memory component is likely responsible for a portion
of the decline in the SI rate. However, a host of variables influences witnesses’ decisions in real cases. For example, witnesses to real crimes may simply become more
cautious as the delay between the crime and the identification increases. Our results
are also consistent with those of Tollestrup et al. (1994). We did not find a decline
over the first few (0–2) days as did Tollestrup et al. We computed SI rates for each
day for delays up to 30 days. The rates were similar, hovering around 60–70% (with
the exception of the NEE category) for each of the days within the first week, and
bottomed out after the first week at about 40%.
The tendency to choose the cross-racial suspect from the photographic lineups is
lower than the tendency to pick the intrarace suspect in all evidence categories, except
the SPV category. These results are in line with the effects found by many in the field
(Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Malpass, Laviqueur, & Weldon, 1973; Platz & Hosch, 1988;
Shepherd, Deregowski, & Ellis, 1974). Overall, our findings are consistent with the
meta-analytic work on cross-race effects indicative of a small-to-moderate decrease
in the rate of identifying the culprit when the identification is cross-racial (Anthony
et al., 1992; Meissner & Brigham, in press). A reversal occurs in the SPV group; this is
puzzling and at odds with the literature in general. As already noted, the perpetrator
is more likely to be present in the SPV group. It is possible that witnesses tend to pick
a suspect of a different race when there is even a vague memory of the perpetrator
available to them and when the suspect is in fact the perpetrator. It may be that a
witness’s decision criterion is somewhat less strict for individuals of a different race
(Slone, Brigham, & Meissner, 2000), and that this tendency to choose other-race faces
manifests itself when the perpetrator is present in the lineup. Of course the number
of witnesses in the SPV group is small, and the difference between the same and
cross-race SPV groups are not statistically significant. In general our data indicate
8 We

thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that we compute this correlation.
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that witnesses do not pick suspects from a different race more often than those of
their own race.
A host of studies have supported the phenomenon of weapon focus, including meta-analytic studies (Kramer et al., 1990; Loftus et al., 1987; Steblay, 1992);
however, support for the weapon focus effect was not evident in the present study.
Further, the suspect was chosen more often in the weapon-present group than in the
weapon-absent group for both the MPV and MPV + SPV conditions. One possible
explanation for our finding is that weapon-focus is simply not a real-life phenomenon.
Perhaps the arousal level during a crime is simply too high in real life crimes, whether
a weapon is present or not. The emotions of fear or anger, associated with weaponpresent crimes, are not present to the same extent in a laboratory as in a real crime
(Yuille, 1993). Still, this explanation does not explain the difference between the
results of our archival study and the archival study of Tollestrup et al. (1994) that
corroborated the laboratory findings. It should be pointed out, however, that when
an analysis of covariance was performed on the Tollestrup et al. data the presence
of a weapon had only a marginally significant effect on the suspect identification
rate.
Our findings do not indicate that victims respond differently than witnesses in
identifying suspects. Tollestrup et al. (1994) and Yuille (1993) have suggested the
emotional arousal experienced by victims might result in different response levels
for victims than for unaffected bystanders or even victims of nonviolent crimes, for
example, fraud cases. Tollestrup et al. did find a significant association between witness types (robbery victims, robbery witnesses, and fraud victims) across evidence
levels. Tollestrup et al. found that SI rates were related to witness type. Across evidence categories the SI rates were 46.5, 33.3, and 25.5 for robbery victims, robbery
witnesses, and fraud victims respectively. We found the SI rate only slightly higher
for victims than witnesses overall. The SI rate was higher for victims than for witnesses in both the SPV and the combined extrinsic evidence categories, MPV +
SPV, although the percentages were reversed for the MPV group. None of these
differences were significant. We agree with Tollestrup et al. that a victim should be
defined as one who “directly interacts” (p. 146) with the perpetrator. We evaluated
the victims and witnesses as designated in the police reports in terms of Tollstrup’s
“direct interaction” criterion and found that victims did indeed experience a more
direct interaction with the perpetrator than the witnesses. However, in many of
our cases a witness may have experienced a high degree of emotion even though
they had not been directly involved (e.g., a person in line during bank robbery as
compared with the teller who had been held up by the robber). Thus our sample
of witnesses may have included witnesses who were quite emotionally affected by
the crime even though they had not directly interacted with the perpetrator. The
fact that our witness group may have contained witnesses who were highly emotional may account for the fact that our data do not clearly support the Tollstrup
et al. results. In addition, it should be noted that Tollestrup et al. found a significant association between witness types and identification outcomes when comparing robbery victims, robbery witnesses, and fraud victims, but a subsequent post
hoc multiple comparison test did not reveal significant differences between these
groups.
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The relationship between confidence and suspect/foil identification for the live
lineups is a solid one; indications are that highly confident witnesses choose fewer distracters than moderately confident ones. We obtained significant correlations for the
highly incriminating evidence category (SPV), the inclusive evidence category (MPV
+ SPV), and for the data computed across all categories of evidence. Only one highly
confident witness in the sample of witnesses at live lineups picked a foil. Wells and
Bradfield’s (Wells & Bradfield, 1998) observation that detectives may inadvertently
cue witness when they know who the suspect is may be correct in certain cases; such
inadvertent cuing may have happened in some of our cases. It must be noted however
that the Sacramento Police Department is aware of the effects of bias on the part
of detectives. According to the Identification Administrator for the SPD (H. Ayers,
personal communication, September 10, 1997) detectives are instructed to be careful
concerning any statements or actions they might make during or after the identification, which might be considered suggestive. The SPD detectives are instructed in the
contents of The California Police Officers Legal Sourcebook (California Department
of Justice, 1993), including the chapter on lineups and showups. Section 8C of that
chapter states: “. . . if you tell a witness that he has picked the ‘right’ or (‘wrong’)
person, it may jeopardize the admissibility of later in-court identifications.” (p. 229).
Of course the detectives present at the lineup may still unconsciously cue witnesses,
but at least their awareness of the problem may mitigate some of the suggestiveness
inherent in the post-lineup situation.
The bulk of the experimental literature indicates that the confidence–accuracy
relation is a weak one (Sporer et al., 1995). However, a recent trend in the experimental literature indicates that under some circumstances confidence may be a good
predictor of accuracy. Lindsay et al. (1998) obtained confidence–accuracy correlations of .51 and .68 for two different videos when the witnessing conditions varied
widely. Sporer et al. (1995) found a substantial confidence–accuracy correlation when
the analysis was limited to witnesses who made positive identifications. Our results
parallel those of Lindsay et al. (1998) and Sporer et al. (1995); however, it would be
wrong to infer that our data indicate that confidence predicts accuracy. Our findings
do indicate that highly confident witnesses are much more prone to choose the suspect in a criminal proceeding than are moderately confident ones. Further, it is more
likely that the witnesses’ choices are correct in the SPV cases than other cases. It also
should be emphasized that our confident witnesses (except for one) did not make
misidentifications, and in this sense were seldom inaccurate.
The data from the field showups is inconsistent with those obtained by Gonzalez
et al. (1994), which indicated that field showups produced fewer suspect identifications than lineups. Two of the studies reported in the Gonzalez et al. article were
laboratory studies; the SI rates, in both the perpetrator-present lineups and the
perpetrator-absent lineups were greater for lineups than the showups. Study 3 of
the Gonzalez et al. report was an archival study. The percentage differences were
striking. Only 22% of the witnesses positively identified the suspect at the showups,
whereas 75% did so when photographic lineups were used. It should be noted that
the sample used to compute these lineups figures was small (n = 24). Our findings
show that the suspect identification rate is highest for field showups. Our results indicate that field showups produced a high rate of suspect identification, a finding that

B-12

P1: FYD/FPW

P2: FJU

Law and Human Behavior [lahu]

PP253-344984

August 16, 2001

Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases

11:11

Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999

487

is consistent with the hypothesis that showups are suggestive. The SI rates were 76%
for field showups and 48% for photographic lineups, n = 258 and 284 respectively.
These differences carry throughout all of the evidence levels. Of course, some of
the differences reported in our study may be confounded by the amount of delay.
However, we found that the SI rate for lineups administered within the first week
were significantly smaller than those for showups. The relatively high SI rate for the
lineups reported by Gonzalez et al. may in part be due to the small sample, but it is
the low SI rate (22%) for showups, which is troubling. The Gonzalez et al. sample of
showups is large (n = 172). At this point we have no explanation for the differences
between the two studies. At any rate, our results are consistent with the laboratory
findings that showups are biasing (Yarmey et al., 1996). In addition, our study confirms the intuition of the United States Supreme Court that the risks of bias are
greater in showups than lineups (Stovall v. Denno, 1967). Several other courts have
expressed the opinion that showups are suggestive (People v. Johnson, 1989; People
v. Orozco, 1981). In fact, this opinion is expressed in the National Police Foundation
report, Model Rules: Eyewitness Identification (Project on Law Enforcement Policy
and Rulemaking, 1974), and in the U.S Department of Justice document, Eyewitness
Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness
Evidence, 1999), both of which indicate that showups are biasing, and suggest methods to mitigate the bias. It might be noted that the booking rate for the showups
in our study for which there is no extrinsic evidence is 77%, whereas the rate for
the extrinsic evidence categories is about 96%; nevertheless, the rate of identification for the no-evidence category is 78%, equal to or slightly higher than it is for
those cases that include extrinsic incriminating evidence. Certainly, booking rates
are not a failsafe method of assessing perpetrator-absent identifications, but it seems
reasonable to argue that a showup category with a 23% nonbooking rate contains
more perpetrator-absent showups than does a category with a 4% nonbooking rate.
Consequently, the fact that the NEE category has a higher SI rate than the SPV or
the MPV + SPV extrinsic evidence categories provides additional support for the
view that showups are indeed biasing.
The field showup data was assessed in terms of both evidence categories and
the typical eyewitness categories of race, weapon presence, and victim/witness differences. In general, the SI rates were high for the various groups. The cross-race
groups produced lower SI rates than the own-race groups for all incriminating evidence categories, a trend consistent with the experimental data. The weapon-present
groups in the MPV, SPV, and the MPV + SPV evidence categories produced higher SI
rates than the weapon-absent groups, a trend not expected from the laboratory data.
None of these categories produced significant differences. It may be that the images
generated in field showups are too fresh and vivid to allow for the variables of race,
weapon presence, or witness type to produce large, statistically significant effects.
The current study clearly indicates that witnesses at field showups react differently than those assessing a photographic lineup. We have found that witnesses
demonstrate high SI rates at field confrontations. But perhaps of greater interest is
the fact that none of the classic eyewitness factors, race, weapon presence, or witness
type, produced significant or even marginally significant effects when the identifications were made at field showups. If most jurisdictions identify suspects primarily
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through the use of showups, (Gonzalez et al., 1993) many of the factors found to be
influential in the laboratory are irrelevant in a large proportion of real cases. Certainly later identifications might be based on photographic or live lineups, but these
would likely be tainted by the earlier field identification. The finding that SI rates do
not vary with many of the eyewitness factors that influence witness behavior at lineups does not mitigate the biasing effect of field showups. However, it does underline
the point that the eyewitness literature may have to take into account the methods
of identification to a far greater extent than in the past when assessing the effects of
situational or witness variables on identification.
The data comparing the identification rates of suspects at lineups conducted after
witnesses have observed the suspect at an earlier procedure with lineups conducted
with no prior identification procedure, are consistent with the hypothesis that earlier
identifications may contaminate later ones. Further, the data tracking the changes
in “yes” and “no” responses (which included rejections, “I don’t know” responses
and false alarms) indicate that a process similar to the concept underlying unconscious transference is operating here (Ross, Ceci, Dunning, & Toglia, 1994). A large
number of witnesses who say “no” or “I don’t know” in the earlier identification
say “yes” later. Apparently, these witnesses did distinguish, at least to some degree,
the perpetrator and the suspect at the earlier lineup. Either the witness recalled that
the person in the preliminary identification procedure did not fit their image of the
perpetrator or their image of the perpetrator was simply too vague to say “yes.” Evidently, whatever image the witnesses had of the suspect at an earlier time became
more dominant at the later identification. The witness’s image of the perpetrator
could have been overwritten by the image of the suspect in the earlier identification
procedure; in other cases the witness could have confused the sources of the images
(Ross et al., 1994). If a witness rejected the earlier identification because they had
two distinct images, that of the perpetrator and that of the identification picture, then
at the later identification procedure he may have recalled the image in prior lineup
as the one at the crime scene. Whether the process involved is one of overwriting
or one of source exchange, the data indicate that the image observed at the earlier
identification has become the one associated with the perpetrator. It would then be
difficult for a witness to any longer distinguish his memory of the perpetrator from
that obtained at the preliminary identification. In either case these data are consistent with the laboratory findings on bystander misidentification. These findings do
argue against putting a suspect in a later lineup, when he has been observed at an
earlier one. Chances of identifying the suspect are greatly increased and this is the
case even when the later identification is administered some months after the crime.
Any argument that a live lineup could be used for elimination purposes after the
suspect has once been identified is highly questionable in light of this data.
There are several limitations to this study in need of mention. The cases cover a
broad range of crimes. Our set of crimes was similar to those of the Tollestrup et al.
(1994) study in that our cases included a wide variety of robberies; however, our
set was slightly broader than Tollestrup et al.’s in that it contained additional types
of crimes, for example, residential burglaries. The essential aspects of the crimes
in our study were that the victims were aware that a crime was taking place, and
that the observation times were relatively short. The victims in our cases were quite
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likely attentive to the perpetrator, unlike many victims of fraud (Tollestrup et al.).
Consequently, our results should not be applied to cases involving fraudulent activity
in which the victims may not realize the culprit is a criminal until long after the
event. There were certainly a wide range of viewing conditions and viewing times
in our study; still, the crimes did not provide lengthy opportunities for rehearsal as
did, say, the homicide assessed in Yuille and Cutshall’s seminal field study (Yuille
& Cutshall, 1986). In the current study, the crimes occurred relatively quickly, but
future work might vary viewing conditions such as time to observe, in order to assess
the interaction of viewing times with other situational factors.
It was difficult to obtain large samples for a number of analyses. We found it
difficult to achieve large samples of cases in either the MPV or the SPV categories.
Weapon-absent cases were particularly difficult to come by. Another problem was
the difficulty in obtaining live lineups. These are relatively infrequently administered
in California and, we gather, in other jurisdictions (Tollestrup et al., 1994). Thus, our
sample of live lineups was restricted. This in turn limited our sample of confidence
ratings, because a standard scale of confidence is administered only for live lineups by the Sacramento Police Department. Many expressions of confidence were
recorded in the police reports for the photographic lineups, a very large category
of identifications; however, as noted previously, the police reports contained only a
few instances of recorded misidentifications, making it impossible to obtain a large
sample of confidence–suspect/foil relations.
The current study clearly demonstrates the validity of comments by Tollestrup
et-al. (1994) to the effect that forensic research is multifaceted and that factors affecting eyewitness behavior may vary from one context to another. One of the problems
with the literature to date has been the assumption that eyewitness factors have
the same effect and that witnesses respond similarly regardless of the forensic situation (Tollestrup et al., 1994). A diversity of methods is needed if we are to provide
the legal profession with practical advice regarding eyewitness memory. It is from a
combination of methods, controlled experiments, field studies, and archival studies
that conclusions should be drawn. An examination of the similarities and differences
between the identification outcomes generated by the different approaches may determine when one approach is applicable in contexts other than its own. The results
of the study reported here converge with several eyewitness findings from the laboratory: the effect of delay and of cross-race identification, and the biasing effect of
showups; however, our results diverge from the experimental literature with regard
to weapon focus effects, and to some extent the relationship between confidence
and suspect identification. Thus, the present study highlights the need for several
approaches to eyewitness research.
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THIRTY YEARS OF INVESTIGATING THE
OWN-RACE BIAS IN MEMORY FOR FACES
A Meta-Analytic Review
Christian A. Meissner and John C. Brigham
Florida State University
The current article reviews the own-race bias (ORB) phenomenon in memory for
human faces, the finding that own-race faces are better remembered when compared
with memory for faces of another, less familiar race. Data were analyzed from 39
research articles, involving 91 independent samples and nearly 5,000 participants.
Measures of hit and false alarm rates, and aggregate measures of discrimination
accuracy and response criterion were examined, including an analysis of 8 study
moderators. Several theoretical relationships were also assessed (i.e., the influence
of racial attitudes and interracial contact). Overall, results indicated a "mirror effect"
pattern in which own-race faces yielded a higher proportion of hits and a lower
proportion of false alarms compared with other-race faces. Consistent with this
effect, a significant ORB was also found in aggregate measures of discrimination
accuracy and response criterion. The influence of perceptual learning and differentiation processes in the ORB are discussed, in addition to the practical implications
of this phenomenon.
She based her identification on Smith's eyes, which she said were greenish-blue
and upon his hands which she said were "light and slender" like the holdup man's.
Mrs. McCormick testified that Smith's eyes were "different from most colored
people . . . bright and piercing." Smith's defense attorneys then attempted to parry
the state's first thrust in the trial. Mrs. McCormick was handed a picture of a man
she couldn't identify. It was a picture of David Charles, with shorter hair, taken
while he was in Vietnam. Assistant defense attorney Kitchen asked Mrs. McCormick if she had ever made the statement that all Black people look alike. "Yes,
I made that statement," Mrs. McCormick said, "and they do to a certain extent, but
there's a difference here" (Lickson, 1974, p. 66).
In 1971, five Black men, who became known as the "Quincy Five," were
wrongfully indicted for the murder of Khomas Revels during a robbery in
Tallahassee, Florida. Although no forensic evidence obtained from the crime
scene was ever linked to the men, five White eyewitnesses positively identified
them as among the perpetrators. In each of three trials the state argued, "What
better evidence can there be than, 'I saw him,' from unprejudiced witnesses? This
has been used since time immemorial. This is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Five eyewitnesses!" (Lickson, 1974, p. 87). Despite the lack of physical evidence
against these men, two of the defendants, Dave Roby Keaton and Johnny Frederick, were found guilty on the basis of eyewitness testimony and coerced
confessions obtained by investigators. During the third trial involving David
Christian A. Meissner and John C. Brigham, Department of Psychology, Florida State
University.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Christian A. Meissner or to John
C. Brigham, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida 32306-1270.
Electronic mail may be sent to meissner@psy.fsu.edu.
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Charles Smith, hired investigators on the defense team located the three actual
perpetrators of the robbery and murder, who became known as the "Jacksonville
Three." The Jacksonville men were later brought to trial and convicted based on
latent fingerprint evidence and identification of the automobile used in the murder.
The Quincy Five were finally exonerated.
At the trial of David Charles Smith, social psychologist Dr. William Haythorn
of Florida State University (a colleague of John C. Brigham) was called as an
expert witness in rebuttal of the eyewitness misidentifications. Because the only
evidence against the Quincy Five was in the form of cross-racial identifications,
Haythorn and Brigham set out to locate empirical evidence on the often purported
claim that "they [other-race persons] all look alike." However, at the time of this
case (c. 1971) only a handful of studies had examined the phenomenon (Berger,
1969; Horowitz & Horowitz, 1938), and only one study had been published in the
previous decade (Malpass & Kravitz, 1969). Due in part to this lack of scientific
evidence on cross-racial identification, the court prohibited the expert testimony
of Haythorn.
Today, three decades later, a plethora of researchers have studied the ownrace bias (ORB) in memory for human faces (also referred to as the cross-race
effect or other-race effect). Although most now agree that the phenomenon is
reliable across cultural and racial groups (Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1989),
there is less consensus about the social and cognitive mechanisms that may
govern the effect. Furthermore, little is known regarding variables that might
moderate the effect, including those applicable to the eyewitness scenario, such as
study time and retention interval. Thus, the goal of the current review and
meta-analysis is not only to reconsider the reliability and generalizability of the
ORB, but also to evaluate the validity of various theoretical mechanisms previously discussed in the literature and to propose a framework that might best
account for the pattern of results across studies. Finally, we discuss the various
practical implications of our findings for the legal and criminal justice systems.

Reliability of the ORB Effect
Literature reviews of the ORB have noted the robustness of the phenomenon
(Brigham & Malpass, 1985; Chance & Goldstein, 1996), and researchers have
endorsed the importance and reliability of the effect in several surveys (Kassin et
al., 1989; Yarmey & Jones, 1983). Furthermore, expert witnesses have cited the
effect in cases involving disputed cross-race identification (Brigham, Wasserman,
& Meissner, 1999; Leippe, 1995), and attorneys have acknowledged the importance of racial interactions in eyewitness identifications (Brigham, 1981; Brigham
& WolfsKeil, 1983). Given the source of such endorsements, one might be quick
to concede the robust and generalizable nature of the ORB effect. However, it is
important to further investigate the particular levels at which reliability might be
assessed. For example, (a) Is the effect generally replicable across studies? (b) Is
the effect consistent across various racial/ethnic groups? (c) Is the effect significant across different types of memory tasks? and (d) Is the effect reliable across
individuals and testing occasions?
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Replicability Across Studies
The first issue has been explored in several previous meta-analytic reviews of
the effect. Bothwell, Brigham, and Malpass (1989) found that roughly 80% of the
samples they reviewed demonstrated a significant ORB effect. Overall, effect size
estimates from several previous meta-analyses (Anthony, Copper, & Mullen,
1992; Bothwell et al., 1989; Shapiro & Penrod, 1986) have indicated a significant
weak-to-moderate effect, accounting for 6% to 11% of the variability across
studies. R. C. Lindsay and Wells (1983) also examined the reliability of the effect
across 13 studies by way of a vote-counting procedure. Although they asserted
that fewer than half of the studies (6 of 13) demonstrated a true ORB effect, their
criterion requiring a complete crossover interaction of White and Black participants may have been overly stringent. As Chance and Goldstein (1996) later
noted, a large majority of the studies (11 of 13) reviewed by R. C. Lindsay and
Wells showed at least some evidence of the effect.
Consistency Across Racial/Ethnic Groups
Several of these reviews have also examined the consistency of the ORB
effect across racial/ethnic groups. Whereas Bothwell et al. (1989) found relatively
equivalent estimates for both White and Black individuals, Anthony et al. (1992)
found that the ORB effect among White participants accounted for 2.5 times the
variance than that among Black participants. These inconsistencies could be due
to the analysis of slightly different groups of studies. Moreover, both reviews
relied on moderately small samples, in meta-analytic terms (number of independent samples: ks = 28 and 44; number of participants: ns = 1,445 and 1,725,
respectively), increasing the likelihood of significant fluctuations in moderator
effects due to the influence of one or more studies.
Generalizability Across Memory Tasks
Most studies documenting the ORB effect have used a standard recognition
paradigm in which participants are tested on their ability to discriminate between
a subset of faces shown previously (targets) and a subset of novel faces (distractors). Although a handful of studies have utilized some variant of this basic task
(Cross, Cross, & Daly, 1971; D. S. Lindsay, Jack, & Christian, 1991; Luce, 1974;
Malpass, 1974), some reviewers, such as R. C. Lindsay and Wells (1983), have
criticized the literature for not examining performance on other memory tasks,
including more applied identification tasks. More recently, however, researchers
have responded to this criticism by documenting the effect across a variety of
paradigms, including matching tasks (Malpass, Erskine, & Vaughn, 1988) and
lineup identification paradigms (Berger, 1969; Brigham, Maass, Snyder, & Spaulding, 1982; Doty, 1998; Fallshore & Schooler, 1995; Platz & Hosch, 1988). In
addition, researchers have shown the presence of the effect across other measures
of performance such as reaction time (Chance & Goldstein, 1987; Valentine,
1991) and other tasks of forensic relevance including facial reconstruction tasks
(Ellis, Davies, & McMurran, 1979) and photo lineup construction by law enforcement officers (Brigham & Ready, 1985).
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Reliability Across Individuals and Testing Occasions
A fourth level of reliability, namely consistency of the ORB effect across
individual participants, has only recently been examined. In general, memory for
human faces has been shown to demonstrate reliable properties when assessed by
tools designed to investigate cognitive maturation and/or neurological impairment. For example, Malina, Bowers, Millis, and Uekert (1998) found that the
Faces subtest of the Recognition Memory Test (Warrington, 1984) had sufficient
internal consistency and reliability (Cronbach's a = .77) for clinical use (see also
Soukop, Bimbela, & Schiess, 1999). Similarly, the Benton Facial Recognition
Test (Benton, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1983), the Faces subtest of the
Wechsler Memory Scale—III (1997), and the Face Recognition subtest of the
Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children (Kamphaus, Beres, Kaufman, & Kaufman, 1996) have all produced sizeable reliability estimates (rs > .75). Interestingly, and pertinent to the current investigation, several laboratory efforts at
demonstrating reliability in a face-recognition task have yielded only moderate
reliability estimates (Chance & Goldstein, 1979; Goldstein & Chance, 1980;
Malpass et al., 1998; Prospero, Corey, Malpass, Parada, & Schreiber, 1996).
Although researchers had taken care to randomly assign faces to recognition sets
in controlling for item effects (see Chance & Goldstein, 1979), more deliberate
standardization in controlling the memorability of materials and test sets may
provide for better estimates of facial memory reliability in future studies.
Although it has largely been assumed that the ORB effect would follow a
similar pattern of reliability across testing occasions (namely, moderate-to-large
reliability estimates), little research has been available to test this assumption. In
a recent study, we (Slone, Brigham, & Meissner, 2000) sought to test the
reliability of the ORB effect across an immediate and (2-day) delayed testing
occasion. Our results indicated that although participants performed reliably on
both own-race and other-race faces, rs (127) = .56 and .44, ps < .001, respectively, the magnitude of the difference between own-race and other-race performance (i.e., the ORB) was only somewhat reliable across the delay, r(127) = .21,
p < .05). Malpass et al. (1998) also recently investigated the reliability of
other-race face recognition across two separate testing occasions. Although they
found no reliability in performance on other-race faces, r(l 1) = .08, ns, this may
have been due, in part, to the small sample of participants (n = 13). Their estimate
of reliability for same-race recognition was significant, but of moderate size,
r(59) = .36, p < .01. Although left unaddressed by the current meta-analysis, the
issue of test-retest reliability in the ORB merits further investigation. Once again,
greater care in the standardization of materials across race of face may provide
more reasonable estimates of reliability in future studies.

The Search for Social-Cognitive Mechanisms
Thus far, theoretical notions for the ORB have spanned the realms of both
social and cognitive mechanisms. Whereas early candidates included the effect of
social attitudes and the notion of physiognomic differences between races, more
recent hypotheses have involved the potential influence of interracial contact and
the notion of a perceptual learning mechanism. Unfortunately, inconsistency has
often plagued the literature seeking to verify each theory. Because previous
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reviews of the ORB effect have given much attention to the various theoretical
positions (Brigham & Malpass, 1985; Chance & Goldstein, 1996; Shepherd,
1981), we provide only a cursory updated description of each approach.
Racial Attitudes
One initial explanation for the ORB effect was that individuals with less
prejudiced racial attitudes would be more motivated to differentiate other-race
members, when compared with more prejudiced persons. Early research indicated
that racial attitudes appeared to influence the degree of stereotypic likeness
assigned to other-race members (Secord, Bevan, & Katz, 1956). In addition, early
studies examining participants' performance on identification of race/ethnicity
(e.g., Jewish vs. non-Jewish) demonstrated that more-prejudiced individuals often
performed better than less-prejudiced individuals (Allport & Kramer, 1946;
Lindzey & Rogolsky, 1950). However, other studies were not always supportive
of the findings (Carter, 1948), and subsequent researchers noted that highprejudiced performance was likely influenced by a response bias to label more
faces as out-group members (Elliott & Wittenberg, 1955).
Within the ORB literature, several early studies demonstrated a small relationship between attitudes toward other-race persons and recognition memory
performance (Berger, 1969; Galper, 1973). However, when response bias was
taken into account, Dowdle and Settler (cited in Yarmey, 1979) found that racial
attitudes were unrelated to memory performance. Similarly, more recent studies
have consistently failed to find a relationship between racial attitudes and memory
for other-race faces (Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Lavrakas, Buri, & Mayzner,
1976; Platz & Hosch, 1988; Slone et al., 2000; Swope, 1994). However, racial
attitudes are related to another factor thought relevant to recognition of other-race
faces, namely, amount of interracial contact. A number of studies have found that
those with more prejudiced attitudes report less contact with other-race members
(Brigham, 1993; Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Brigham & Meissner, 2000;
Brigham & Ready, 1985; Slone et al., 2000; Swope, 1994).
Physiognomic Homogeneity
A second possibility for the ORB effect involves possible group differences
in the inherent memorability of faces, such that faces of some races might show
less physiognomic variability among group members when compared with other
races. However, researchers examining this hypothesis have generally found little
support for its validity. For example, Goldstein (1979) found no differences in
physiognomic variability among Japanese, Black, and White faces. Additionally,
several studies have demonstrated that latency and accuracy of same-different
judgments do not differ across race of participant or race of face (Goldstein &
Chance, 1976, 1978). Finally, within-race rated similarity has shown, at best, only
an inconsistent relationship to perception by own-race and other-race individuals,
leading Goldstein and Chance (1979) to conclude that, overall, there is little
"compelling evidence for the homogeneity hypothesis" (p. 111). We should note
that although physiognomic homogeneity may not be responsible for the ORB
memory effect, a number of studies have indicated that different physiognomic
facial features may be more appropriate for discriminating between faces of
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certain races (Ellis, Deregowski, & Shepherd, 1975; Shepherd, 1981; Shepherd &
Deregowski, 1981).
Interracial Contact
A number of researchers have posited that the quality or quantity of interracial
contact may play a vital role in the degree of ORB demonstrated by any particular
individual. For example, researchers have proposed that increased contact with
other-race individuals may increase memory performance by (a) reducing the
likelihood of stereotypic responses and increasing the likelihood that individuals
may look for more individuating information (Malpass, 1981; Shepherd, 1981),
(b) influencing individuals' motivation to accurately recognize other-race persons
through associated social rewards and punishments (Malpass, 1990), or (c)
reducing the perceived complexity of unfamiliar other-race faces (Goldstein &
Chance, 1971). Two major approaches to investigating contact are to examine
groups of individuals differing in their degree of other-race contact or to assess
individuals' self-reported contact with other-race persons.
With regard to the former approach, several early studies demonstrated that
adolescents and children living in integrated neighborhoods better recognized
novel other-race faces than did those living in segregated neighborhoods (Cross et
al., 1971; Feinman & Entwisle, 1976). Other more recent studies have also shown
evidence of the influence of contact in samples of White and Black individuals
from Great Britain and Africa (Carroo, 1986; Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Wright,
Boyd, & Tredoux, 1999). Finally, a novel application of the contact hypothesis
was recently conducted by Li, Dunning, and Malpass (1998) who demonstrated
that White "basketball fans" were superior to White "basketball novices" in
recognizing Black faces. Given that the majority of professional basketball
players are Black, this effect was predicted on the basis of the fans' experience in
differentiating individual players. It is interesting to note that not all studies have
found the predicted relationship between high-contact and low-contact groups.
Burgess (1997) found only a small effect of contact on the performance of
Southern (Florida) and Northern (Maine) American samples of White individuals.
Similarly, Ng and Lindsay (1994) found little support for the influence of contact
on the performance of Canadian and Singapore samples.
In a number of other studies, researchers have assessed the relationship
between memory for other-race faces and individuals' self-reported experience
with other-race persons. Whereas early studies generally failed to find a significant relationship (Berger, 1969; Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Cross et al., 1971;
Malpass & Kravitz, 1969), numerous studies over the past several decades have
found at least some evidence of the relationship in both recognition tasks (Byatt
& Rhodes, 1998; Carroo, 1986, 1987; Lavrakas et al., 1976; Li et al., 1998; D. S.
Lindsay et al., 1991; Slone et al., 2000; Swope, 1994; Wright et al., 1999) and
more applied lineup identification paradigms (Brigham et al., 1982; Platz &
Hosch, 1988). This curious pattern of results over time will be further examined
in the current meta-analysis. It is possible that the precision and validity of
measures used to assess interracial contact have improved over the years. Alternatively, as Chance and Goldstein (1996) posited, a cohort effect may exist such
that opportunities for interracial contact have increased following the desegrega-
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tion and civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s, allowing for a greater
range in the degree of interracial contact in recent years.
Perceptual Learning
As reviewed in the previous section, a fair degree of empirical support exists
for the notion that interracial contact has some influence on the magnitude of the
ORB. However, researchers are still attempting to elucidate the specific cognitive
mechanisms through which contact might actuate this influence, and to model
their effects in more formal ways. The most popular general approach is likely
that of perceptual learning. As historically defined by Gibson (1969), perceptual
learning involves "an increase in the ability to extract information from the
environment, as a result of practice and experience with stimulation coming from
it" (p. 3). Numerous reviews have been written concerning the various mechanisms likely to underlie the phenomenon (Ahissar & Hochstein, 1998; Proctor &
Dutta, 1995; Walk, 1978), and most note the important role of Gibson's notion of
differentiation, denned as focused attention directed toward invariant cues that
provide the best bases for discriminations within a given stimulus set. More recent
work by Haider and Frensch (1996, 1999) has furthered Gibson's notion by
demonstrating that perceptual skill involves learning to distinguish between
"task-relevant" and "task-redundant" information. Thus, increases in accuracy
and speed of processing appear to reflect the extent to which individuals have
knowledge of, and provide attention to, the appropriate (invariant) features of the
stimulus.
Such an encoding-based effect has been documented in a variety of perceptual
skill domains, including chess (Reingold, Charness, Pomplun, & Stampe, in
press), bird watching (K. E. Johnson & Mervis, 1997, 1998), sports (Helsen &
Pauwels, 1993; Shea & Paull, 1996), radiology (Christensen et al., 1981; Lesgold
et al., 1988; Myles-Worsley, Johnston, & Simons, 1988), and even chicken sexing
(Biederman & Shiffrar, 1987). It is possible that perceptual learning might also be
responsible for the ORB phenomenon. For example, individuals may be able to
discriminate own-race faces more accurately due to their use of appropriate
(invariant) aspects of the face. On the other hand, cues used for own-race faces
may not be appropriate when attempting to remember other-race faces, and thus
performance would worsen when attempting to discriminate such unfamiliar
stimuli. A handful of studies have investigated this notion of perceptual learning
from a discrimination training perspective. Other research within this general
framework has attempted to identify various aspects of the face that might be
deemed "task-relevant" when recognizing own-race versus other-race faces and to
provide evidence in support of more formal models of the ORB.
Discrimination training. Some researchers in the face memory domain have
directly investigated the perceptual learning hypothesis by providing individuals
with discrimination training on own-race and other-race faces. Although training
seems to have no effect on improving own-race recognition (Malpass, 1981),
there is some evidence that training may reduce the ORB, at least in the short run.
For example, Malpass, Lavigueur, and Weldon (1973) attempted to improve
recognition memory for own-race and other-race faces by either verbal or visual
training tasks. Although verbal training showed no effect on recognition, a
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relatively short visual training task (1 hr) produced a significant reduction in the
magnitude of the ORB. Lavrakas et al. (1976) also investigated the effects of
training by presenting participants with a concept learning task. Post-training
recognition performance demonstrated significant improvement on other-race
faces for individuals in the concept learning conditions compared with the
unchanged performance of individuals in a control condition. However, when
participants in all conditions were tested again 1 week later, the performance of
trained and untrained participants on other-race faces was no different. Finally,
E. S. Elliott, Wills, and Goldstein (1973) investigated the influence of paired
associate discrimination training in reducing the magnitude of the ORB. Whereas
participants in the no-training and own-race training conditions displayed the
typical ORB effect, those in the other-race training condition demonstrated
significant improvement in recognition accuracy for other-race faces.
Configural-featural hypothesis. Although relatively short-lived effects of
discrimination training have been found, other researchers have sought to identify
the various cognitive processes that might differentiate own-race and other-race
face recognition. One notable advance in the face memory literature has involved
work on the face inversion effect, the finding that inverted (upside-down) photos
of faces are identified more poorly than inverted photos of other objects. In early
work on this effect, Yin (1969) concluded that face recognition was the product
of a unique system, different from systems responsible for recognizing other kinds
of visual stimuli. In contrast to this "neural specialization" hypothesis, Diamond
and Carey (1986) proposed that perceptual learning might be operating in face
recognition. In several experiments they showed that the inversion effect was not
unique to faces, but rather occurred when participants had a great deal of
experience with the stimulus materials. Inversion appeared to disrupt the effectiveness with which individuals were able to encode stimuli that were highly
familiar to them. This, they claimed, stemmed from experienced participants'
reliance on configural (or relational) properties of the stimulus. Novice participants, on the other hand, relied on only the featural (or isolated) aspects of the face
that were less influenced by inversion. A number of subsequent studies have
supported this general configural-featural hypothesis (see Farah, Wilson, Drain,
& Tanaka, 1998).
The notion of expertise and configural processing has also been applied to the
ORB effect. In particular, Rhodes, Brake, Taylor, and Tan (1989) proposed that
greater experience with own-race faces would lead to a larger inversion effect, due
to an increased reliance on configural information. The encoding of other-race
faces, on the other hand, should not be as influenced by inversion due to the
featural aspects that are relied on. As hypothesized, Rhodes et al. observed that
own-race faces were significantly more susceptible to inversion than other-race
faces for measures of both reaction time and accuracy. However, several other
studies have observed either no interaction of inversion with the ORB (Buckhout
& Regan, 1988) or larger inversion effects on other-race faces (Valentine &
Bruce, 1986). Given the various methodological differences across studies, further
empirical and theoretical work on the significance of inversion effects in the ORB
would be valuable.
Finally, Fallshore and Schooler (1995) examined whether such perceptual
expertise might also be involved in the verbal overshadowing effect, the finding
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that generating a verbal description of a face significantly impairs subsequent
identification accuracy (see Meissner & Brigham, in press, for a meta-analytic
review). Specifically, they hypothesized that requesting participants to provide a
description of a same-race face might cause significant declines in recognition
performance by (a) forcing participants to rely on the featural (more verbalizable)
aspects of the face and (b) disrupting the configural (less verbalizable) memory
trace that was originally encoded. Performance in cross-race identification, however, was predicted not to show the overshadowing effect due to individuals'
reliance on featural aspects when encoding other-race faces. Consistent with their
hypotheses, Fallshore and Schooler found that although participants' recognition
performance on same-race faces demonstrated the overshadowing effect (a 47%
decrement in performance when verbal descriptions were given), other-race faces
showed no such decline in performance.
"Face space" models. Although the configural-featural hypothesis has received much attention, other researchers have examined the particular manner in
which faces might be represented in memory. Likely the most ambitious work
involves that of Valentine and his colleagues (Valentine, 1991; Valentine &
Bruce, 1986; Valentine & Endo, 1992) in the development of an exemplar-based
model of facial memory. Although Valentine and colleagues conceded the notion
of a configural-featural distinction in the type of facial features that individuals
may encode, they disputed Diamond and Carey's (1986) proposal that a fundamental change in the underlying processing strategy occurs under inversion
(Valentine, 1988; Valentine & Bruce, 1988). Rather, Valentine (1988) proposed
that, in conjunction with the notion of schema theory pioneered by Goldstein and
Chance (1980), an exemplar-model reflecting "the acquisition of knowledge of
how faces vary" may account for the effects of inversion, race, and distinctiveness
(Valentine, 1988, p. 485).
Generally speaking, Valentine's (1991) multi-dimensional space (MDS)
framework holds that the representational system may be thought of as a hypothetical space in which faces are stored based on various dimensions representing
features or sets of features. The model posits that these dimensions are based on
an individual's prior experience with the stimulus set and thus are best suited for
representation of own-race faces, due to a reliance on appropriate featural and/or
configural information. As a result of this encoding, own-race faces are spread
more evenly throughout the MDS and are better individuated from one another at
retrieval. Conversely, other-race faces are poorly represented (and, thus, more
tightly clustered in the MDS) due to the encoding of less appropriate featural
and/or configural information. Valentine's (1991) model also posits, however, that
with increasing experience, other-race faces may be better represented once the
relevant (invariant) aspects of other-race faces are learned.
In a test of the MDS framework, Chiroro and Valentine (1995) examined the
effects of race, typicality, and level of perceptual experience within the cross-race
paradigm. Although the influence of rated distinctiveness on recognition of
own-race faces had been widely known (Brigham, 1990; Hosie & Milne, 1995),
the manner in which it might interact with race and perceptual experience had not
been investigated. Based on the assumptions of the MDS model, Chiroro and
Valentine predicted that only individuals who had considerable previous experience with other-race faces (high-contact) would demonstrate distinctiveness ef-
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fects for both own-race and other-race faces. This was due largely to the notion
that such individuals should be able to distinguish between typical and distinctive
other-race faces based on features they had extracted through prior experience. In
contrast, low-contact individuals were predicted to demonstrate no differences in
performance on the distinctiveness dimensions of other-race faces. Overall, their
results indicated the predicted four-way interaction such that distinctiveness
effects for low-contact individuals were confined to own-race faces. On the other
hand, high-contact individuals demonstrated significant effects of distinctiveness
regardless of the race of the face.
Race-feature hypothesis. An alternative to Valentine's (1991) MDS model
was proposed by Levin (1996) in explaining the paradoxical effect that individuals are slower at classifying the race of an own-race face compared with that of
an other-race face. This other-race classification advantage (ORCA) was observed
by Valentine and Endo (1992) and was explained as resulting from strong
activation due to the high-density cluster of other-race faces in the representational system (MDS). Levin (1996) proposed an alternative to this explanation in
which the ORCA was said to arise from a "facilitated classification process" (p.
1366). In particular, Levin suggested that other-race faces were more quickly
classified due to an automated process in which race-specific coding is performed
without regard for other individuating information, which is largely ignored.
In testing this race-feature hypothesis, Levin (1996) observed that participants
demonstrating a large ORB in recognition memory also demonstrated a large
ORCA when compared with other individuals (see also Levin & Lacruz, 1999).
Given that the ORB observed was driven largely by false alarm responses to
other-race faces, Levin argued that participants' coding of race alone was insufficient to discriminate between other-race faces, leading to a tendency to respond
"seen before" during test. Levin further proposed that individuals having greater
experience with other-race persons would be less likely to generate the racefeature response, but instead would initially seek out individuating information for
later use. Although he did not test this possibility, Levin's observation is analogous to that of skill differences in the "basic level" categorization effect (K. E.
Johnson & Mervis, 1997, 1998; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991). Namely, whereas
novices respond to stimuli most quickly based on a basic level categorization
(e.g., bird), experts respond just as quickly at the basic, subordinate (e.g., wren),
and even sub-subordinate levels (e.g., Carolina wren). Thus, experts' conceptual
knowledge of domain-relevant features appears to allow them faster access to
multiple levels of identification. Similarly, individuals with more experience with
other-race faces may have faster access to identity information by way of their
conceptual knowledge of individuating features.
Taken together, a perceptual learning approach to understanding the ORB has
considerable potential for explaining its cognitive origins. The focus on encodingbased processes within the configural-featural and race-feature hypotheses may
stimulate future empirical and theoretical progress. In addition, the representational model put forth by Valentine and colleagues (Valentine, 1991; Valentine &
Endo, 1992) has provided a testable framework within which both general and
effect-specific approaches to memory for faces may interact. The current metaanalysis was designed to aid researchers in further exploring perceptual learning
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aspects of the ORB by providing aggregate estimates of the effect across several
performance measures.

Meta-Analysis
The present review of the ORB paradigm has yielded many testable hypotheses concerning both the general reliability of the effect and the various mechanisms posited for its occurrence. Our meta-analysis took the approach advocated
by Hedges and Olkin (1985) in which a mean weighted effect size for the sample
of studies was initially calculated, followed by prediction of effect size based on
moderating variables (see B. T. Johnson, Mullen, & Salas, 1995, for a discussion
of various approaches). In particular, we were interested in examining ORB effect
size estimates for basic measures of hits (correctly identifying a face as "old") and
false alarms (incorrectly identifying a face as "old"), as well as aggregate signal
detection estimates of discrimination accuracy (the standardized distance between
the means of the "new" and "old" distributions) and response criterion (the level
of familiarity necessary for an individual to categorize a given stimulus as "old"
vs. "new"; for a review of signal detection theory, see Green & Swets, 1966).
Second, in testing the validity of several theoretical mechanisms posited in the
literature, we also provide estimates of the influence of racial attitudes and
self-rated interracial contact on other-race memory performance, as well as an
estimate of the correlation between attitudes and contact as measured across
studies. Finally, in addition to overall effect size analyses, eight moderating
variables (described below) are examined across the four performance measures.
Method
Studies
A total of 91 independent effect sizes described in 39 research articles were located,
representing the responses of 4,996 participants. Of the 39 research articles, 6 (15%) were
unpublished manuscripts or theses/dissertations. Studies were obtained using several
methods, including (a) searches of PsycINFO, Sociofile, and Dissertation Abstracts
databases and using the key words "face memory," "face recognition," and "face identification" along with the key words "race" and "ethnicity"; (b) cross-referencing with the
three previous meta-analyses (Anthony et al., 1992; Bothwell et al., 1989; Shapiro &
Penrod, 1986) and various reviews on the effect (Brigham & Malpass, 1985; Chance &
Goldstein, 1996; R. C. Lindsay & Wells, 1983); and (c) contact with colleagues in the field
who may have had knowledge of fugitive literature that had neither been published nor
presented at a conference.

Inclusion—Exclusion Criteria
To be included in the analysis, studies must have involved a within-subjects test of
participants' memory for own-race and other-race faces. The statistical difference in
performance on these two sets of stimuli for each participant is defined as the ORB. Note
that, in contrast to several previous meta-analyses (Anthony et al., 1992; Bothwell et al.,
1989), studies that involved only a single race of participants were included in addition to
studies that involved races other than Whites and Blacks. Reasons for excluding studies
involved (a) the lack of sufficient data from which to compute an effect size (Bruce,
Beard, & Tedford, 1997; Caroo, 1988; Horowitz & Horowitz, 1938; Luce, 1974; Malpass,
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1988), (b) the use of a between-subjects design and analysis (Caroo, 1986; E. S. Elliot,
Wills, & Goldstein, 1973), or (c) the implementation of various methodological procedures that might obscure interpretation of the effect size estimate, such as unequal
presentation rates for own-race and other-race faces (Byatt & Rhodes, 1998; Doty, 1998;
Goldstein & Chance, 1985; Lavrakas et al., 1976; Padgett, 1997; Valentine & Bruce,
1986).

Coded Variables
Based on the suggestions of Lipsey (1994), moderator variables were selected by way
of three general categories of study descriptors.1 First, we examined variables that were
of substantive experimental and applied interest in characterizing the reliability and
generality of the ORB effect, including the race of the participant and the type of memory
task used. Fifty-six percent of the samples were reported as White, and 32% were reported
as Black. The remaining 12% of samples included individuals of Arab/Turkish, Asian, and
Hispanic origin. The majority (91%) of studies used a recognition paradigm, whereas 9%
of studies used a (simultaneous and target-present) lineup identification task. Briefly,
recognition paradigms involve presenting participants with a set of faces that they must
later recognize from a group of "old" and "new" faces. Identification paradigms are
generally more applicable to the eyewitness situation and involve presenting participants
with a single face (either from a photograph or a short video) that they must later identify
from a group (or photo lineup) of 6-8 similar faces.
Second, we assessed methodological or procedural aspects of studies such that we
might identify possible sources of distortion involving boundary conditions under which
the ORB might be observed. Such variables included (a) whether test stimuli were
identical (72%) or different (28%) from those used at study, (b) whether races of face were
presented and tested in a blocked (19%) or mixed (81%) fashion, (c) the amount of time
participants were permitted to study individual faces (minimum = 0.12 s; maximum = 4
min; median = 3 s), and (d) the length of the retention interval between study and test
phases (minimum = immediate; maximum = 3 weeks; median = 2 min).
Finally, we also considered other extrinsic study characteristics, including the date of
publication or presentation and whether the effect size estimate was taken from a
published or unpublished manuscript. Of the studies included for analysis, 27% were
published in the 1970s, 33% in the 1980s, and 40% in the 1990s. Fifteen percent of these
studies were unpublished and took the form of a conference presentation or a thesis/
dissertation.

Measure of Effect Size
Our measure of effect size for the performance variables (i.e., hits, false alarms, and
discrimination accuracy) was a single sample estimate equivalent to Hedge's gu. This
effect size was computed simply as the mean difference between own-race and other-race
performance divided by the sample standard deviation, or
g = (jU-own - Mother)/SD

(1)

To control for skewness in estimating the true population parameter, g was transformed
to gu by way of Equation 2:

'To assess the reliability of coding study moderator variables, two raters generated independent
codings for each variable across studies. Rate of agreement across all variables ranged between 93%
and 100%.
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g u = c(m)*g,

(2)

c(m) = 1 - (3/[(4*d/) - 1]).

(3)

where

To assess the influence of both attitudes and contact on the ORB, as well as the
correlation between the two measures across studies, r coefficients were recorded for each
independent sample, after which r was transformed to Fisher's Zr by way of Equation 4:
Z r =.5*log e [(l+r)/(l-r)].

(4)

All formulae were obtained from Rosenthal (1994). Effect sizes demonstrating the ORB
will be positive for measures of hits, discrimination accuracy, and response criterion, and
negative for the measure of false alarms. Likewise, positive estimates for the racial
attitude and interracial contact measures indicate that positive attitude toward and increased contact with other-race individuals leads to better performance on other-race
faces.

Results
Weighted Effect Size Analyses
To examine the pattern of effect sizes for each measure, estimates were
weighted as a function of their independent sample sizes, after which the results
were analyzed across studies. For each measure, the mean weighted effect size
(gu) is presented, in addition to a test of the significance of the estimate (Z), and
the associated 95% confidence intervals.
Hits and false alarms. The mean weighted effect size for the proportion of
hit responses across studies (k = 74) demonstrated a significant ORB, gu = .24,
Z = 15.43, p < .001, with 95% confidence intervals of .21 and .27. In practical
terms, an odds-ratio analysis indicated that participants were 1.4 times more likely
to correctly identify a previously viewed own-race face when compared with
performance on other-race faces. For false alarm responses, the mean weighted
effect size across studies (k — 53) also indicated a significant ORB, gu = -.39,
Z = 22.24, p < .001, with 95% confidence intervals of -.42 and -.35. Participants were 1.56 times more likely to falsely identify a novel other-race face when
compared with performance on own-race faces.
Taken together, these results illustrate a "mirror effect" pattern in which
other-race faces receive a lower proportion of hits and a higher proportion of false
alarms when compared with own-race faces (Figure 1). The mirror effect has been
termed a "regularity" of recognition memory and has been demonstrated for such
variables as frequency, distinctiveness, and study time (see Glanzer & Adams,
1985, 1990). Although the theoretical mechanisms of this effect are often debated
between models (Glanzer & Adams, 1990; Hintzman, 1988; Hirshman, 1995;
McClelland & Chappell, 1998; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997), many studies have
shown that the aggregate measure of discrimination accuracy is generally influenced when mirror effects are observed. Other researchers have noted changes in
response criterion estimates as well; however, substantial differences in discrimination accuracy between stimuli must be present for the criterion effect to be
observed (Hirshman, 1995; McClelland & Chappell, 1998). Hence, we were
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Other-Race Faces
Own-Race Faces

False Alarms

Hits

Figure 1. "Mirror-effect" pattern demonstrated in hit and false alarm responses to
own-race and other-race faces.

interested to see whether ORB differences would occur only on estimates of
discrimination accuracy, or on estimates of response criterion as well.
Discrimination accuracy. The mean weighted effect size for the measures
of discrimination accuracy across studies (k = 56) was gv = .82, a significant
ORB, Z = 42.32, p < .001, with 95% confidence intervals of .78 and .85. Overall,
the ORB in discrimination accuracy accounted for 15% of the variability across
studies, and participants were 2.23 times more likely to accurately discriminate an
own-race face as new versus old when compared with performance on other-race
faces.
Response criterion. Unfortunately, only six studies (k = 14) actually calculated a response criterion measure across participants. Of the 14 independent
samples, 11 demonstrated a significant ORB effect (a = .05) such that other-race
faces yielded a more liberal criterion when compared with performance on
own-race faces. The remaining 3 samples demonstrated nonsignificant patterns.
To further assess this effect, a studywise response criterion analysis was conducted in which the mean hit and false alarm rates for each study were used to
calculate a response criterion estimate (see Macmillan & Creelman, 1990). The
mean weighted effect size for the estimates of response criterion across studies
(k = 49) was gu = .30, a significant ORB, Z = 17.91, p < .001, with 95%
confidence intervals of .26 and .33. Overall, this small effect of response criterion
in the ORB accounted for only 1% of the variability across studies and indicated
that own-race faces generally yielded a more conservative criterion when compared with performance on other-race faces.
In summary, the pattern of results for discrimination accuracy measures was
consistent with the mirror effect pattern that was observed in the hit and false
alarm responses. Given the significant size of the discrimination accuracy effect,
the presence of a response criterion effect in the ORB was expected (Hirshman,
1995). A recent model of recognition memory proposed by McClelland and
Chappell (1998) provided an account of this pattern of results by simulating the
process of differentiation (Gibson, 1969). As discussed previously, differentiation
has been implicated in the various perceptual learning approaches to explaining
the ORB. In the Discussion section, we consider the merits of McClelland and
Chappell's model and its theoretical implications for the ORB.
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Racial attitudes. Researchers have long posited that attitudes toward
other-race persons may be responsible for the ORB in face memory. However,
as noted, empirical results have not generally supported this notion. To assess
the validity of this hypothesis, we examined the pattern of correlations
between racial attitudes and performance on other-race faces across studies
(k = 14). The mean weighted effect size across studies indicated no significant
relationship, Zr = — .01, Z = .25, with 95% confidence intervals of —.08 and
.06. Hence, there appears to be no evidence of a direct influence of racial
attitudes on the ORB.
Interracial contact. Researchers have also posited that interracial contact
should influence the degree of ORB demonstrated by any given individual. To
assess this relationship across studies, we examined the pattern of correlations
between self-rated interracial contact and discrimination of other-race faces
(k = 29). The mean weighted effect size across studies demonstrated a
significant relationship, Zr = .13, Z = 5.34, p < .001, with 95% confidence
intervals of .08 and .18. Overall, contact appears to play a small, yet reliable,
mediating role in the ORB, accounting for approximately 2% of the variability
across participants. This seemingly weak relationship between self-rated contact and the ORB may be due to limitations in the range of variability present
in such measures. Future studies may wish to further explore alternative
methods of assessing interracial contact.
Attitude-contact relationship. As noted previously, we have found evidence of a relationship between attitudes toward other-race persons and
self-rated contact in our lab. It is conceivable that although individuals'
attitudes have no direct influence on their memory for other-race faces, racial
attitudes may yet play a mediating role by way of their relation to individuals'
social experience with other-race persons. The mean weighted effect size
between interracial attitudes and contact across studies (k = 10) demonstrated
a significant relationship, Zr = .36, Z = 11.42, p < .001, with 95% confidence
intervals of .30 and .42. In general, individuals with more positive attitudes
toward other-race persons tend to rate themselves as experiencing more
interracial contact when compared with individuals with more negative
attitudes.
Moderator

Effects

A test of the homogeneity of variances across the sample of weighted effect
sizes (hit, false alarm, discrimination accuracy, and response criterion measures)
indicated a significant degree of variability, exceeding that expected on the basis
of sampling error alone, Qs > 1,000, ps < .001. Thus, the design moderators
discussed earlier were used to predict the variability across the sample of effect
sizes. A weighted least-squares regression analysis (Hedges, 1994) was conducted
for each measure across the three sets of moderator variables (i.e., reliability and
generalizability, methodological characteristics, and extrinsic study factors). Effect sizes in the analysis were weighted as a function of their sample size. Due to
the sensitivity of this fixed-effects analysis, we took a more conservative approach
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and discuss only those moderator effects with Zj ^ 3.30 or a = .001.2 Significant
effects resulting from this criterion yielded semipartial correlations (rs) ranging in
magnitude from .11 to .33. Table 1 provides a summary of moderator effects (Zj)
across the four performance measures.
Reliability and generalizability. The first set of moderators assessed
whether the ORB was reliable across racial/ethnic groups and whether the effect
was generalizable to the type of memory task. Similar to that of Anthony et al.
(1992), results indicated that White participants demonstrated a significantly
larger ORB when compared with Black participants with regard to the measure of
discrimination accuracy, Zj = 6.91, p < .001. This effect appeared to stem largely
from differences in the magnitude of false alarm responses, Zj = 9.50, p < .001.
However, Whites and Blacks did not differ in the magnitude of the ORB on either
proportion of hits or estimates of response criterion, ZjS ^ .79. White participants
also demonstrated a significantly larger ORB when compared with participants
grouped in the "other" racial/ethnic category. This effect was observed reliably in
hit, false alarm, and response criterion estimates, ZjS ^ 8.14,/?s < .001. However,
the analysis of discrimination accuracy was not significant, Zj = 1.13. Mean
weighted effect sizes for each racial/ethnic group across the four performance
measures are displayed in Table 2.
Analysis of the effect sizes found in recognition versus lineup identification
paradigms yielded no significant difference with regard to the measure of false
alarm responses, Zj = 1.55. However, there was a tendency for studies using an
identification paradigm (gu = .45) to yield a larger ORB for proportion of hits
when compared with studies using a recognition paradigm (gu = .22), Zj = 2.76,
p < .01. Nevertheless, it is evident that the ORB effect is generalizable to both
recognition and lineup identification tasks. As only a small proportion (9%) of the
samples involved the use of an identification task, future studies utilizing the
lineup paradigm would be valuable.
Methodological characteristics. The second set of moderators examined
various methodological aspects that might influence the magnitude of effects
observed across studies. First, studies were coded for whether they utilized the
identical or different facial photographs at study and test and for whether the
presentation of stimuli was mixed or blocked by race/ethnicity. Results indicated
that the type of stimulus (i.e., identical vs. different) significantly influenced
estimates of the ORB on the proportion of hits and estimates of response criterion,
ZjS ^ 3.42, ps < .001. This effect of stimulus type was also apparent in the
proportion of false alarms, Zj = 3.27, p < .01, though not at the a = .001 level.
2
This conservative criterion (a = .001) for study moderators was chosen due to the sensitivity
of the "fixed effects" analysis. Given the exploratory nature of our investigation, we felt that such
a criterion might allow us to examine a range of variables that would likely be replicable under direct
empirical investigation. A more conservative, "random effects" model was also run on the sample
of studies (see Raudenbush, 1994). Results indicated that White participants yielded a significantly
larger own-race bias (ORB) on false alarm responses when compared with both Black, Z = 2.50,
p < .05, and other racial/ethnic participants, Z = 2.45, p < .05. White and other participants also
exhibited a significant difference in the response criterion estimates, Z = 2.13, p < .05. Additionally, limiting the amount of study time significantly increased estimates of the ORB on aggregate
measures of discrimination accuracy, Z = -2.19, p < .05. No other moderator effects were found
to be significant, Zs < 1.36.
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Table 1
Influence of Moderator Variables (Zj) Across Measures of Hits, False
Discrimination Accuracy, and Response Criterion
False
Discrimination
Hits
alarms
accuracy
Moderator
(k = 74)
(k = 53)
(k.= 56)
Race/ethnicity of participant
White vs. Black
0.79
9.50***
6.91***
White vs. Other
8.14***
10.36***
1.13
Task
—
Identification vs. recognition
2.76
1.55
Stimulus
3.42***
Photo vs. face
3.27
0.16
Order of study
4 47***
5 49***
Blocked vs. mixed
1.13
0.60
Study time (in seconds)
11.70***
2.65
Retention interval (in minutes)
1.55
0.45
0.86
Year of study
2.50
5.46***
10.50***
Status of study
1.74
0.69
Published vs. unpublished
0.63
***p < .001.

Alarms,
Response
criterion
(k = 49)

0.12

11.55***
—

7.34***
0.81
1.19

7.17***
0.50
1.59

In addition, presentation of stimuli (i.e., blocked vs. mixed) significantly influenced ORB estimates of discrimination accuracy, Zj = 4.47, p < .001, largely as
a function of the proportion of hits, Zj = 5.49, p < .001. As displayed in Table
3, the pattern of weighted means demonstrated that significantly larger ORB
effects were observed if facial photographs were altered from study to test and if
the presentation of faces was blocked by race/ethnicity.
Studies were also coded for the length of time participants studied each target
face (in seconds), and the length of the retention interval between study and test
phases of the experiment (in minutes). Results indicated that the amount of study
time influenced estimates of the ORB on measures of discrimination accuracy,
Zj = 11.70, p < .001, rs = -.29. The direction of the effect indicated that
reducing the amount of study time for each face significantly increased the
magnitude of the ORB, largely as a result of an increase in the proportion of false
alarm responses to other-race faces, Zj = 2.65, rs = —.09. This effect of exposure
time is similar to the findings of Anthony et al. (1992) across their meta-analytic
Table 2
Weighted Effect
Measures as a
of Participant
Race/ethnicity
of participant
Whites
Blacks
Others

Size Estimates (gu) on Performance
Function of Race/Ethnicity
False Discrimination Response
Hits alarms
accuracy
criterion
0.35
0.32
0.04

-0.62
-0.15
-0.22

1.06
0.66
0.74

0.38
0.32
-0.21
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Table 3
Weighted Effect Size Estimates (gu) on Performance Measures as a Function
of Changes in Stimuli and Order of Study by Race of Face
Moderator
Stimuli at study
and test
Identical
Different
Order of study by
race of face
Mixed
Blocked

Hits

False
alarms

Discrimination
accuracy

Response
criterion

0.20
0.37

-0.36
-0.48

0.76
0.82

0.14
0.53

0.21
0.45

-0.38
-0.45

0.79
1.18

0.30
0.37

sample of White participants. Length of the retention interval had a significant
influence on the size of the ORB across estimates of response criterion, Z3 = 7.17,
p < .001, rs = .18. The direction of the effect indicated that lengthening the
retention interval induced more liberal responding to other-race faces.
Extrinsic study factors. As a final set of moderator variables, effect sizes
were coded for whether they had been taken from a published or unpublished
manuscript and for the date of the manuscript's publication or presentation.
Results indicated no significant differences in the magnitude of effect sizes taken
from published and unpublished manuscripts, ZjS ^ 1.74. However, a rather
interesting effect was found for date of study, most significantly across measures
of false alarm and discrimination, ZjS & 5.46, ps < .001. Weighted means for each
decade are presented in Table 4. It appears that whereas the size of the ORB has
significantly decreased over time for measures of discrimination accuracy, rs =
— .22, and proportion of hits, rs = —.06, it has significantly increased over time
for the proportion of false alarms, rs — —.17. Curiously, this effect does not hold
for estimates of response criterion.
Influence of date of study on estimates of attitude and contact. With regard
to estimates of racial attitude and interracial contact, we also assessed the effect
of date of study on the magnitude of effects observed. Whereas the estimated
influence of racial attitudes on recognition of other-race faces has significantly
decreased over the past 3 decades, Zj — 16.67, p < .001, rs = —.46, the influence
of interracial contact on recognition has significantly increased, Z= = 9.28, p <
.001, rs = .40 (see Table 5). As noted previously, the increase in magnitude of
Table 4
Weighted Effect Size Estimates (gu) on Performance
Measures as a Function of Date of Study
Date of study
1970s
1980s
1990s

Hits
032
0.23
0.21

False
alarms
-0.28
-0.38
-0.41

Discrimination Response
accuracy
criterion
L 3 5 0 . 3 9
0.72
0.11
0.64
0.32
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Table 5
Weighted Effect Size Estimates (Zr) of Influence of
Racial Attitudes and Interracial Contact as a
Function of Date of Study
Date of study
1970s
1980s
1990s

Attitudes
006
0.02
-0.08

Contact
-0.01
0.19
0.27

effect of contact over the past 3 decades may be due to a cohort effect resulting
from increases in the opportunities for interracial contact between groups (Chance
& Goldstein, 1996). Alternatively, the increase may be due to improved precision
and validity in the measures used to assess interracial contact. Nevertheless, it is
increasingly evident that the contact hypothesis plays a vital role in our conception of the ORB.

Discussion
The present meta-analysis has empirically reviewed over 30 years of research
on the ORB in memory for faces. Thirty-nine research articles were located,
involving the combined responses of nearly 5,000 participants. Analyses examined differences in performance on own-race and other-race faces across measures
of hit and false alarm responses and across aggregate measures of discrimination
accuracy and response criterion. Results of hit and false alarm rates illustrated an
ORB mirror-effect pattern in which own-race faces produced a higher proportion
of hits and a lower proportion of false alarms compared with other-race faces (see
Figure 1). Consistent with this effect, measures of discrimination accuracy demonstrated a significant, moderately sized ORB, accounting for 15% of the variability across samples. Measures of response criterion also showed a significant
ORB; however, this effect was considerably smaller, accounting for only 1% of
the variability across samples.
In addition, estimates of the influence of both racial attitudes and interracial
contact on the ORB were examined across studies. Although no influence of racial
attitudes was present in the sample, a small, yet significant, effect of interracial
contact was found, accounting for approximately 2% of the variability across the
sample. Although racial attitudes appeared to have no direct influence on the
ORB, a possible mediating role was indicated by a moderately strong relationship
between racial attitudes and interracial contact, accounting for 13% of the variability.
Several study moderators were also examined across the various measures.
Results indicated that White participants were more likely to demonstrate the
ORB, especially with regard to false alarm responses. Additionally, ORB effects
were more likely in measures of discrimination accuracy when presentation and
testing were blocked by race of face and when study time was reduced. Measures
of response criterion demonstrated ORB effects when stimuli differed between
study and test and when the retention interval between study and test was
increased. Finally, date of study had a significant influence on both false alarm
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and discrimination measures. Results indicated that, over the past 3 decades, the
ORB effect appears to have become most prominent in false alarm responses.
Measures of the influence of racial attitudes and interracial contact were also
affected by date of study, such that the effect of racial attitudes on other-race face
recognition has decreased, whereas the effect of interracial contact has increased
in more recent years.
Theoretical Implications
The pattern of hit and false alarm responses across studies exhibited a
mirror-effect pattern (see Figure 1). This pattern of responses has been demonstrated across a number of manipulations in the literature and has been deemed a
"regularity" of recognition memory (Glanzer & Adams, 1985, 1990). It is interesting that this mirror-effect pattern is often captured in aggregate signal detection
measures of discrimination accuracy and response criterion, consistent with our
meta-analytic results. Much of the debate regarding this phenomenon has involved whether the mirror effect pattern results from a change in the response
criterion for each stimulus set, or whether the effects observed on the response
criterion measures represent an actual change in the psychological sense of
familiarity resulting from the manipulation.
In support of the latter hypothesis, McClelland and Chappell (1998) have
proposed a model of recognition memory involving a mechanism of differentiation. As discussed previously, differentiation is a process in which the perceiver
focuses attention toward invariant cues that provide the best basis for discriminations within a given stimulus set (Gibson, 1969). McClelland and Chappell
model this process by proposing that individuals store features of a given stimulus
in memory and that these features (and their associated probabilities) are updated
in the representation each time the individual encounters the particular stimulus,
thereby resulting in an increase in the psychological sense of familiarity. Furthermore, this increase in the strength of the representation is accompanied by a
decrease in the likelihood of responding to a novel, unrelated stimulus. Thus, as
McClelland and Chappell conclude, "familiarity breeds differentiation" (p. 726).
McClelland and Chappell's (1998) model effectively simulates the mirroreffect pattern across measures of both discrimination accuracy and response
criterion. In doing so, the authors note that the response criterion effects are
reproduced despite the fact that the model actually holds the response criterion
constant across the stimulus manipulation. Thus, the fluctuation in response
criterion is produced as a function of changes in the distributions of new and old
items across the familiarity continuum, and not as a result of shifts in the location
of the criterion itself. A recent model by Shiffrin and Steyvers (1997) also
reproduced these results and was similarly based on the process of differentiation;
however, some conceptual differences do exist between the two approaches.
With regard to the ORB, McClelland and Chappell's (1998) model suggests
that individuals store own-race faces more accurately and efficiently with respect
to the appropriate featural and configural information represented in memory.
This accuracy and efficiency may be the result of prior experience (or familiarity)
with own-race faces that has led to the ability in attending to the proper invariant
aspects of the face. Other-race faces, on the other hand, appear to be encoded in
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a less efficient manner, in which fewer or inappropriate cues are selected for
storage. When later presented with a recognition task, such differences in encoding result in both differential discrimination accuracy and criterion of responding
to own-race versus other-race faces. However, this apparent difference in response criterion occurs as a byproduct of differentiation processes in which the
underlying distributions of own- and other-race faces shift along the familiarity
continuum. In practical terms, our general familiarity with other-race faces, in the
absence of an appropriate representation of features in memory, leads to differential responding in acknowledging the familiarity of the face. As such, this
apparent difference in response criterion indicates the role of increased variability
in the encoding of featural and/or configural information of other-race faces when
compared with the more consistent (less variable) representation of own-race
faces.
In summary, the mirror-effect pattern across hit and false alarm responses,
together with the associated discrimination accuracy and response criterion effects, suggest a process of differentiation consistent with several recent models of
recognition memory (McClelland & Chappell, 1998; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997).
The implications of this type of model are consistent with the perceptual learning
framework outlined previously, including research on the configural-featural
(Diamond & Carey, 1986; Rhodes et al., 1989) and race-feature hypotheses
(Levin, 1996), as well as the representational model proposed by Valentine and
his colleagues (Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Valentine, 1991). Furthermore, the
importance of prior research on the influence of interracial contact, particularly
with regard to the effects of discrimination training (e.g., Malpass et al., 1973) and
prior experience with other-race faces (Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Li et al.,
1998), are substantiated within this theoretical framework. Although we have
previously discussed the potential importance of response criterion measures in
the ORB based on findings in our lab (Slone et al., 2000), few studies currently
in the literature have documented this effect. Future research that more thoroughly
investigates the importance of response criterion can further distinguish its role in
the differentiation process.
Applied Considerations
From an applied perspective, several issues merit further discussion. First, the
magnitude of the ORB that has been found across many studies, accounting for
15% of the variance in discrimination accuracy, indicates that this is an issue of
considerable practical importance. Although our analyses demonstrated that the
overall magnitude of the effect on discrimination accuracy has decreased over the
past 2 decades, it was also observed that the influence of false alarm responses on
the ORB has actually increased during that same period. We believe this to be of
great practical significance, as it is precisely the existence of false alarms, namely
the erroneous identification of an individual who is not the perpetrator, with which
attorneys, judges, and researchers have been most concerned. For example, a
recent U.S. Department of Justice report focused on 28 cases in which felony
convictions were overturned due to subsequent DNA analyses. In over 85% of
those cases, erroneous eyewitness identifications (i.e., false alarms) were the
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primary evidence that led to the original conviction (Connors, Lundregan, Miller,
& McEwan, 1996).
Second, our moderator analyses indicated that both recognition and lineup
identification tasks yield similar ORB estimates across studies. Although a trend
was present for lineup tasks to demonstrate a larger ORB effect on correct
identifications, more studies involving the use of lineup tasks are needed to better
assess the reliability of this effect. Furthermore, as R. C. Lindsay and Wells
(1983) noted some time ago, it is important that researchers also manipulate the
presence or absence of the target such that they might examine the influence of
diagnosticity (i.e., the ratio of correct identifications to false identifications) in the
other-race lineup situation.
Our moderator analyses also demonstrated that the amount of study time
significantly influenced discrimination accuracy in the ORB, particularly through
an increase in false alarm responses to other-race faces when study time is limited.
Although the application of the laboratory-based term "study time" to the crime
situation may seem forced, it should be noted that many crimes involving
eyewitnesses occur in a matter of seconds (e.g., assaults, murders, some robberies). This short period of time would involve very limited "study time" for the
eyewitness, hence increasing the chances of subsequent false alarms (i.e., mistaken identifications) in cross-race situations.
Moderator analyses also indicated that the length of the retention interval
between study and test influenced the ORB through a change in the response
criterion. More specifically, this effect indicated that as the length of time
increased between study and test, participants increasingly adopted a more liberal
response criterion when responding to other-race faces. This liberal response
criterion indicated that participants required less evidence from memory (e.g.,
familiarity or memorability of the face) to respond that they had previously seen
an other-race face. In actual cases, the time between viewing the suspect at the
crime and later attempting an identification can range between days, weeks,
months, and even years. Given this influence of response criterion, the legal
community should be cautious of cross-race identifications attempted after such
extensive delays.
In the eyewitness literature, researchers have made a distinction between
system variables—those that are, at least in principle, controllable by the criminal
justice system (e.g., interviewing techniques) and estimator variables—those that
can be manipulated experimentally, but that are not controllable in actual cases;
their influence can only be "estimated" post hoc (e.g., the ORB) (Wells, 1978;
Wells, Wright, & Bradfield, 1999). Some have suggested that greater research
attention should be directed toward system variables, because research results
may be more directly applicable to police procedures and legal policy. However,
there is one related aspect of the ORB that does involve system variables, namely
the procedures used in the construction of identification lineups (Brigham, Meissner, & Wasserman, 1999; Brigham & Ready, 1985). Brigham and Ready (1985)
found that race influenced the manner in which individuals constructed lineups,
such that both Blacks and Whites used a looser criterion (i.e., more faces were
seen as similar to each other, and therefore as useful in a lineup) when constructing lineups of other-race faces as compared with constructing own-race lineups.
Hence, there was a tendency to construct fairer lineups (in which the faces were
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actually similar to one another) when working with own-race faces. Further
research on this application of the ORB seems warranted.
Legal "Safeguards" to the ORB in Eyewitness Identification
As we have discussed elsewhere (Brigham, Wasserman, & Meissner, 1999),
several purported "safeguards" are available to defendants accused primarily on
the basis of eyewitness evidence, including cross-examination by defense counsel,
cautionary instructions to jurors, and expert testimony regarding eyewitness
evidence. Although cross-examination has not been shown effective in allowing
jurors to distinguish accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses (R. C. Lindsay, Wells,
& O'Connor, 1989; R. C. Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981), cautionary jury
instructions may have some potential (Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod, 1990; Greene,
1988; Katzev & Wishart, 1985), assuming that they contain accurate information.
Unfortunately, such instructions are typically written by legal scholars who have
little knowledge of the research findings.
What might more appropriate model jury instructions include? Based on the
survey responses of researchers classed as "eyewitness experts" (Kassin et al.,
1989) and the results of research meta-analyses, useful model jury instructions
could summarize the negative impacts of several factors on the accuracy of
eyewitness memory, each of which was listed by over 70% of the experts in the
Kassin et al. survey (see also Leippe, 1995). These include short exposure time,
high stress, misleading postevent information, and biased lineup instructions.
Model instructions could also describe potential problems due to unconscious
transference, cross-race identifications, unfair lineups, and the use of showups.
They could also point out that expressed confidence or certainty about an identification is not a strong indicator of accuracy (Bothwell, Deffenbacher, &
Brigham, 1987; Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995).
The most commonly cited jury instructions are likely those in United States
v. Telfaire (1972), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
endorsed the use of a cautionary instruction on eyewitness evidence. The Telfaire
instructions state that the juror should evaluate whether the witness "had the
capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the defendant," and whether the
witness's identification "was the product of his [sic] own recollection." Jurors are
told that they may also take into account "the strength of the identification
[certainty]," whether the identification "may have been influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to him [sic] for identification,"
and the "length of time that lapsed between the occurrence of the crime and the
next opportunity of the witness to see the defendant" (Cutler & Penrod, 1995, pp.
255-256).
Although Telfaire was seen by some as a positive step, researchers have noted
many shortcomings. For example, the instructions fail to specify in which direction each factor should influence an evaluation of the eyewitness. Furthermore,
the Telfaire decision was based largely on the five factors listed by the Supreme
Court in Neil v. Diggers (1972). These factors included (a) the witness's opportunity to view the suspect during the crime, (b) the length of time between the
crime and the subsequent identification, (c) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness during the identification, (d) the (apparent) accuracy of the witness's
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prior description of the suspect, and (e) the witness's degree of attention during
the crime. However, only two of these five factors have been clearly supported by
research findings (see Brigham, Wasserman, & Meissner, 1999), namely opportunity to view the suspect and the retention interval between viewing and identification of the suspect. Finally, many factors shown by research to be relevant to
eyewitness accuracy, such as the ORB, stress, weapon focus, lineup bias, and so
forth, are not mentioned in the Telfaire instructions.3
On a more positive note, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently held that in
cases involving a cross-race identification, the defendant is entitled to jury
instructions specifically warning jurors about the potential for misidentification of
other-race persons (State v. Cromedy, 1999). In this case, a Black intruder
sexually assaulted a White college student in her apartment. Eight months later the
victim saw a man on the street whom she believed to be her assailant. The man
was immediately picked up, and the woman identified him 15 min later in a
one-person "showup." It is interesting to note that the victim had failed to identify
the same man from a photograph lineup only 2 days after the initial assault! The
New Jersey Supreme Court, citing in its decision some of the studies included in
our meta-analysis, ruled that a cross-race identification, as a subset of eyewitness
identification, requires a special jury instruction in the appropriate case. Namely,
the instruction should be given when the cross-racial identification is a critical
issue in the case, especially when other evidence does not corroborate it. Unfortunately, the instruction advocated by the New Jersey Supreme Court was not
directional. The instruction indicated that jurors "may consider, if you think it is
appropriate to do so, whether the cross-racial nature of the identification has
affected the accuracy of the witness's original perception and/or accuracy of a
subsequent identification," without indicating what that effect might be.
With regard to expert testimony, the present meta-analysis results provide
additional material that could be presented by an eyewitness expert in cases
involving disputed eyewitness evidence. The present findings provide strong
evidence of the reliability of the ORB effect, based on the responses of almost
5,000 respondents. The analyses yield meaningful indexes of the strength of the
effect, namely that it accounts for 15% of the variance in discrimination accuracy
or, alternatively, that participants were over 2.2 times as likely to accurately
identify own-race faces as new versus old, when compared with performance on
other-race faces. The findings indicate that the majority of errors for other-race
faces are false alarms, that is, incorrectly identifying an other-race face as having
been seen before. This is the type of error that is generally seen as most harmful
in a crime situation. The results show that the ORB is not related to the level of
racial prejudice. Finally, factors such as study time and retention interval play an
important role in determining when the ORB is most likely to occur.
Given both the reliability of the ORB shown in the present analysis (especially with regard to false alarm responses) and the general agreement among
researchers regarding the importance of the phenomenon (Kassin et al., 1989;
3
In his concurring opinion in Telfaire, Chief Judge Bazelon urged that juries be warned of the
pitfalls of cross-racial identification. Unfortunately, this caution was not included in the final version
of the instructions.
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Yarmey & Jones, 1983), we advocate the use of expert testimony in cases
involving disputed cross-racial eyewitness evidence. Although prior research has
demonstrated that the factors influencing eyewitness testimony often reach beyond jurors' common knowledge (Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; Devenport, Penrod, & Cutler, 1997), the courts have often prohibited expert testimony on
eyewitness identification, including the ORB (e.g., People v. Dixon, 1980; United
States v. Hudson, 1989; United States v. Watson, 1978), ruling that such testimony
would not be helpful to jurors. However, in a recent case, United States v.
Norwood (1996), the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey ruled in
support of expert testimony on cross-racial identification, along with several other
factors. In its decision, the court reasoned that such expert testimony would not
confuse or overwhelm the jury. Rather, the "defendant's expert's proposed
testimony regarding cross-racial identification was sufficiently tied to facts of
[the] case and would be helpful to [the] jury" (p. 1133). The decision relied
heavily on the 1985 United States v. Downing decision, which held that such
expert testimony should (a) properly "fit" the particular features of the case, (b)
be based on reliable scientific principles, and (c) not confuse or overwhelm the
jury. Expert testimony on cross-racial identifications was also found to be helpful
to the jury in United States v. Stevens (1984) and United States v. Smith (1984).
In closing, the present meta-analysis has yielded many intriguing findings that
appear both to bolster our current understanding of the mechanisms responsible
for the ORB effect and to illuminate new directions for future research. We
believe that previous research has sufficiently underscored the robustness of the
phenomenon and illustrated the potential for moderator variables in defining its
limits. The current analysis sought only to bring together these findings and to
discuss the potential for various theoretical frameworks that might account for the
pattern of results across studies. Overall, the ORB was found to be a reliable and
generalizable phenomenon, deserving of further theoretical consideration. Moreover, the strong influence of false identifications in the ORB indicates that this
issue is of great practical importance as well.
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THE ROLE OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
EVIDENCE IN FELONY CASE DISPOSITIONS
Heather D. Flowe
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and Ebbe B. Ebbesen
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University of California, San Diego
We addressed the question of whether felony case dispositions are associated with
eyewitness identification evidence. Toward this end, 725 felony cases (rape, robbery, and assault) were randomly sampled from the archives of a District Attorney’s
Office in a large south-western city in the United States. A positive identification
was present more often in accepted compared to rejected cases, although the
association was significant in acquaintance cases (i.e., cases in which one or more
of the eyewitnesses was familiar with the defendant), not stranger cases. Additionally, suspect and crime incident factors were associated with case issuing outcomes
to a larger extent than eyewitness identification evidence. Analyses further indicated
that eyewitness identification evidence was stronger in prosecuted compared to
rejected cases in which eyewitness testimony was the sole evidence against the
defendant. Neither the presence of multiple identifications nor nonidentifications of
the suspect varied across issuing outcomes. The findings are discussed in relation to
additional research that is needed at the police and prosecution stages to advance
public policy development with respect to the evaluation of eyewitness identification evidence by prosecutors.
Keywords: witnesses, lineups, legal processes, legal evidence, legal testimony

The connection between erroneous eyewitness identification evidence and wrongful convictions has been the motivating force behind much research in forensic
psychology (Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006). In analyses of cases in which inmates
were later exonerated, erroneous eyewitness identification has been cited as the
primary reason for the wrongful convictions (e.g., Borchard, 1933; Connors, Lundregan, Miller, & McEwen, 1996; Gross et al., 2005). Wrongful conviction cases may
signal that prosecutors are not screening out cases that have weak eyewitness identification evidence. What is more, perhaps cases with eyewitness identification evidence are more likely to be prosecuted than otherwise would be the case, regardless
of whether there is other case evidence to implicate the suspect.
The overarching goal of the present study was to examine the role that
eyewitness identification evidence plays in felony issuing decisions. The research
was carried out in one of the largest District Attorney’s Office in the United
States, which serves a population equal to about 3 million people. Laboratory
research has played a strong and important role in identifying factors that can
affect the reliability of memory. This body of research has served as the foundation for the development of best practice guidelines for administering lineups in
This article was published Online First October 18, 2010.
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criminal cases (Wells et al., 2000). We have accumulated limited systematic
empirical knowledge, however, of eyewitness identification evidence in actual
cases in the United States. Most of what we do know has been gathered from
analyses of cases that were not randomly sampled (e.g., Behrman & Davey,
2001). Such cases may not be representative of the types of cases that prosecutors
typically evaluate. Consequently, we do not know the types of cases in which
eyewitness identification plays an instrumental role in implicating the suspect,
whether legal officials assess the strength of eyewitness identification evidence, or
whether eyewitness identification evidence affects the decision to prosecute once
other case factors are taken into account. Descriptive information of this sort is
important because it may profitably lead to additional studies that can further
guide public policy development with respect to improving the reliability of
eyewitness identification evidence that is used to prosecute defendants. In the
sections that follow, we review archival research on prosecutorial decision making and provide an overview of the factors that can affect the accuracy of
eyewitness memory. The specific aims of this archival study are then presented.
Archival Research on Felony Issuing Decisions
Prosecutors have the discretion to determine whether a suspect will be charged
and what charges the suspect should face (Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 1978). Prosecutors
also have a legal and ethical obligation to protect felony suspects who are not just
innocent-in-fact, but who are also innocent-in-law (California District Attorneys
Association, 1996). Charges should not be filed even if the prosecutor has a personal
belief in the suspect’s guilt. Rather, issuing decisions should be guided by whether the
evidence in the case is legally sufficient and admissible. Previous archival research
has found that felony charges are more likely to be issued if there is physical evidence
to support the allegations (Albonetti, 1987; Feeney, Dill, & Weir, 1983; Jacoby,
Mellon, Ratledge, & Turner, 1982; Miller, 1969; Nagel, & Hagan, 1983) and if the
crime is serious, such as when a victim has been injured (Kingsnorth, MacIntosh, &
Sutherland, 2002). Factors that may lead prosecutors to not file charges include: A
primary aggressor has not been identified (e.g., the California Primary Aggressor Law
requires a primary aggressor be identified), the suspect is thought to be innocent, or
there are “interests of justice” concerns, such as the suspect will provide testimony in
a more serious case (Silberman, 1978). Despite the fact that much research has been
carried out examining the relationship between evidentiary factors and felony issuing
decisions, little is known about the role that eyewitness identification evidence may
play in prosecution.
Eyewitness Identification Evidence and Felony Issuing
The prosecution of cases in which eyewitness identification is the sole
evidence linking the suspect to the crime may raise serious concerns. Metaanalytic reviews of the large body of laboratory research on eyewitness identification indicates that there are several factors that can reduce the accuracy of face
recognition, including: relatively shorter durations of exposure to the culprit
(Shapiro & Penrod, 1986), weapon exposure (Steblay, 1992), stress (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty, 2004), if the culprit is of a different race
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than the eyewitness, a factor which is known as own race bias or the cross race
effect (Meissner & Brigham, 2001); relatively longer retention intervals between
the crime and the identification test (Shapiro & Penrod, 1986), and the type of
procedure that is used to test the eyewitness’ memory (Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, &
Lindsay, 2003). These results indicate that the validity of the eyewitness identification evidence can be influenced by the circumstances of the crime and the
identification test. Arguably, therefore, legal officials should be cautious about
prosecuting individuals when there is only eyewitness identification evidence to
tie the suspect to the crime.
Survey research suggests that prosecutors may not be sufficiently sensitive to
the factors that can affect eyewitness accuracy (Brigham, 1981). Other research
finds that the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence is more favorably
viewed by jurors, judges, and the police compared to eyewitness memory experts
(e.g., Benton et al., 2006; Magnussen, Melinder, Stridbeck, & Raja, 2009).
Therefore, felony charging may be more likely in cases that have eyewitness
identification evidence because the evidence persuades a prosecutor of the suspect’s guilt or because the prosecutor believes the evidence will persuade a jury
of the defendant’s guilt. Only a single study, to our knowledge, has examined the
role that eyewitness identification evidence plays in felony charging. The study
surveyed prosecutors asking them to estimate how often they processed cases in
which eyewitness identification was the critical piece of evidence linking the
defendant to the crime (Goldstein, Chance, & Schneller, 1989). Prosecutors
estimated on average that 3% of the time they encountered such cases. More
systematic data, however, is needed to further address the association between
eyewitness identification evidence and case prosecution.
Once felony charges are issued against a defendant, procedural safeguards
that might be available at the trial stage to protect innocent defendants from being
convicted on the basis of erroneous eyewitness identification evidence may be
ineffective. Previous research suggests that procedural safeguards, such motions
to suppress identification evidence at trial, the cross-examination of eyewitnesses,
and cautionary instructions to the jury regarding eyewitness evidence (see Devenport, Kimbrough, & Cutler, 2009, for a review), may not adequately protect
defendants who have been mistakenly identified. Furthermore, most defendants in
the criminal justice system are convicted on the basis of a plea bargain agreement
(Piehl & Bushway, 2007; U.S. Department of Justice, 2001), and as such, the
reliability of the eyewitness identification evidence will not be evaluated by a
judge or a jury in the vast majority of cases. Thus, there is a need to describe the
extent to which eyewitness identification evidence plays a role at earlier stages of
the criminal justice system, such as at the arrest and prosecution stages.
Goals of the Present Study
In the jurisdiction under study, the Uniform Crime Charging Standards
(California District Attorney’s Association, 1996), hereafter referred to as UCCS,
provide basic criteria to assist prosecutors in determining whether a suspect
should face felony charges. The criteria are not legally binding and are meant to
assist prosecutors in their exercise of discretion. The criteria recommend prosecutors charge a case only when the following four basic criteria are met: (a) the
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evidence shows suspect is guilty of the crime to be charged, (b) there is legally
sufficient and admissible evidence corpus delicti, whereby the prosecutor can
reasonably argue that a substantial crime—affecting significantly the personal or
property rights of others— has been committed, (c) there is legally sufficient and
admissible evidence of the suspect’s identity, and (d) there is a reasonable
probability of a conviction in view of the evidence and the foreseeable defense
that could be raised.
Given this background, we tested whether charges were issued more often
when a case had eyewitness identification evidence, all else being equal. Cases
that were forwarded by the police to the District Attorney’s Office for prosecution
were analyzed to examine the relationship between felony issuing decisions and
case characteristics, including suspect, crime, and eyewitness factors. The factors
recorded from the case file included: physical evidence, crime severity, prior
record, arrest at the scene of the crime, suspect admittance to the crime, and
eyewitness identification evidence.
The second aim was to test whether the quality of identification evidence
varied in relation to felony issuing outcomes. The U. S. Supreme Court has
established criteria, which are commonly referred to as the Biggers criteria, for
inferring the accuracy of an eyewitness’ identification (Neil v. Biggers, 1972).
The Biggers criteria are: the degree to which the eyewitness paid attention to the
culprit, the length of time between the crime and the identification test, the
eyewitness’ identification certainty, the quality of the view that the eyewitness had
of the culprit, and the degree to which the suspect matches the eyewitness’
description. Previous research has indicated that layperson evaluations regarding
the validity of eyewitness evidence relate to the Biggers criteria in a summative
fashion (Bradfield & Wells, 2000). The present study extended this work by
testing whether cases that are issued for felony prosecution are perceived to have
stronger eyewitness identification evidence compared to those that are rejected.
The degree to which the Biggers criteria allow for making a strong inference
about the accuracy of an identification has been called into question by psychologists (e.g., Wells & Murray, 1983). Therefore, it is important to point out that we
are not endorsing the use of these criteria for establishing eyewitness identification strength. Rather, the aim is to test whether these factors might influence
prosecutor perceptions of eyewitness identification evidence strength.
The third aim was to test whether eyewitness identification evidence is
stronger in prosecuted versus rejected cases in which eyewitness testimony served
as the sole evidence against the suspect. The UCCS provide further guidance to
prosecutors regarding cases in which eyewitness testimony is the sole evidence
linking the accused to the crime. The UCCS advise that in such cases the
prosecutor should generally charge only when: (a) there is no opportunity for
mistake because the eyewitness(es) know the suspect, (b) the eyewitness(es) had
a substantial opportunity to have observed the culprit, (c) the investigative
standards have been satisfied and the eyewitness(es) can furnish an adequate
description of the accused, and (d) a line up has been conducted.
In light of these guidelines, we tested whether cases in which eyewitness
identification evidence was the sole evidence against the suspect had stronger
eyewitness identification evidence than other cases. Additionally, we examined
whether photo arrays were more common in eyewitness identification only cases.
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In particular, the rate of prosecution was compared for cases that had live show-up
compared to photo array identifications. In a live show-up procedure, the police
present a single suspect in vivo to the eyewitness for identification at the scene of
the crime, whereas in a photo array procedure, the suspect’s photograph is
presented to the eyewitness imbedded among photographs of distractor persons.
The validity of a suspect identification from a live show-up is more difficult to
assess compared to a suspect identification from a photo array. A positive
identification from a show-up may result from guessing alone, whereas the odds
that a suspect is identified from a photo array based on guessing alone are reduced
by virtue of there being distractor persons (Steblay et al., 2003). If prosecutors
scrutinize the strength of eyewitness identification evidence in deciding whether
to issue charges, then perhaps charges are issued more often in cases that have
photo array compared live show-up identification evidence.
The fourth and final aim was to test whether prosecuted cases were more
likely than rejected cases to have multiple eyewitnesses that identified the police
suspect. The likelihood that the suspect is guilty should theoretically increase as
the number of positive identifications in a case increases. Additionally, Clark and
Wells (2008) demonstrated that nonidentifications of the suspect affect the odds
that the suspect is guilty to a larger extent than do multiple positive identifications.
In view of their findings, we also tested whether nonidentifications of the suspect
covaried with charging decisions.
Finally, the analyses of the cases were conditioned on whether any of the
eyewitnesses had been previously acquainted with the suspect. Stranger cases, in
which none of the eyewitnesses are acquainted with the perpetrator, arguably carry a
greater risk of wrongful conviction because of mistaken eyewitness identification.
However, cases that involved an identification of the suspect by an acquaintance were
not excluded from the sample because even in acquaintance cases the defendant may
have been mistakenly identified. To illustrate, eyewitness experts are called to testify
by the defense about eyewitness errors in cases in which the suspect was positively
identified from a lineup or a show-up by an acquaintance (e.g., People v. Aguilar,
2008; People v. Cummings, 2009; People v. Figueroa, 2008; People v. Guerra, 2009;
People v. Hernandez, 2004; People v. Ledesma, 2006; People v. Lopez, 2004; People
v. Magana, 2003; People v. Robles, 2009; People v. Rountree, 2005; People v.
Rubalcava, 2005; People v. Trujillo, 2009; Smith v. Smith, 2003; State of Washington
v. Riofta, 2003; United States v. Burton, 1998; United States v. James, 2001).
Although the eyewitness was acquainted with the defendant (e.g., lived in the same
neighborhood, went to the same high school, lived in the same building) at issue in
these cases was whether the eyewitness’ perception of the culprit was affected by
variables such as stress, the presence of a weapon, or the witness being of a different
race than the defendant. Additionally, inclusion of acquaintance cases is needed to
calculate the overall prosecution rate for stranger cases in which eyewitness identification evidence is the sole evidence implicating the suspect.
Method
Case Selection
Felony cases (rape n ⫽ 302, robbery n ⫽ 239, and assault n ⫽ 184) were
randomly sampled from the District Attorney’s closed (no appeal pending) case
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archives (1991–2000), which included cases that the DA accepted or rejected for
prosecution (36% of the cases sampled were rejected). The sample was comprised
of adult suspects that had been arrested for violating specific sections of the
California Penal Code.1 Basing the sampling scheme on specific sections of the
Penal Code ensured that the cases within a given crime category were relatively
homogenous with respect to perpetrators and victims. For example, none of the
rape cases included child victims or statutory rape allegations. These crime
categories were selected because they are violent felonies and were thought likely
to have eyewitness identification evidence.
The arrest rates for rapes (45%), robberies (34%), and assaults (72%) for this
city during the study period were comparable to national arrest rates (51, 25, and
56%, respectively) (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
1996). Moreover, with respect to issuing decisions across the cases in the
population from which we sampled, we determined that the prosecutor issued
felony charges 56% of the time in rape and 88% of the time in robbery, which is
comparable to previous estimates (U.S. Department of Justice, 1998) of prosecutorial charging rates (54 and 73%, respectively); the prosecution rate for assault
was 68%, which is a rate that is higher than a previous estimate (34%) (U.S.
Department of Justice, 1998).
Among prosecuted cases (n ⫽ 465), 73% of defendants pleaded guilty, 16%
of defendants went to trial (84% were found guilty on one or more charges), and
all charges were eventually dismissed for the remaining 12% of defendants.
Defendants were convicted on average of 43% (M ⫽ 0.43) of the original charges
(SD ⫽ 0.35; range: 0.00-.1.00, Median ⫽ 0.33).
Materials
A case file typically contained police records, the preliminary trial transcript,
the probation officer’s assessment of the defendant’s personal history and the
sentencing agreement. A total of 46 research assistants coded the cases and were
provided with detailed (written and verbal) instructions, as well as a number of
practice cases to code. The reliability of the coding was examined by having more
than one person code a random subset of the cases in the sample, as well as by
having the first author on the study check every coding form for consistency and
completeness. As might be expected given the basic level of coding, agreement
between coders was extremely high (e.g., 100% for crime type, 100% for
eyewitness identification procedure type; 100% for both eyewitness and suspect
1
Rape was defined as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse
of the perpetrator” under conditions in which a person is incapable of giving consent or is prevented
from resisting, or under conditions in which the sexual intercourse is accomplished “against a
person’s will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury on the person or another,” according to California Penal Code, section 261. Cases involving
victims under the age of 18 were not sampled. Assault cases were defined as the alleged use of a
deadly weapon (that includes firearm or semiautomatic weapons) or force to produce great bodily
injury according to the California Penal Code Section 245 (1 and 2, a– d). Robbery was defined as
“the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate
presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear” according to section 211 of
the California Penal Code.
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race; 98% for identification retention interval; 96% for physical evidence). Disagreements were resolved between coders before the data were entered for
analysis.
Measures
Felony case issuing served as the primary outcome measure, with felony
charges filed by the DA in 68% of the sampled rape cases, 73% of sampled
robbery cases, and 45% of sampled assault cases. The predictors coded included
suspect, crime incident and eyewitness variables.
The suspect characteristics coded were: Suspect age (continuous variable),
gender (man ⫽ 1 or woman ⫽ 0), race (White ⫽ 1 or Non-White ⫽ 0) and
whether the suspect had any prior felony convictions (yes ⫽ 1 or no ⫽ 0). Crime
incident factors that were coded included: crime type, (rape, robbery, or assault);
suspect admittance to the crime (yes ⫽ 1 or no ⫽ 0); physical evidence implicating the suspect (0 or 1, with 0 indicating no evidence and 1 indicating there was
at least one piece of physical evidence, including: stolen property recovered, the
weapon was found, biological evidence matched suspect); whether the suspect
was arrested at the crime scene (yes ⫽ 1 or no ⫽ 0); and crime severity (0 or 1,
with 1 indicating cases in which the victim was injured and/or the perpetrator used
a weapon).
The eyewitness variables that were assessed in relation to charging decisions
included: whether any identification procedure had been conducted (yes ⫽ 1 or
no ⫽ 0); whether any positive identification of the suspect had been made by an
eyewitness (yes ⫽ 1 or no ⫽ 0); whether there were any eyewitnesses in the case
who did not identify the suspect when given the opportunity (yes ⫽ 1 or no ⫽ 0);
the number of eyewitnesses in the case who made a positive eyewitness identification; the proportion of eyewitnesses who made a positive eyewitness identification; type of identification procedure conducted (live show-up, photo show-up,
photo array, both show-up and photo array, or other); and whether the suspect was
a stranger to all of the eyewitnesses in the case (yes ⫽ 1 or no ⫽ 0). We also
coded whether all of the eyewitnesses in the case were of a different race than the
culprit (yes ⫽ 1 or no ⫽ 0) because Gross et al. (2005) found that cross race
identification errors were common in erroneous convictions (cf Flowe, Finklea, &
Ebbesen, 2009).
Six measures related to the Biggers criteria for evaluating the strength of an
eyewitness identification that may have affected charging decisions were derived
from the files, including whether the eyewitnesses viewed the culprit from head
on (as opposed to having only a side or back view of the culprit), proximity of the
eyewitness(es) to the culprit, retention interval length between the crime and the
identification test(s), lighting conditions during the crime, eyewitness identification confidence, and the degree to which the eyewitness description(s) matched
the suspect. Each of these indicators, which are described in detail below, was
derived from the files as a dichotomous variable to reflect the memory strength
that might be expected given the circumstances; data were coded as 1 or 0, with
1 reflecting the expectation that memory strength would be relatively better under
the given circumstance. Descriptive statistics for the raw data on which the coding
of the strength indicators was based are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1
Raw Descriptive Statistics and Coding Outcomes for the Eyewitness
Strength Indicator Variables

Strength indicators
Viewed culprit head-on
Proximity
Retention interval
Lighting
Confidence
Number of descriptors

N
257
272
270
259
243
185

Raw data descriptive statistics
Median
Mean
Range
n/a
n/a
n/a
1 foot
32.75 inches 0–2400 inches
2.88 days
7 days
0–90 days
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
10
10.54
0–22

Code
assigned
(proportion
of N)
0
1
0.01 0.99
0.36 0.64
0.42 0.58
0.18 0.82
0.09 0.91
0.35 0.65

If all of the eyewitnesses in the case viewed the culprit head on, the case was
assigned a value of 1; otherwise, the case was assigned to a 0 to indicate that the
viewing angle was from only the back or the side of the culprit for one or more
of the eyewitnesses. For the proximity variable, if more than one eyewitness was
tested in a case, the median value across the eyewitnesses in the case was
computed to measure proximity; when proximity was averaged across all suspects, the median was 1 foot. Cases in which the identifying eyewitness(es) were
a foot or less away from the culprit were assigned a value of 1, indicating that the
eyewitnesses were close in proximity to the culprit, whereas the remaining cases
were assigned a value of 0 to indicate that the culprit was relatively more remote
for one or more of the eyewitnesses. If the information needed to code proximity
was not explicitly provided in the report, the coder estimated the value of the
variable if there was adequate information for so doing in the eyewitness’
statement to the police.
Cases in which the eyewitness(es) attempted an identification of the culprit
within 24 hours of the crime were assigned a value of 1, indicating a relatively
short retention interval length, and cases in which the identifications took place
more than 24 hr after the crime were assigned a value of 0 to indicate a longer
retention interval length. The lighting conditions the eyewitness(es) had while
viewing the crime were coded based on the police report for every case. If the
crime took place either outside in broad daylight or inside in a well-lit room, the
case was assigned a value of 1. Otherwise, if the crime took place outside in
the dark, under street lamps, or in a dimly lit or darkened room, the case was
assigned a value of 0. If all of the eyewitnesses in the case made a statement
indicating that they were certain about their identification of the defendant (as
opposed to indicating that the defendant resembled the culprit to some degree but
they were not certain he or she actually was the culprit), the case was assigned a
1 to indicate that all of the eyewitnesses were confident in their identifications. If
any of the witnesses was not positive, the case was assigned a 0 to indicate that
the eyewitness(es) were relatively less confident. These factors were measured to
examine whether they were associated with charging decisions.
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Eyewitness descriptions of the suspect were obtained from the police crime
incident report, which has a standard section for collecting 22 descriptors of the
culprit’s physical appearance (e.g., age, gender, race, height, weight, build, eye color,
hair color, hair length, hair type, hair style, facial hair, complexion). The data are
collected in a recognition format, as every physical descriptor is accompanied by
response options on the form. For instance, with respect to the build of the suspect,
eyewitnesses can indicate whether he is stocky, muscular, thin, etc. When the
suspect is arrested, the police complete an identical description checklist on the
arrest report. The correspondence between the description of the culprit given by
the eyewitness and the description of the suspect given by police was determined
for every descriptor (match vs. no match2) and the average degree of correspondence was determined for every witness. If there was more than one eyewitness
in the case who gave a description of the suspect, the correspondence scores were
averaged across eyewitnesses to create a single measure of description correspondence for each case. The data across cases were then subjected to a median split
(median ⫽ 75% correspondence). Cases that were equal to or above the median were
scored a value of 1 to indicate a relatively high degree of correspondence between the
eyewitness descriptions and the suspect, whereas the remaining cases were scored a
value of 0 to indicate a low degree of correspondence.
Overall eyewitness identification evidence strength was computed for every
case by summing across the individual strength indices. Scores could range from
0 to 6, with 6 indicating the highest degree of strength possible on the scale.
Cases that pose the greatest risk for erroneous conviction based on mistaken
eyewitness identification—and therefore, should be less likely to involve a decision to prosecute—were identified using the following criteria. First, cases in
which none of the eyewitnesses were previously acquainted with the defendant
(i.e., stranger cases) were identified. Second, within the subsample of stranger
cases, cases that had eyewitness identification evidence alone and cases that had
eyewitness identification evidence with limited corroboration were identified.
Cases that had eyewitness identification evidence alone were defined as cases that
did not have any physical evidence or any suspect behavioral evidence that might
be indicative of guilt, including admittance to the current offense and/or a prior
felony conviction. Cases that had eyewitness identification evidence with limited
corroboration were defined as cases that did not have physical evidence but that
did have suspect behavioral evidence that might be indicative of guilt, including
admittance to the current offense and/or a prior felony conviction.
Results
Preliminary Results
Suspect and crime incident profile. Table 2 provides descriptive characteristics for each crime category and for the overall case sample (see Total column).
With respect to the overall sample, suspects were typically male (93% of cases), 29
2
The descriptors were coded as matching using the following criteria: age values within ⫾5
years, height within ⫾2 inches, and weight within ⫾10 pounds, and the remaining descriptors had
to correspond exactly to be coded as a match.
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Rape
Prosecution

Robbery
Prosecution

Total
Prosecution

Variable
Mean
N Mean
N Mean
N Mean
N
Suspect characteristics
Ageb
33.1
0.12
154 29.2
⫺0.08
266 26.9
⫺0.15ⴱ
220 29.4
⫺0.10ⴱ
640
a
Male
0.90
0.12
154
0.99
0.18
266
0.89
⫺0.02
223
0.93
0.08ⴱ
643
Whitea
0.39
0.00
155
0.28
⫺0.13ⴱ
260
0.25
0.06
217
0.29
⫺0.06
632
Prior felony recorda
0.53
0.60ⴱⴱⴱ
184
0.49
0.33ⴱⴱⴱ
301
0.63
0.35ⴱⴱⴱ
239
0.55
0.40ⴱⴱⴱ
724
Incident characteristics
Severity1
0.77
0.28ⴱⴱⴱ
184
0.75
0.51ⴱⴱⴱ
302
0.65
0.28ⴱⴱⴱ
239
0.69
0.31ⴱⴱⴱ
725
Physical evidencea
0.52
0.23ⴱⴱ
184
0.46
0.38ⴱⴱⴱ
302
0.44
0.17ⴱ
239
0.47
0.25ⴱⴱⴱ
725
Suspect admita
0.39
0.12
184
0.41
0.47ⴱⴱⴱ
302
0.27
0.11
239
0.36
0.24ⴱⴱⴱ
725
Suspect arrested at
crime scenea
0.29
⫺0.28ⴱⴱⴱ
184
0.10
0.06
302
0.21
⫺0.02
239
0.18
⫺0.10ⴱ
725
Eyewitness characteristics
All strangers to
suspecta
0.29
0.11
184
0.12
0.08
302
0.62
0.27ⴱⴱⴱ
239
0.33
0.16ⴱⴱⴱ
725
a
ⴱⴱⴱ
ⴱ
Any positive IDs
0.29
0.29
184
0.22
0.09
302
0.53
0.14
239
0.34
0.17ⴱⴱⴱ
725
Number of positive
IDsb
1.36
0.19
61
1.11
0.03
70
1.35
0.00
139
1.29
0.05
270
Any non-IDs of
suspecta
0.21
⫺0.17
61
0.08
0.16
70
0.21
0.04
139
0.18
0.00
270
Proportion of positive
IDsb
0.83
0.19
61
0.93
⫺0.15
70
0.84
⫺0.02
139
0.86
0.02
270
Cross race
eyewitnessesa
0.32
0.21ⴱ
184
0.30
0.18ⴱ
302
0.52
0.20ⴱ
239
0.30
0.21ⴱⴱⴱ
725
a
Variable is dichotomous, coded as “1” if present and “0” if absent; therefore, the mean equals the proportion of N cases in which the factor
was equal to 1. b Variable is continuous.
ⴱ
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). ⴱⴱ Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). ⴱⴱⴱ Correlation is
significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).

Assault
Prosecution

Table 2
Descriptive Characteristics of Sample and Zero-Order Correlations With Felony Case Prosecution by Crime Type
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years of age (range: 16 –79 years), and were about equally likely to be White (30%),
Black (33%), or Hispanic (32%) (6% were classified as Native American, Asian or as
belonging to other racial categories). More than half of the suspects had a previous
felony conviction (range: 0 –22 felony convictions) and the majority (67%) were
acquainted with one or more of the eyewitnesses in the case.
Felony charging was positively associated with the suspect having a prior
felony conviction. Not surprisingly, given the crime categories coded, most often
the criminal action in question was severe, as 69% of the suspects were alleged
to have used a weapon and/or to have injured a victim. Cases that were accepted
for prosecution were more likely to have severe circumstances compared to
rejected cases. About half of the cases had physical evidence that tied the suspect
to the crime, and the presence of physical evidence was associated with an
increased likelihood of prosecution. In one-third of the cases the suspect admitted
to the crime. Admittance to the crime was positively associated with prosecution
in only rape cases.
A total of 237 defendants were classified as stranger cases. For 153 of these
defendants (64%) there was at least one eyewitness who was given an identification test; 7% of the stranger cases (16/237) were eyewitness identification alone
cases, and the suspect was charged with a felony 56% of the time (9/16). Among
these defendants, 6 pleaded guilty, 1 was found guilty at trial, and the charges
were dropped in 2 cases. An additional 20% of the stranger cases (48/237) were
eyewitness identification evidence with limited corroborating evidence cases.
Felony charges were issued in 83% of these cases (40/48). Among these defendants, 31 pleaded guilty, 8 were found guilty at trial, and the charges were
dropped in 1 case. Therefore, across cases in which the suspect was prosecuted
(n ⫽ 465), 2% (16/465) were eyewitness identification alone cases, and 9%
(40/465) were eyewitness identification evidence with limited corroborating evidence cases.
Eyewitness identification evidence profile.
Table 2 also presents the
proportion of cases for which any positive identification of the suspect was made,
whether by an acquaintance or a stranger. Across the sample, one out of every
three suspects had positive ID evidence in their case. Having had at least one
positive identification of the suspect by an eyewitness was positively associated
with felony issuing for every crime type.
The association between positive identification evidence and case issuing
decisions was examined next. At least one eyewitness made an identification of
the suspect in 64% of stranger cases (115/179) and in 50% of rejected cases
(29/58); the association between case issuing and positive identification evidence
was marginally statistically significant in stranger cases, 2(1) ⫽ 3.16, p ⫽ .07.
In acquaintance cases, 33% of accepted cases (71/286) and 14% (30/202) of
rejected cases had a positive identification of the suspect by at least one eyewitness. The association between case issuing and positive suspect identification was
statistically significant in acquaintance cases, 2(1) ⫽ 6.58, p ⬍ .05.
An identification test was likelier under the following circumstances: there
was physical evidence implicating the suspect (r ⫽ .10, p ⬍ .05, two-tailed); the
suspect had a prior record (r ⫽ .13, p ⬍ .0001, two-tailed); the suspect did not
admit to the crime (r ⫽ .13, p ⬍ .0001, two-tailed); none of the eyewitnesses
knew the suspect (r ⫽ .38, p ⬍ .0001, two-tailed); all of the eyewitnesses were
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cross race with respect to the suspect (r ⫽ .23, p ⬍ .0001, two-tailed); and the
suspect was caught at the crime scene (r ⫽ .38, p ⬍ .0001, two-tailed). None of
the other suspect or crime incident factors were associated with whether an
identification test was performed.
Table 3 provides additional information about the characteristics of the
identification tests, conditioning the results by acquaintance (n ⫽ 120) versus
stranger (n ⫽ 153) ID cases. Suspects presented for identification appeared largely
in live show-ups followed by photo arrays for both stranger and acquaintance
cases.
Eyewitness Evidence and the Decision to Prosecute as a Felony
Table 4 reports the findings from two separate models that examine the
likelihood of prosecution in relation to suspect, crime incident, and eyewitness
variables. A separate model was performed for stranger and acquaintance cases.
Logistic regression analysis was used because the outcome variable is dichotomous (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989). The eyewitness evidence variable included
in the analyses was whether there was a positive identification in the case because
the univariate results indicated that this eyewitness measure was the one that was
most strongly related to case issuing outcomes. As the number of cases was not
large, the variables included in the analysis were only those that were found to
have a strong univariate relationship with case issuing (see Table 2). Crime type
was also entered into the models using reference cell coding, with robbery as the
reference category. Robbery was designated as the reference category because the
descriptive analysis presented earlier (see Table 2) indicated that the characteristics of assault and rape cases were more similar to each other than they were
with robbery cases.
Stranger cases. A model with the predictors significantly fit the data better
than a model without any predictors, 2(7) ⫽ 73.92, p ⬍ .01. The odds that a
suspect was charged with a felony were about 8 times higher if the suspect had a
prior record. Admittance to the crime and physical evidence also increased the
odds that the case was prosecuted. Felony charges were less likely to be brought
in assault compared to robbery cases; felony issuing did not differ for rape
compared to robbery cases. Positive eyewitness identification evidence was associated with an increase in the odds that a case was prosecuted, but the
association was not significant (p ⫽ .14). The overall model correctly predicted
55% of cases that were rejected and 97% of cases that were prosecuted.

Table 3
Eyewitness Identification Procedure Distributions for Stranger
and Acquaintance Cases
ID Procedure
Live show-up
Photo array
Multiple
Other

Stranger (n ⫽ 153)
0.59
0.30
0.05
0.06

Acquaintance (n ⫽ 120)
0.50
0.41
0.02
0.08
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Table 4
Logit Estimates of Suspect, Incident, and Eyewitness Variables on Likelihood
of Prosecution for Stranger and Acquaintance Cases
Variable
Suspect characteristics
Prior felony record
Suspect admit
Incident characteristics
Severity
Physical evidence
Crime type
Assault
Rape
Eyewitness characteristics
Any positive ID
Constant
⫺2 Log likelihood
Cox & Snell R2

Stranger
Coefficient
SE

Odds

Acquaintance
Coefficient
SE
Odds

2.08ⴱⴱⴱ
1.41ⴱⴱ

0.38
0.49

8.01
4.12

1.74ⴱⴱⴱ
1.34ⴱⴱⴱ

0.25
0.26

5.68
3.82

0.71
0.82ⴱ

0.41
0.38

2.03
2.27

1.43ⴱⴱⴱ
1.16ⴱⴱⴱ

0.27
0.25

4.21
3.20

⫺1.75ⴱⴱⴱ
⫺0.40

0.45
0.52

0.17
0.67

⫺1.61ⴱⴱⴱ
0.33

0.36
0.32

0.20
1.39

0.57
⫺0.98
189.84
0.27
ⴱ
p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.

0.39
0.50

1.77

0.63ⴱ
⫺2.31
435.30
0.37

0.30
0.36

1.89

Acquaintance cases. A model with the predictors significantly fit the data
better than a model without any predictors, 2(7) ⫽ 224.92, p ⬍ .01. The odds that
a suspect was charged with a felony were over 5 times higher if the suspect had
a prior record. Severe allegations, admittance to the crime, and physical evidence
also significantly increased the odds that the case was prosecuted. Eyewitness
identification evidence significantly increased the odds that a case was prosecuted.
Felony charges were less likely to be brought in assault compared to robbery
cases; rape did not differ from robbery case issuing. This model correctly
predicted 67% of cases that were rejected and 85% of cases that were prosecuted.
Eyewitness Identification Evidence Strength
Eyewitness identification strength in accepted versus rejected cases.
Table 5 provides eyewitness identification evidence strength by case issuing
decision. Overall strength of the eyewitness identification evidence did not difTable 5
Eyewitness Identification Strength by Case Issuing Decision
(Issued vs. Rejected)
Overall strength
Viewed culprit head-on
Close proximity
Short retention interval
Good lighting
High confidence
Description corresponded

Issued (n ⫽ 186)
4.33
0.99
0.63
0.62
0.83
0.93
0.64

Rejected (n ⫽ 59)
4.19
0.98
0.63
0.59
0.76
0.89
0.58

B-112

EYEWITNESS ID EVIDENCE AND CASE DISPOSITIONS

153

ferentiate prosecuted from rejected cases (M ⫽ 4.33 and M ⫽ 4.19, respectively),
nor could case issuing decisions be distinguished on the basis of any of the
individual strength indicators. As can be seen in Table 5, the majority of accepted
and rejected cases had eyewitnesses with reasonably good viewing conditions and
witnesses who expressed high confidence in their identification.
Eyewitness identification strength in eyewitness identification alone cases.
Overall eyewitness evidence strength was further examined across prosecution
outcomes in the eyewitness identification alone cases. The UCCSs suggest eyewitness identification alone cases should be scrutinized by the prosecutor to assess
the validity of the evidence. The overall strength of the eyewitness evidence was
higher for charged compared to not charged eyewitness identification alone cases
(M ⫽ 4.73 vs. M ⫽ 3.62, respectively), t(25) ⫽ 2.76, p ⬍ .05, two-tailed. Each
of the individual strength indicators was tested to explore whether there was a
given factor that best distinguished issued from rejected cases in terms of
eyewitness identification strength. No statistically significant differences for any
of the individual indicators emerged.
Show-Ups versus lineups. The UCCS advise that charges in eyewitness
identification alone cases should be issued when a lineup has been conducted.
Accepted and rejected cases, however, could not be differentiated on the basis of
identification procedure type. Live show-ups were the most common procedure in
both prosecuted (64%) and rejected cases (57%).
Eyewitness identification outcomes and charging decisions. Whether a
case had any nonidentifications was unrelated to whether the case was prosecuted
in stranger as well as in acquaintance cases. Additionally, charging decisions were
not related to either the number of positive eyewitness identifications in the case
or the proportion of positive eyewitness identifications in the case. These results
are summarized in Table 2.
Discussion
Suspect and case factors that have been identified by previous archival
research as influential in felony charging decisions were significantly associated
with case issuing decisions in the present study. Eyewitness identification evidence was present more often in cases that were issued compared to cases that
were rejected for prosecution, although the association between eyewitness identification evidence and case issuing was statistically significant only in acquaintance cases, not in stranger cases. Defendant prior record, crime severity, admittance to the crime and physical evidence were associated to a larger extent with
case outcomes compared to eyewitness identification evidence. Additionally,
overall, the strength of the eyewitness identification evidence was not associated
with charging decisions. However, in the cases in which eyewitness identification
evidence was the sole evidence against the defendant, accepted cases scored
higher on the Biggers criteria compared to those that were rejected. This result
suggests that prosecutors were attempting to evaluate the strength of the eyewitness identification evidence in making issuing decisions when there was only
eyewitness identification evidence linking the suspect to the crime. Finally,
multiple identifications of the defendant by more than one eyewitness and nonidentifications of the defendant were not associated with charging decisions. The
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following sections discuss these findings and the additional research questions
they raise.
Association Between Eyewitness ID Evidence and Felony Issuing
In both stranger and acquaintance cases, positive eyewitness identification
evidence was associated with increased odds of prosecution. The association
between eyewitness identification evidence and case issuing, however, was stronger and statistically significant only in acquaintance cases. In part, this may have
resulted because statistical power was greater in the acquaintance case analysis
because the sample size was relatively larger compared to stranger cases. The
result would also arise, however, if prosecutors tend to scrutinize eyewitness
identification evidence in stranger cases. Mistaken eyewitness identification concerns are of course greater in stranger compared to acquaintance cases. Therefore,
on one level the fact that eyewitness testimony plays a relatively small role in case
issuing decisions is a desirable result. On the other hand, the association between
eyewitness identification evidence and case prosecution is likely to vary across
jurisdictions depending on the procedures that are in place for determining
whether a suspect should be presented in an eyewitness identification test and the
weight that should be given to a positive eyewitness identification of the suspect.
Further research is needed to determine the role that eyewitness identification
evidence plays in apprehending the suspect. Additional questions that remain
include: Is eyewitness identification evidence the “icing on the cake” in determining the guilt of a suspect in the mind of the investigators? Does it play a
pivotal role in leading the police to continue (or to stop) collecting evidence
against a suspect? At what point during the course of an investigation does
eyewitness identification evidence get collected? In the present study, other forms
of evidence, such as physical evidence and suspect prior felony conviction, were
positively associated with whether there was an identification test conducted in
the case. Additional research is needed to determine how crime and suspect
factors influence whether the suspect is shown to the eyewitness(es) for identification. This issue is important to investigate because whether eyewitness identification evidence provides additional information regarding the suspect’s guilt
depends on the extent to which it is independent from other case evidence.
Case Prosecution and the Strength of Eyewitness Identification Evidence
Relatively few cases were prosecuted based solely on eyewitness identification evidence. Results indicated that most of the cases evaluated for prosecution
had other forms of evidence in addition to (or instead of) eyewitness identification
evidence implicating the suspect. This finding suggests that the police tended to
not forward a suspect for prosecution unless there was other evidence in the case.
Another factor contributing to the low number of cases that relied solely on
eyewitness identification evidence is that quite often the suspects in the sample
knew one or more of the eyewitnesses in their case. In acquaintance cases the
identity of the suspect may not be much of an issue, although acquaintances can
also make incorrect identifications.
There was some evidence to suggest that prosecutors may be scrutinizing the
quality of eyewitness identification evidence, albeit in limited circumstances. The
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strength of the eyewitness identification evidence did not generally vary across
accepted and rejected cases. However, in a subset of cases that were arguably
relatively weak from an evidentiary standpoint, the eyewitness identification
evidence was stronger in accepted compared to rejected case. In these cases, the
suspect was positively identified, none of the eyewitnesses knew the suspect, there
was no physical evidence, and the suspect did not admit to the crime and did not
have a prior record. In cases in which the suspect admitted to the crime and/or had
a prior record, the strength of the identification evidence did not vary across
prosecution outcomes. These findings support the conclusion that in the absence
of other evidence, such as suspect prior record and physical evidence, prosecutors
are taking into account the strength of the eyewitness’ testimony as suggested by
the UCCS. However, there were few cases in which eyewitness identification
evidence was the sole evidence in the case; therefore, the strength of the conclusion would be served well by replication of these findings.
Interestingly, live show-ups were the most often used identification procedure.
The prevalence of show-ups versus lineups did not vary in relation to prosecution
outcomes, suggesting that prosecutors do not place greater weight on one procedure
versus another. Few studies have investigated live show-ups and further research
on this topic seems warranted. On the one hand, a positive identification from a
live show-up could be strong evidence of the suspect’s guilt. An eyewitness who
positively identifies a suspect from a live show-up usually does so at the crime
scene, immediately after the crime. Memory strength is likely to be higher than if
the eyewitness were given a lineup test, which is usually administered on average
5 days later for robbery cases and 18 days later for assault cases (Flowe et al.,
2009). Research has demonstrated that identification accuracy usually declines
with the passage of time (e.g., Shapiro & Penrod, 1986). Another benefit of live
show-ups is that the test is sometimes given in the context in which the crime
occurred, which could facilitate memory retrieval. Finally, if the police can test
the eyewitness at the crime scene, this obviates the need for having to locate and
liaise with a witness for an identification test at a later time. On the other hand,
there are no foils in a show-up; therefore, investigators may not be able to
distinguish between positive identifications that are made based on the eyewitness’ memory for the culprit versus those that are made based on guessing alone
(Steblay et al., 2003). Clearly additional research is needed to evaluate the best
strategy for identifying suspects at the crime scene, such as the use of mobile
lineup devices (e.g., MacLin & Phelan, 2007).
Which Factors Should Prosecutors Take into Account in Evaluating the
Strength of Eyewitness Identification Evidence?
The findings raise the possibility that prosecutors take into account a range of
indicators to assess the strength of the eyewitness identification evidence. None of
the individual indicators of eyewitness identification evidence strength by itself
was associated with case outcomes. The strength indicators when considered as a
unit were associated with case outcomes in relatively weak cases. These findings
are in keeping with previous research that found that participant evaluations of
eyewitness evidence strength were related to the Biggers criteria in a summative
fashion (Bradfield & Wells, 2000). More systematic work that evaluates each of
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the strength indicators, however, is needed, as the indicators of strength measured
in the present study were not independent of one another. For instance, cases in
which the eyewitnesses were relatively confident in their identification probably
had better viewing conditions overall. More systematic work on the issue in field
settings could lead to the specification of a strength marker(s) this is widely
available and that can be reliably measured. Such a marker would assist prosecutors in the evaluation of eyewitness identification strength. The importance of
this work is highlighted by the fact that most of the defendants in the eyewitness
identification evidence alone cases pleaded guilty. If the defendant pleads guilty,
then trial safeguards for protecting defendants from being convicted on the basis
of erroneous eyewitness identification are of course rendered impotent.
Multiple Eyewitness Identifications and Nonidentifications and
Felony Issuing
Clark and Wells (2008) demonstrated that multiple identifications of the
suspect by eyewitnesses increase the odds that the suspect is guilty, whereas
nonidentifications decrease the odds that the suspect is guilty. Their analysis
further demonstrated that in cases in which there are multiple eyewitnesses who
have been presented with a lineup test, the odds that a suspect is guilty are affected
to a larger extent by a nonidentification compared to an additional positive
identification, all other things being equal. Therefore, multiple identifications and
especially nonidentifications should be taken into account by prosecutors. Results
in the present study, however, indicated that case issuing outcomes were not
associated with whether multiple eyewitnesses identified the suspect or with
whether there were any eyewitnesses who did not identify the suspect. Additional
research is needed to determine how police and prosecutors evaluate cases that
have multiple eyewitnesses. As pointed out by Clark and Wells (2008), the degree
to which a nonidentification affects the prior odds of suspect guilt depends on
variables such as the nonidentifying eyewitness’ memory strength. For example,
if an eyewitness with relatively good viewing conditions positively identifies the
suspect while an eyewitness with relatively poor viewing conditions does not
identify the suspect, then the posterior odds that the suspect is guilty would be
reduced little by the nonidentification. In view of this consideration, future
research could examine whether police and prosecutors weigh the validity of
eyewitness identification evidence in relation to the degree of interaction that the
eyewitness had with the culprit.
Limitations
The nature of archival research makes it difficult to draw cause and effect
conclusions from the findings. First, our results may be specific to the location
and/or the District Attorney’s Office that we examined. It is highly plausible that
the relationship between eyewitness identification evidence and charging decisions varies across jurisdictions. Additional studies are needed in several other
jurisdictions to more fully understand how legal officials use eyewitness identification evidence in deciding whether to prosecute. Second, the degree to which
we are able to make inferences about legal decision making using criminal
archives depends on the validity and completeness of the information reported by
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law enforcement officials in the archival records. Third, we sampled only rape,
robbery and assault cases. Eyewitness identification evidence may have a differential effect on case processing depending on crime type. In murder cases, for
example, there tends to be enormous pressure to bring a perpetrator to justice. Would
charges in murder cases often be issued even if there was only eyewitness identification evidence? Fourth, eyewitness identification evidence in a rejected case may
have an effect on case processing if the case is later re-opened. For example, we
encountered one case in the sample in which the credibility of a rape victim was
called into question because she was not forthright with the police about having
seen the perpetrator (who was a stranger) on the bus earlier on the day that she was
reportedly raped. The case was rejected partly on this basis. The suspect was later
arrested for raping four other women. The first case was re-opened in light of the
new victim reports and physical evidence. There were so few of these types of
cases that we could not systematically analyze them. However, it is important to
point out that just because a case has been rejected does not mean that it will not
be prosecuted in the future.
In summary, prosecutorial discretion to bring felony charges against a police
suspect is a potential procedural safeguard that could help protect innocent
suspects from being convicted on the basis of erroneous eyewitness identification.
Results from the current study indicated that physical evidence and suspect factors
were more strongly associated with case issuing decisions than eyewitness identification evidence. Additional research is needed to determine markers of identification accuracy that can be used by prosecutors in assessing the strength of
eyewitness identification evidence.
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DISCOUNTING THE ERROR COSTS
Cross-Racial False Alarms in the Culture of
Contemporary Criminal Justice
James M. Doyle
Carney and Bassil
Research regarding own-race bias (ORB) is examined by focusing on results that
indicate that Whites may apply more lenient criteria to the recognition or identification of Blacks, resulting in a higher rate of false-alarm responses. The practical
context of the forensic identification task is reviewed to assess whether the more
lenient criteria applied by witnesses who are attempting identifications of Blacks
resonate with the criminal justice system's tendency to apply more lenient criteria
to the conviction and sentencing of Blacks. Practical implications and future
research directions are considered.

Are White eyewitnesses simply more willing to guess where the identification
of a Black suspect is concerned? Is there an endemic tendency among White
American eyewitnesses to discount the error cost—defined as "the product
o f . . . the probability of error, and the cost if an error occurs" (Posner, 1973, p.
399)—implicit in the identification of an African American suspect? Is this what
one ultimately means when one says that Whites apply more liberal response
criteria to the task of recognizing Blacks (Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Sporer,
2001 a)? There are questions of deeper theoretical interest, but from a practical,
forensic perspective, the possibility of increased other-race guessing has claims
for emergency status on the research agenda.
Is it possible that the cultural situation of contemporary White witnesses has
persuaded them that they are less likely to be wrong if they identify a Black
suspect? Or convinced them that they can be less concerned by the harm that
results if they do misidentify a Black suspect? Or both? Do Whites see the
probability of error as lower in cross-racial situations and the cost of error as
easier to accept? Nothing in the data gathered in this issue establishes the truth of
these conjectures, but nothing has yet ruled them out either, and there are more
than a few findings that suggest that an inquiry is in order. The picture is a
depressing one.

The Identification in Context
In the Innocence Project's latest study of wrongful convictions uncovered by
DNA analysis, 36% of the wrongful convictions derived from Whites misidentifying Blacks (Dwyer, Neufeld, & Scheck, 2000). Researchers have reported that
White Europeans demonstrated a significantly larger own-race bias (ORB) when
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to James M. Doyle, Attorney at
Law, Carney and Bassil, 20 Park Plaza, Suite 800, Boston, Massachusetts 02116. Electronic mail
may be sent to jamesdoyle@sprintmail.com.
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compared with Black African participants (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Further
analysis has indicated that this ORB effect among Whites stems largely from
false-alarm responses (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Moreover, while other measures of ORB have been decreasing over time, measures of false-alarm responses
have been increasing. Meissner and Brigham's (2001) meticulous meta-analysis
of past studies concluded that "over the past 3 decades, the ORB effect appears
to have become most prominent in false-alarm responses" (p. 22). That conclusion
is difficult to reject when 11 of 14 samples, drawn from six studies, indicated that
more liberal response criteria were applied in cross-race situations. False alarms,
remember, result in prison sentences, even death sentences.
In the contemporary American criminal justice system, an eyewitness guess
(if that is what it is) occupies a central place in a criminal process composed of
a cascading series of events, each augmenting the dangers of any guess that went
before or comes after and all of which have been shown by one study or another
to be racially sensitive (Morris, 1988). The error cost calculations I have described
can be applied to a whole catalogue of racially weighted decisions that extend
from the street cop's decision to stop a suspect to the Supreme Court's decision
to affirm his death sentence (McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987; Morris, 1988). The
practice of racial profiling, for example, is rational if one believes that stopping
Black drivers to search their cars for drugs is less likely to be a mistake or if one
believes that the cost of the mistake is less serious. It is especially rational if one
believes both of these things. Racial profiling is not rational—although it could be
a powerful expression of irrational bigotry—unless one believes these things.
The startlingly elevated rates of incarceration for Black adolescents could
indicate that throwing a young Black life away is perceived to be less likely to be
a mistake or that the mistake matters less than it might with a White adolescent
(Bridges & Steen, 1998). Providing inadequate defense counsel and investigative
services to indigent Black defendants, incarcerating the young Black male population at a lavish rate for exaggerated terms (Mauer & Huling, 1995), imposing
a draconian system of mandatory minimum drug sentences with disparate impact
on Blacks, executing Black murderers of Whites at a rate 13 times the rate of
White murderers of Black victims (McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987)—all of these
inequities continue to mount long after claw-and-fang racism in the Ku Klux Klan
style has gone out of fashion.
Cross-racial eyewitness cases provide a window on these issues because, in
eyewitness cases, racism of the old-fashioned sort is beside the point by definition.
An eyewitness to a crime never faces the question "Do I identify a White or a
Black?" but rather "Which Black (or which White) do I identify?" Paradoxically,
analysis of the eyewitness situation—because race is apparently not salient in the
most flagrant way (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001)—stands an excellent chance of
illuminating the litany of racially weighted choices I have described. The eyewitness research can provide an opportunity to test whether the racially unbalanced results in the justice system flow from the fatalistic acceptance of the cost
of error in crimes where the perpetrator was undoubtedly Black and the universe
of choices was entirely Black too. Are White discounts of error costs a necessary
permissive factor? Do they inflict as much damage in their way as old-school
racism?
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I am guilty here of pulling one thread from the impressive fabric of research
displayed in this issue and perhaps of placing more weight on that thread than it
can bear. As Wells and Olson (2001) observed, I cannot point to anything
resembling proof of this hypothesis. Still, since a false-alarm identification is an
indispensable predicate to a wrongful conviction in an eyewitness-based prosecution, it does seem worth asking whether conscientious research from a systemvariable perspective might counteract racially driven criterion shifts, reduce false
alarms, and show valuable results in the real world. Before that can happen, the
focus must be tightened. Even the tightened focus reveals daunting challenges.

Attitudes and Contact
The role of racial attitudes and interracial contacts in ORB is endlessly
intriguing, but perhaps the point should be made that it is less immediately
important to the forensic setting than it might seem. In part, this is a matter of
sequence. Improved perceptual learning and more reliable encoding resulting
from increased interracial contact will produce only evanescent improvements if
the actual identification task follows the encoding—as it always will in the
forensic context—and the identification task is approached with criteria so relaxed
that they aggravate the number of false alarms.
Among the more provocative findings assessed in this issue is that although
cross-racial contacts are rising and racial attitudes are generally felt to be improving, the number of false alarm responses from White Europeans attempting
to recognize other race individuals is rising (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Putting
aside for a moment the direction of the change, the fact that there is a change in
any direction across this relatively brief historical period argues that one should
hesitate to embrace explanations intrinsic to human memory before ruling out
dynamic explanations rooted in the culture. It seems, at least to amateur eyes, that
the existing data on attitudes and contact fail to take adequate account of key
aspects of the problem.
This is especially important to a distinct group that is at acute risk for
misidentification: the young, urban, African American men depicted in police
mug shots, who are likely to be displayed to eyewitnesses in a photo array.
The demise of Jim Crow segregation laws means that Blacks and Whites
experience more face-to-face contact, but it does not necessarily follow that those
face-to-face contacts are the most influential element of the White witnesses' view
of the other race. The fact that general racial attitudes have improved since the
days of Uncle Tom's Cabin, or even To Kill A Mockingbird, does not mean that
attitudes toward that particular, young male subgroup are consistent with the
general trend.
Face-to-face contact with African Americans constitutes a small fraction of
White America's contact with African American faces—or at least of White
America's contact with representations of African American faces. One of the
central features of the African American experience has always been that of being
represented by others. Every American, Black and White, has seen, as Henry
Louis Gates (1994) put it,

B-122

256

DOYLE
Tens of thousands of the most heinous representations of Black people, on
children's games, portable savings banks, trade cards, postcards, calendars, tea
cosies, napkins . . . nothing but images of Black people devoid of reason, simian or
satanic in appearance, and slothful, lustful, or lascivious in nature, (p. 11)

This endemic societal tendency is particularly noticeable in contemporary
portrayals of the young men enmeshed in the forensic identification process. As
Tricia Rose (1994) pointed out,
The White American public, many of who only tangentially know any Black men
personally, has been inundated with images of young Black men who appear fully
invested in a life of violent crime, who have participated in drug-related gang
shootings and other acts of violence for "no apparent reason." (p. 153)

It might be argued that the shift in stereotypes from the 19th century's grinning
minstrel show "coons" to today's glowering gangsta' rappers shows progress of
a kind, but, if so, it is not progress that is likely to heighten White witnesses' sense
of the cost of potential errors in identification. The qualitative change in stereotypes raises the question whether data about racial attitudes generated when the
older stereotype prevailed have any usefulness in understanding the current
situation or whether older studies (when for example, they are included in a
meta-analysis) simply obscure the issue. Whatever these media-created contacts
do with one hand to enhance perceptual learning and identification accuracy—and
studies showing improved performance by hardcore NBA basketball fans indicate
that they can (Li, Dunning, & Malpass, 1988)—they may take away with the other
hand when they decrease the identifying witnesses' fears of misidentification. To
put it another way, the research must recognize that the ability to identify faces of
another race is a function not simply of the absolute amount of exposure one has
had to members of that race but also of the quality of that exposure. (MacLin,
Malpass, & MacLin, 2001). Our concept of quality of the contact must encompass
the substance of media portrayal, not simply the duration of exposure or the
degree of attention.
If there is a cohort effect in action here, as Chance and Goldstein (1996)
posited, the effect on the cohort that has raised the number of false alarms is more
likely to have its source in contemporary media images than in the legacy of the
civil rights movement. Face-to-face contact with the mature African American
professional who sits in the next office cubicle is not likely to ameliorate this
situation. The Blacks that Whites encounter in photo-arrays will look more like
rappers Public Enemy than Bill Cosby.

The Photo-Array Moment
One recurrent forensic event, a witness's exposure to a photo-array composed of mug shots of young Black men, stands at the confluence of a startling
number of psychological forces, all tending to depress a White European's
assessment of the likelihood of an error in making an identification or of that
error's cost, or both.
A White eyewitness presented with a photographic array of mug shots of
young Black men confronts a uniform, semantic category. This category evokes
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all of the in-group/out-group dynamics fully discussed in a number of contributions to this issue. (Sporer, 2001a, 2001b). It is also aggravated by the fact that the
particular out-group under scrutiny here has chosen for reasons of its own to adopt
a "hard" pose by dressing, talking, and looking as much alike as they can (Majors
& Billson, 1992; Doyle, 1996). There is no sinister design behind this: Many of
these features of the photo-array process are natural consequences of the approved
match-to-description procedure for lineup construction (Technical Working
Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999).
All of this brings to the stage the traditional elements of Europe's encounter
with the Other. At least to Whites, "they" do sometimes all look the same. George
Orwell (1968) commented on his own reactions with characteristic honesty in
describing a visit to Marrakesh:
When you walk through a town like this—two hundred thousand inhabitants, of
whom at least twenty thousand own literally nothing except the rags they stand up
in—when you see how the people live, and still more, how easily they die, it is
always difficult to believe that you are walking among human beings.... The
people have brown faces—besides, there are so many of them! Are they really the
same flesh as yourself? Do they even have names? Or are they merely a kind of
undifferentiated brown stuff, about as individual as bees or coral insects? (p. 387)

This attitude—irresistibly evoking Nickerson and Adams's (1979) demonstration
that although most people distinguish pennies from other coins, few can recognize
the correct features of the penny in a penny lineup—is only the beginning of the
problem.
The fact that the suspect's criminal history is revealed by the mug-shot format
shows the witness not only that the suspect is a member of an out-group but also
that he is a member of a smaller out-group within that out-group—one more
likely to be guilty of a crime (Sporer, 200la). Moreover, the format also indicates
that because each of the men displayed in the mug-shot array was guilty in the
past, each is also likely to be guilty of something else in the future; the format
therefore intensifies the spectre of a new error cost associated with a false negative
or a miss. On the one hand, it seems to the witness that an error in making an
identification choice is less likely; on the other hand, it seems that making no
identification at all dictates an error cost in the form of a future crime that might
have been prevented. At the same time, the witness is encouraged by the format
to feel that a mistake in identifying a veteran criminal for the wrong crime is
simply the price society has to pay for security: Maybe he didn't do this one;
probably he did another.
The cultural forces driving down White estimates of the error cost in an
identification case will not be captured by self-reports of contact or generalized
assessments of attitude. Research into attitudes and contacts must begin to take
account of what John Thompson (1990) has called "the mediazation of modern
culture" (p. 16). People rely less and less on face-to-face contact, more and more
on the products of complex commercial mass media. As Thompson put it,
The deployment of technical media should not be seen as a mere supplement to
pre-existing social relations: rather, we should see this deployment as serving to
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create new social relations, new ways of acting and interacting, new ways of
representing oneself and responding to the self-presentation of others, (pp. 16)

I have argued elsewhere (Doyle, 1992, 1996) that contemporary media products
in both their news and entertainment incarnations have a specific, dehumanizing
impact on contemporary Whites' views of who lives in the inner city and how
they live. I do not say that these arguments are in any sense proven by the data
collected in this issue, but it does seem to me that the false alarm virus that this
issue has begun to isolate would find a particularly receptive host in a cultural
context weighted in that direction.

The Problems With Solutions
What does it mean for the relationship between psychological science and the
legal system if the heart of the ORB problem does lie in the criterion shifts
experienced by White eyewitnesses? Can the legal system adjust to the findings
collected here? It is very difficult to be optimistic: Problems of principle and
problems of practice stand in the way.
Opponents of expert psychological testimony in eyewitness cases have always
worried that the effect of expert testimony is to lower the number of mistaken
convictions at the cost of raising the number of mistaken acquittals. In this view,
expert testimony, by artificially enhancing the jury's general skepticism, may do
more harm than good and certainly involves scientific psychology in a utilitarian calculation that, to put it bluntly, is none of science's business (Egeth &
McCloskey, 1984). As the body of eyewitness research has developed and
deepened, proponents of expert testimony have been able to respond that, on the
contrary, expert testimony effectively draws the jurors' attention to factors—for
example, decision time—that are diagnostic of accuracy and away from others—
for example, trial testimony confidence—that can mislead (Leippe, 1995). Where
thoughtful courts have accepted expert psychological testimony on eyewitness
identification, it has been because the courts have been persuaded that there is a
fit (United States v. Downing, 1985) between particular, diagnostically significant
elements of the research and the case on trial.
If, however, ORB turns out to be rooted in discounted error costs and relaxed
criteria, the question arises whether general skepticism is not what ORB is all
about. There is, after all, no preexisting set of ideal criteria. Does one actually
know that Whites' criteria in regard to choosing Blacks are too low and their
criteria for choosing Whites are just right? Or does one know only that they are
different? Perhaps both sets of criteria are wrong. Although there is widespread
agreement that ORB exists, can anyone actually say that the racial difference
between a White witness and a Black suspect is in any meaningful sense
diagnostic of reliability? That racial difference "postdicts" error? If not, isn't error
cost being discussed as a judicial question—even a profound political question—
rather than a scientific one? Everyone can agree that in trials of Black and White
defendants, jurors should see the error costs as equivalent and apply the same
criteria, but how to bring that about is a complex question.
Contributors to this issue, for example, find cause for guarded optimism in
State v. Cromedy (1999), a recent decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court that
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mandated a jury instruction in cross-racial identification cases (Meissner &
Brigham, 2001). However, the Cromedy decision merely illustrates the danger of
using the existing legal toolbox to catch eyewitness errors after they have
occurred (Bartolomey, 2001).
The Cromedy opinion requires New Jersey judges to draw the jury's attention
to the fact that the identification is cross-racial; it requires nothing more. The
Cromedy court apparently believed that this highlighting will activate the jury's
preexisting understanding that cross-racial identifications are difficult to accomplish. (Because the Cromedy court believed that this difficulty was common
knowledge, it also forbade expert testimony on the point.)
It is difficult to say whether the Cromedy instruction amounts to nothing or
whether it amounts to worse than nothing. Even assuming that the laconic
instruction that the court approved does remind the jurors that cross-racial
identifications are more difficult, has anything been achieved? After all, if the
dangers in ORB lie in relaxed criteria, then cross-racial identifications are not
more difficult for White witnesses; cross-racial identifications are more facile.
Correct cross-racial identifications are more difficult, but the act of choosing is
apparently experienced as less demanding.
Besides, there is the pronounced danger that once a jury is persuaded that
cross-racial identifications are more difficult in the sense that they impose heightened challenges for eyewitnesses, the jury will rely more heavily on misleading
factors (such as witness confidence) in determining whether the witness has
surmounted those challenges or not. At best, using jury instructions to manipulate
the jurors' criteria in an effort to compensate for artificially relaxed criteria used
by White eyewitnesses will be an unwieldy business. Conceivably, a cross-racial
identification instruction given at the beginning of a trial and framing the jurors'
response to what is to come may prove more effective, but it is hard to be
optimistic that the effect will be dramatic. Expert testimony will be preferable in
that it can attempt to steer jurors away from resort to false criteria of their own
(e.g., testimonial confidence) to buttress the relaxed criteria employed by the
witness, but it will be no panacea. The current state of the science precludes
psychology achieving any immediate transforming impact on the legal system's
post hoc evaluation of cross-racial identifications.

The Best and the Good
Still, there is the possibility of preventing errors before they occur, and the
research into cross-racial identification error does suggest some avenues of
exploration that tend in that direction. Although the best approach to the problem
might be to secure a comprehensive understanding of the fundamental nature of
the ORB, there are systems-variable inquiries that may shed light on the fundamentals while at the same time ameliorating the symptoms.
To begin with, if the ORB false alarm increase is the result of lowered barriers
to identification choices (and "lowered" may not be the word; "more permeable"
might better capture the situation), then a set of marginal identifications that call
for particularly rigorous application of the system-variable procedures already
uncovered may be at issue. The National Institute of Justice's (NIJ's) Eyewitness
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Evidence: A Guide For Law Enforcement (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999) takes on a heightened importance in cross-racial situations. Indeed, the elements of psychologically endorsed identification practice that
were eliminated in the NIJ guide—most notably, sequential lineup administration
and blind lineup procedures—seem particularly important once one has reviewed
the cross-racial studies (Wells et al., 2000). For the marginal White eyewitness
tempted to make an identification by a lower perceived error cost, eliminating the
relative judgment aspects of a simultaneous lineup may make the difference. For
a marginal White witness who has allowed an identification to slip past more
liberal criteria, inadvertent confidence boosting by a lineup administrator who is
aware of the suspect's identify may prove particularly seductive.
Research may also uncover new system-variable methods of tweaking existing procedures. Wells and Olson's (2001) ingenious suggestion that cross-racial
cases use blank screening lineups or arrays is a promising example. Research may
also continue to investigate the causes while attacking the symptoms. Perhaps, for
example, the error cost calculations could be tested in staged crime events by
presenting target/present and target/absent cross-racial arrays in differing formats:
say, mug-shot, yearbook, and family picture settings. Perhaps computer technology could be used to "de-mug" the mug shot. Perhaps a foil could ask the witness,
"Can you believe all these guys are from the medical school?" Perhaps instructions to lineup witnesses that include a cross-racial warning and make race salient
would lessen the social pressure on witnesses by making them feel free to say no.
Perhaps, as Sommers and Ellsworth's (2001) jury study indicated, White decision
makers will do better when race is made more salient.
It may be that continued conscientious research into the psychological roots
of ORB will result in a diagnosis to which experimental psychology cannot be
applied as a cure. It maybe that the source of ORB is impacted in our culture. That
is no reason to fail to pursue research along the lines collected in this issue. One
may as well know, even if there is little one can do about what one learns.
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SUMMARY
A ﬁeld study (N ¼ 379) investigated the effects of clothing bias on show-up identiﬁcations using
variations in type of clothing (distinct and common), the similarity of clothing between the event and
the identiﬁcation procedure, target-present and two target-absent show-ups (high similarity and low
similarity innocent suspects), and time delay. Results showed a signiﬁcant clothing bias by clothing
type interaction on identiﬁcation accuracy; however, no overall effects of delay or common clothing
on identiﬁcation accuracy were found. With distinct clothing, signiﬁcant effects of clothing bias and
suspect similarity emerged. Implications for police use of show-ups are discussed. Copyright # 2006
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

In 1990, witnesses to a gang shooting in New Jersey described one of the gang members as
wearing a Day-Glo reversible jacket (orange and burgundy) with the orange side turned
out. Shortly after the shooting, the police apprehended Luis Kevin Rojas wearing an orange
and burgundy reversible jacket, with the burgundy side out. After being asked to turn the
jacket inside out to expose the orange side, Mr. Rojas was identiﬁed by seven eyewitnesses
as being a gang member who had been involved in the shooting (Flynn, 1998). Was
Mr. Rojas identiﬁed because he was presented to the witness in a show-up rather than a
lineup? Would he have been identiﬁed from the show-up even if he had not been forced to
wear his coat orange side out? In other words, was this a mistaken identiﬁcation resulting
from accumulated biases? A brief review of the show-up literature will demonstrate
that show-ups are a risky method of eyewitness identiﬁcation. Further, a review of the (very
limited) literature suggests that clothing bias is a serious concern. We will argue that the
show-up is an identiﬁcation procedure prone to clothing bias and then explore the extent
and some limiting conditions, of the clothing bias effect on show-ups in a ﬁeld study.
The show-up involves exposing a witness to one person, the suspect, either live or in a
photograph. A potential problem with this procedure is that with only one person shown to
the eyewitness, the identity of the police suspect is obvious. In fact, when the identity of a
suspect is obvious in a lineup, the lineup is considered unfair (e.g. Lindsay & Wells, 1980;
Phillips, McAuliff, Kovera, & Cutler, 1999). Thus, the inherent suggestiveness of the showup may lead a witness to identify an innocent suspect as the perpetrator. Despite the
*Correspondence to: J. E. Dysart, Department of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, The City
University of New York, 445 West 59th Street, New York, NY, 10019-1199, USA. E-mail: jdysart@jjay.cuny.edu
Contract/grant sponsor: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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suggestiveness of the show-up, past research on show-up identiﬁcations has reported a
reduced tendency for witnesses to choose anyone from a show-up, including the perpetrator
(Gonzalez, Ellsworth, & Pembroke, 1993; Wagenaar & Veefkind, 1992). In addition, a
recent meta-analysis of show-up studies found that show-ups and simultaneous lineups
result in virtually identical rates of correct identiﬁcation (Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, &
Lindsay, 2003). The fact that guilty suspects are no more likely to be selected from showups than lineups is puzzling. The complete absence of foils (or distractors) in the show-up
would seem to make the task easier for the witness and thus, one would expect the show-up
to result in higher correct identiﬁcation rates of the perpetrator. One possible explanation
for this ﬁnding is that witnesses respond to the perceived pressure to choose with
psychological reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981) and employ a more stringent decision
criterion. Regardless of the reason, show-ups appear to provide neither an advantage nor
disadvantage over lineups in terms of correct identiﬁcations.
Historically, the concerns expressed about show-ups have centred on the potential for
mistaken identiﬁcation. Some studies support biasing effects of show-ups (e.g. Dysart &
Lindsay, in press; Yarmey, Yarmey, & Yarmey, 1996 ) but others report false identiﬁcation
rates from show-ups that are comparable to those from simultaneous lineups (Lindsay,
Pozzulo, Craig, Lee, & Corber, 1997). Finally, some studies have found that show-ups yield
more accurate identiﬁcation decisions overall than lineups (Dekle, Beal, Elliott, &
Huneycutt, 1996; Yarmey, Yarmey, & Yarmey, 1994). This last ﬁnding, however, can be
misleading. Show-ups generate higher rates of correct decisions because they produce
higher rates of correct rejection in target-absent conditions as compared to simultaneous
lineups. The concern with show-ups, however, is that they do not afford the same protection
to innocent suspects, that is provided by using foils (distracters) in lineups. In lineups,
incorrect foil selections are known errors and do not result in any legal action against the
foil that is selected. With show-ups, all false positive choices are false identiﬁcations of
innocent suspects. In support of this concern, the Steblay et al. (2003) meta-analysis
indicated that false identiﬁcations of the suspect were substantially more likely from showups than lineups.
Eyewitness research may also be underestimating the rate of false identiﬁcations with
show-ups in the real world. The reason for this is because lineups usually require that police
have a speciﬁc suspect in custody and an arrest usually requires some source of evidence
leading police to have probable cause to believe the suspect is guilty prior to the
identiﬁcation procedure. Show-ups, however, frequently are based on minimal
information, usually that the suspect resembles a description provided by a witness and
that the suspect was apprehended near the scene of the crime within a generally brief period
following the crime. Given that eyewitness descriptions are frequently vague (Lindsay,
Nosworthy, Martin, & Martynuck, 1994), show-ups may commonly contain innocent
suspects. Furthermore, police and the courts justify the use of show-ups, at least in part, by
arguing that they provide a means of quickly and efﬁciently exonerating the innocent. If
this logic is used, police would be expected to have a more lenient criterion for presenting
suspects in show-ups. As a result, the base rate of suspect innocence may be substantially
higher for show-ups than lineups. Combined with an equal or higher propensity for false
identiﬁcation, a higher base rate of innocence could lead to a much higher rate of false
identiﬁcation from show-ups than lineups.
Despite the intuitive and empirically demonstrated problems with the show-up
procedure described thus far, it is a common method of identiﬁcation used by police in the
United States. Flowe, Ebbesen, Burke, and Chivabunditt (2001) reported that 55% of
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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identiﬁcations conducted in 488 cases between 1991 and 1995 in a large metropolitan area
in the western US used show-ups. McQuiston and Malpass (2001) reported that show-ups
were used by police in El Paso County, Texas, for 30% of identiﬁcation attempts. Gonzalez
et al. (1993) enlisted the help of a detective in Illinois to record all identiﬁcations (line-ups
and show-ups) he was involved in for a period of time. Results from this ﬁeld study
indicated that 77% of identiﬁcations conducted were show-ups. Because of these sizeable
percentages, and the limited number of studies that have investigated factors that may
affect the show-up procedure, more studies are needed which demonstrate the potential
limitations or advantages of this identiﬁcation technique.
Some researchers have attributed lineup identiﬁcation errors to the use of relative
judgement strategies (i.e. the witness treating the lineup like a multiple choice test and
choosing the lineup member most similar to the memory trace of the criminal) (Lindsay
& Bellinger, 1999; Lindsay & Wells, 1985; Wells, 1984; for an alternative view see Clark
& Davey, 2005). Lineup biases may function by making the suspect easy to select relative
to other lineup members (Lindsay, Wallbridge, & Drennan, 1987; Lindsay & Wells, 1980)
or by encouraging witnesses to employ relative judgements (Malpass & Devine, 1981).
Sequential lineups have been shown to reduce reliance on relative judgements (Lindsay
& Bellinger, 1999) and consistently reduce false positive choices of innocent suspects
(Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001). Lineup members in sequential lineups are
presented individually to prevent witnesses from using a comparative strategy. Since, by
deﬁnition, show-ups involve exposing the witness to a single person, relative judgements
are not possible with show-ups. As a result, the show-up procedure may produce fewer
false identiﬁcations than what would be predicted based on the suggestive nature of the
procedure.
Lineup biases have been shown to have less impact with sequential lineups (Lindsay,
Lea, & Fulford, 1991; Lindsay, Lea, Nosworthy, Fulford, Hector, LeVan, & Seabrook,
1991). Clothing bias, where only the suspect appears in the identiﬁcation procedure
wearing clothing similar to that described by the eyewitness, has been shown to increase
false identiﬁcations from lineups (Lindsay & Wells, 1980; Lindsay et al., 1987; Malpass &
Devine, 1981), mug shots (Lindsay et al., 1994), and show-ups (Yarmey et al., 1996).
However, the impact of clothing bias has not sufﬁciently been tested in association with
show-ups.
Clothing bias is of particular concern with the show-up procedure because suspects
presented in show-ups often are apprehended because they were near the scene of the crime
and matched the overall description given by the eyewitness. This concern is supported by
the fact that approximately 50% of all information reported in eyewitness descriptions is
clothing information (Lindsay et al., 1987, 1994). Furthermore, clothing descriptions may
be more distinctive than person descriptions. If a witness describes a robber as a cleanshaven white male in his early 20s, the police are unlikely to stop everyone they see on the
street who ﬁts that description. However, if the description also includes information that
the robber was wearing blue jeans, a white T-shirt, and a baseball cap, police may rely
heavily on these clothing cues to obtain a suspect near the scene of the crime who ﬁts the
description of the clothing and is not inconsistent with the vague person description. This
scenario, which is likely to be common with show-up identiﬁcations, leads to potential
clothing bias because the suspect is likely to be wearing clothing similar to that
remembered by the eyewitness.
To date, one study (Yarmey et al., 1996) has investigated the effects of clothing bias on
identiﬁcation accuracy from show-ups. Yarmey et al. found that when a similar looking
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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(innocent) suspect was presented in a show-up wearing the same clothing that was worn by
the target, false identiﬁcations were higher than when the innocent suspects wore different
clothing than that worn by the target during the event. Yarmey et al. also presented
participants with implausible innocent suspects who did not match the description of the
targets in any manner. In this condition, clothing bias had no signiﬁcant effect on the false
identiﬁcation rate. In addition, Yarmey et al. found that correct identiﬁcations of the target
were not affected by the clothing manipulation, supporting the notion that clothing bias
only serves to decrease identiﬁcation accuracy (Lindsay et al., 1987).
There are many unanswered questions with respect to clothing bias that need to be
addressed, particularly when combined with the show-up procedure. One question relates
to the probability that a similar looking innocent person, wearing exactly the same clothing
as the perpetrator, will be in the vicinity of the crime immediately after the event. Although
this scenario is possible, it seems rather unlikely and, thus, the manipulation used by
Yarmey et al. (1996), where the innocent person both resembled the target (her sister) and
was presented in the exact clothing worn by the perpetrator, may not accurately reﬂect most
potentially dangerous clothing bias situations in the real-world. Addressing this issue with
lineups, Lindsay et al. (1987) investigated the effects of identical, similar, and different
clothing on identiﬁcation accuracy. There was no difference in the impact of identical and
similar clothing, both produced the clothing bias effect. Clothing similarity was enough to
make the innocent target stand out in the lineup and result in selections of him. The current
study investigated the effects of dissimilar, similar, and identical clothing on identiﬁcation
accuracy from show-ups.
A second question that has yet to be addressed in clothing bias investigations is whether
the type of clothing worn by the perpetrator has an effect on the magnitude of the biasing
effect. For example, if a perpetrator is described as wearing a white T-shirt, is a witness
more or less likely to be affected by clothing bias than if the perpetrator was described as
wearing a distinctive shirt (e.g. a shirt with a distinctive logo, photograph, or words)? The
former ‘common’ clothing could have less of an impact on identiﬁcation accuracy due to
the increased likelihood that others could be wearing this type of clothing (and thus that the
police could easily ﬁnd an innocent person matching this description). The latter ‘distinct’
clothing is unlikely to be as typical and thus, its biasing impact may be greater because of
the low probability of ﬁnding an innocent person who matches this distinct description. If a
witness was to engage in the reasoning described above (e.g. ‘What are the chances that the
police could ﬁnd an innocent person matching my entire description?’), it is likely that he
or she would use the distinct clothing as evidence of suspect guilt. Alternatively, common
clothing may be less likely to draw the attention of witnesses, less likely to be encoded, and
thus less likely to produce any biasing effect. The clothing used in previous clothing bias
investigations has clearly been distinctive. Yarmey et al. (1996) used a university T-shirt
or sweater (depending on the weather) with a ‘Guelph XXL Gryphons’ logo on the front
(A. D. Yarmey, personal communication, April 30, 2001); Lindsay et al. (1987) used a
university sweatshirt with a distinctive logo; Lindsay, et al. (1991) used a T-shirt with stick
ﬁgures and writing; and Lindsay et al. (1994) used a colourful Hawaiian patterned shirt to
demonstrate clothing bias in a mug shot search. Thus, one issue that has not been addressed
in the previous literature is the effect of less distinctive clothing on identiﬁcation bias.
Just as the similarity of the clothing is an issue of some importance, so is the match
between the true perpetrator and the innocent suspect. The majority of studies conducted to
date have employed as innocent suspects people selected because they resembled the
confederates who staged the events. In real cases, the descriptions provided by witnesses
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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are often vague and, indeed, the description of the perpetrator’s clothing may be more
detailed and distinctive than the description of the person. As a result, when police
apprehend an innocent suspect based on these descriptions, the clothing may match the
description of the clothes worn by the perpetrator more closely than the suspect resembles
the perpetrator. An important question not addressed in previous studies is the impact of
clothing bias on identiﬁcation of innocent people who are reasonable suspects (i.e. match
the general description of the perpetrator) but not particularly similar to the true culprit. If
an innocent suspect must closely resemble the perpetrator as well as being dressed
similarly for clothing bias to present a problem, the laws of probability suggest that
clothing bias may be a real but relatively rare problem for the criminal justice system. On
the other hand, if clothing bias produces mistaken identiﬁcation of people who would not
be likely to be identiﬁed in the absence of the clothing cues, clothing biased show-ups are a
serious threat to innocent suspects and false identiﬁcations are likely to occur frequently.
The fact that show-ups are recommended in ofﬁcial, government sponsored guidelines for
police practice (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999) and frequently
used by police (Flowe, Ebbesen, Burke, & Chivabunditt, 2001; Gonzalez et al., 1993;
McQuiston & Malpass, 2001) make it imperative that the effects of clothing bias on showups be investigated further.
Finally, there is no theory concerning the impact of clothing similarity and suspect
similarity on the accuracy of show-up identiﬁcation. One explanation is that clothing
provides a memory cue to witnesses assisting them in the search for the face of the criminal
and misleading them when the suspect is innocent (literally, a form of guilt by association).
This seems unlikely given the consistent reports from lineup studies that correct
identiﬁcation rates are not increased by clothing cues. A second possibility was illustrated
above. Clothing information may be used by witnesses in an inferential process where they
estimate the likelihood that the person presented is the criminal. A third possibility is that
clothing acts as a piece of information in an inferential process but only if the memory trace
is weak. Although the current research was not designed to test theoretical explanations for
the clothing bias, it is worthwhile to begin discussing the issue.
To explore the issues raised thus far, participants in the current study were exposed to a
target person in a ﬁeld setting. Then, following a delay period, participants were shown
either a photograph of the target, a high similarity innocent suspect, or a low similarity (but
still plausible) innocent suspect.

METHOD
Participants
A male confederate (hereafter target) approached store and business employees in various
shopping malls in southern Ontario, Canada. Only employees who were not occupied
(e.g. serving customers or stocking shelves) were approached and asked if they would
volunteer to participate in a study for the Department of Psychology at Queen’s University.
Of the 430 people who agreed to participate (approximately 90% of all persons
approached), there were 99 men and 331 women. Some participants (N ¼ 51) were dropped
from the analysis because they were no longer available (e.g. gone home for the day or in a
meeting) when the experimenter returned to conduct the identiﬁcation phase of the study.
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The ﬁnal sample (N ¼ 379) consisted of 88 men (M age ¼ 28.1 years) and 291 women
(M age ¼ 27.9 years).

Design
The study employed a 3 (show-up individual: target, high similarity innocent suspect, low
similarity innocent suspect)  2 (type of clothing worn at original event: distinct,
common)  2 (clothing bias: same clothing worn at event and show-up, different clothing
at original event and show-up) between-subjects design with time delay as a continuous
independent variable. Two additional conditions were used to test a speciﬁc issue. The two
innocent suspects also were shown in clothing similar, but not identical, to the distinct
clothing to investigate the effects of showing innocent people in similar, yet incorrect,
clothing. These two conditions will be referred to as ‘similar-distinct’ conditions and these
data were only included in the ‘Similar-distinct clothing’ section in the Results. The
primary dependent measure was identiﬁcation accuracy. Post-decision conﬁdence also was
measured and some description data were obtained.

Materials
Materials were 7.6  10.2 cm frontal, head and chest, colour photographs of the target and
the high and the low similarity innocent suspects. The target was white, in his early 30s,
1.83 m tall, weighed 113 kg, was clean-shaven, had short brown hair, and no distinguishing
or outstanding features. The two innocent suspects were selected based on pilot work
where 60 participants interacted with the target for approximately 45 seconds, gave a
description of the target, and then ranked from most to least similar the similarity to the
target of ﬁve foils used in previous lineup research (Pryke, 2001). The foils that were
ranked ﬁrst (i.e. most similar) and fourth overall were selected as the high similarity and
low similarity innocent suspects, respectively (Dupuis, 2001). The pilot study results also
showed that a few participants ranked the low similarity innocent suspect as most similar to
the target, indicating that, although he was dissimilar to the target, he was not an
implausible replacement. On the other hand, in lineup research, the low similarity suspect
had never been selected from either the target-present or target-absent lineup.
Two shirts were used for the primary clothing bias manipulations. One shirt was a man’s
blue-gray, short sleeved, button-up plaid shirt (hereafter common clothing). This style of
shirt was typical of men’s fashion at the time the data were collected and was considered to
be common men’s apparel. The second shirt was a black Harley-Davidson T-shirt with a
motorcycle, blue eagle wings and the Harley-Davidson logo on the front (hereafter distinct
clothing). While recruiting participants for the study, the target either wore the common
clothing or the distinct clothing. A third shirt was used to speciﬁcally test the possibility
that similar but not identical clothing may be sufﬁcient to produce a clothing bias effect.
The third shirt was a black Harley-Davidson T-shirt with a motorcycle, howling wolf,
and the Harley-Davidson logo on the front (hereafter similar-distinct clothing). The size of
the design on both Harley-Davidson T-shirts was approximately equal. Photographs of the
innocent suspects were taken in each of the three shirts to be used in the identiﬁcation phase
of the study. Photographs of the target in the common and the distinct shirts worn at the
event also were used. The two innocent suspects appeared in one of the three shirts at test.
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Procedure
Employees (i.e. prospective participants) of stores in shopping malls in southern Ontario,
Canada were approached by the target, who introduced himself as a graduate student in
psychology. He then asked if they would participate in an experiment for the Department
of Psychology at Queen’s University. Employees (in groups of one to three people) were
told that, if they agreed to participate, an (female) experimenter would return later
that day to ask them a few innocuous questions. Because we wanted to avoid telling
participants that the study was investigating their ability to identify the target (in case this
type of knowledge affected the participants’ accuracy) and we needed to give participants
enough information to decide if they wanted to participate in the study, the target
explained that he could not tell participants what the questions were because his job was
only to recruit participants. However, the target assured employees that no personal or
embarrassing questions would be asked of them and that no questions would be asked
regarding their place of employment. At this point, if store employees agreed to take part
in the study, the target thanked them for their time and reminded them that a second
person would return later that day. If employees did not want to participate or felt that
they needed permission from management prior to participating in the study, they were
told of the purpose of the study and were not included as participants. Immediately upon
leaving each store where employees had agreed to participate, the target recorded the
time, the name of the store, and the sex of the participant, approximate age, and a brief
description of the participant to facilitate the identiﬁcation of participants by the
returning experimenter. This was an important step because not all store employees who
were present when the experimenter returned were present when the target had earlier
recruited participants.
The experimenter entered the stores and recorded the time which, when compared with
the confederate’s recorded time, indicated delays varying from 10 to 272 minutes (to the
nearest minute). The experimenter assessed whether the participant(s) were unoccupied
and, therefore, available to complete the study. At this time, if participants were
occupied, the experimenter returned later or waited until the participant(s) were available
(recording that time). If the participant(s) were unoccupied, they were told that they
were going to be shown a photograph and asked to make a decision as to whether or not
the photograph was of the person who asked them to participate in the study. Participants
were told that the photograph they were going to be shown may or may not be of the
person who recruited them to be in the study (standard lineup warning). A photograph of
the target, the high similarity innocent suspect, or the low similarity innocent suspect was
then shown to the participant. The person in the photograph was either wearing the
common, distinct, or similar-distinct (innocent suspects only) clothing. Participants then
made an identiﬁcation decision and rated their conﬁdence in that decision on a 10-point
scale (1 being ‘Not at all conﬁdent’, 10 being ‘Extremely conﬁdent’). If customers/
clients had entered the store during the identiﬁcation and participants needed to be
dismissed, the study ended immediately after obtaining their conﬁdence rating. However,
if no customers awaited service, participants were asked, while viewing the photograph,
if they could remember and describe what the target was wearing when he came into the
store.
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions where possible. It was logistically
impossible for the confederate to change shirts from one store to the next. As a result, the
confederate would recruit participants wearing either the common or the distinct shirt for a
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period of time and then change to the other shirt. Within groups of participants recruited
during each block of time, show-up conditions were assigned randomly. Differences in
delay were haphazard rather than random but mean delay was approximately equal (not
signiﬁcantly different) across clothing and show-up conditions (all F values <1).

RESULTS
The results presented below tested a 3 (show-up individual)  2 (clothing bias)  2
(clothing worn at event) between-subjects design with identiﬁcation accuracy from showups as the primary dependent variable. The data from two additional conditions, where the
innocent suspects were presented in similar looking Harley-Davidson (distinct) attire were
not included in these analyses and are presented separately in the section titled ‘Similardistinct clothing’.

Identiﬁcation accuracy
Delay
Logistic regression analyses revealed no effects of delay on identiﬁcation accuracy from
show-ups or any signiﬁcant interactions with delay in any condition. Participants were
equally likely to make a correct identiﬁcation decision from 10 minutes to 4 hours after the
event. Therefore, the remainder of the analyses were conducted by collapsing over this
variable.
Overall
Using logistic regression analysis with accuracy as the dependent variable and all of the
variables in the equation, a three-way interaction was tested between clothing bias, type of
clothing at event and photograph shown. Results showed no signiﬁcant interaction
(Wald ¼ 1.68, p ¼ 0.195) of these variables. Overall, there was a signiﬁcant main effect of
bias on identiﬁcation accuracy, with the biased conditions yielding a lower correct decision
rate (74%) than the unbiased conditions (87%; Z ¼ 3.22, p ¼ 0.001). However, logistic
regression analysis, with clothing type and clothing bias in the equation, indicated a
signiﬁcant clothing type by clothing bias interaction (Wald ¼ 10.29, p ¼ 0.001).
Participants in the distinct clothing condition were signiﬁcantly less likely to make a
correct identiﬁcation decision from the biased (64%) than from the unbiased (90%)
condition (Z ¼ 4.03, p < 0.001), whereas participants in the common clothing condition
were as likely to make a correct identiﬁcation decision from the biased (89%) and unbiased
conditions (84%; Z ¼ 0.96, p ¼ 0.34).
Additional interactions were tested by separating the target-present and two targetabsent conditions. The clothing bias by type of clothing interaction (with both variables in
the equation), for the target-present and low similarity innocent suspect were nonsigniﬁcant (Wald ¼ 2.72, p ¼ 0.10, Wald ¼ 0.01, p ¼ 0.99, respectively). The result of the
same analysis with the high similarity innocent suspect, however, was signiﬁcant (Z ¼ 3.71,
p ¼ 0.05). Participants in the unbiased conditions were more accurate in the distinct
clothing condition (92.6%) over the common clothing condition (84.0%), whereas
participants in the biased conditions were more accurate in the common clothing condition
(96.0%) than in the distinct clothing condition (83.3%).
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Table 1. Proportion of ‘Yes’ identiﬁcation decisions for common and distinct clothing as a function
of clothing bias conditions and show-up individual
Clothing bias condition

Clothing at event

Common clothing
Show-up individual
Target
High similarity innocent suspect
Low similarity innocent suspect
Distinct clothing
Show-up individual
Target
High similarity innocent suspect
Low similarity innocent suspect

Unbiased

Biased

Biased similar-distinct

0.84 (21/25)
0.25 (6/24)
0.08 (2/25)

0.96 (24/25)
0.16 (4/25)
0.13 (3/24)

N/A
N/A
N/A

0.93 (25/27)
0.23 (7/30)
0.00 (0/29)

0.83 (20/24)
0.50 (17/34)
0.37 (11/30)

N/A
0.50 (14/28)
0.14 (4/29)

Note: Frequencies shown in parentheses.

Distinct clothing
A signiﬁcant bias by photograph interaction was found within the distinct clothing
conditions (Wald ¼ 16.64, p < 0.001). Correct identiﬁcations of the target were unaffected
by the clothing bias manipulation in the distinct clothing conditions, with 83% of
participants identifying him in the biased condition and 93% identifying him from the
unbiased condition (see Table 1; Z ¼ 1.01, p ¼ 0.31). On the other hand, identiﬁcation
accuracy for the high similarity and low similarity innocent suspects was signiﬁcantly
affected by the clothing bias manipulations. When the high similarity innocent suspect was
presented in the unbiased condition, 23% of participants incorrectly identiﬁed him,
whereas 50% of participants identiﬁed him from the biased condition (Z ¼ 2.21, p ¼ 0.01).
Similar results were obtained for the low similarity innocent suspect, where 0% and 37% of
participants identiﬁed him from the unbiased and biased conditions, respectively (Z ¼ 3.61,
p ¼ 0.001).
Common clothing
No interaction was found between the clothing bias conditions and photograph shown
(Wald ¼ 0.15, p ¼ 0.70) when the target appeared in the common clothing. Participants
who viewed the biased target-present show-up were no more accurate (96%) than those
who viewed the unbiased target-present show-up (84%; Z ¼ 1.41, p ¼ 0.16; see Table 1).
Participants who were shown a photograph of the high similarity innocent suspect were
unaffected by the biased clothing manipulation, with 16% and 25% identifying the
innocent suspect in the biased and unbiased conditions, respectively (Z ¼ 0.78, p ¼ 0.44).
Finally, participants who viewed the low similarity innocent suspect were also unaffected
by innocent suspect attire, with 13% and 8% of participants identifying the innocent
suspect from the biased and unbiased conditions, respectively (Z ¼ 0.52, p ¼ 0.60).
Similar-distinct clothing
Two additional conditions were run in which the high and low similarity innocent suspects
were presented in a Harley-Davidson T-shirt that was similar to, but not the same as, the
T-shirt worn by the target. As explained earlier, this was done to explore the effects of
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presenting an innocent person in clothing that matches the description provided by the
witness to some extent, but is not the exact clothing worn by the target. When the high
similarity innocent suspect was presented in the similar-distinct clothing, 50% of
participants identiﬁed him as the target. This proportion of identiﬁcations was not
signiﬁcantly different from that obtained in the biased (i.e. same Harley-Davidson) T-shirt
condition (50%; Z ¼ 0.00, p ¼ 1.00). When the low similarity innocent suspect was
presented in the similar-distinct clothing, 14% of participants identiﬁed him as the target, a
signiﬁcantly greater percentage than those who viewed the unbiased photograph (0%;
Z ¼ 2.07, p ¼ 0.02), and a signiﬁcantly lower percentage than those who viewed him in the
biased photograph condition (37%; Z ¼ 2.02, p ¼ 0.02).
Clothing descriptions
The primary issue of interest for the accuracy of clothing descriptions is whether
participants who gave a correct description of the target’s clothing were more likely to
make a correct identiﬁcation decision. It should be noted again, however, that not all
participants provided a description of the target. Participants who clearly needed to be
excused from the study after the primary dependent measures had been collected (e.g.
customers had entered the store during data collection and needed assistance) were
dismissed after their conﬁdence judgement had been given. In total, 66.2% of participants
in the distinct conditions (N ¼ 153) and 48.6% of participants in the common clothing
conditions (n ¼ 72) provided a description of the target’s clothing.
Common clothing
A description of the common clothing was considered correct if the participant said that the
target wore a blue/grey button-up or plaid shirt. Overall, 52.7% of participants correctly
described the common clothing. An additional 31.9% of participants gave an incorrect
description (e.g. light T-shirt), 6.9% gave an insufﬁcient description (e.g. dark shirt), and
8.3% stated that they could not remember what the target was wearing. Identiﬁcation
accuracy was unaffected by whether or not a participant gave a correct (89%) or incorrect
(78%) clothing description (Z ¼ 1.11, p ¼ 0.13).
Distinct clothing
A description of the distinct clothing was considered correct if the participant stated that
the target wore a black T-shirt. Overall, 62% of participants correctly described the distinct
clothing, 28% of participants gave an incorrect description (e.g. red T-shirt), 4% gave a
correct but very limited description (e.g. T-shirt), and 7% stated that they could not
remember what the target was wearing. Participants who provided a correct description of
the distinct clothing were no more likely to make a correct identiﬁcation decision (83%)
than were participants who gave an incorrect description (74%; Z ¼ 1.17, p ¼ 0.12).
Conﬁdence
To examine the relationship between eyewitness conﬁdence and accuracy, we
distinguished between eyewitnesses who chose the suspect from the showup (choosers)
and those who did not choose the suspect from the showup (non-choosers). For choosers,
accurate eyewitnesses were more conﬁdent (M ¼ 8.88) than inaccurate eyewitnesses
(M ¼ 7.87; F(1, 156) ¼ 21.28, p < 0.001). The conﬁdence-accuracy correlation was
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0.32. Similarly, accurate non-choosers were more conﬁdent (M ¼ 7.88) than inaccurate
non-choosers (M ¼ 5.96; F(1, 219) ¼ 12.29, p ¼ 0.001). The conﬁdence-accuracy correlation was 0.19. Breaking the conditions down further (biased vs. unbiased showups,
distinctive vs. common clothing, etc.) produced correlations ranging from 0.09 to 0.42. The
size and range of the obtained correlations is consistent with the results of lineup research.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Several interesting results were obtained in the current study. First, there was a signiﬁcant
difference in overall identiﬁcation accuracy from common and distinct clothing bias
manipulations. When the target wore what was considered to be common clothing, the
effects of clothing bias were non-existent. However, when the target wore clothing that was
considered to be distinct, the effect of clothing bias on identiﬁcation accuracy was
profound. A second intriguing ﬁnding from the current study pertained to the similardistinct clothing manipulation, where the clothing worn during the event and that shown in
the identiﬁcation procedure were different but similar. The results from these conditions
suggest that if a person who resembles the perpetrator is apprehended near the scene of the
crime, and is wearing distinct clothing similar to that described by the eyewitness, the
likelihood of false identiﬁcation is considerable. Furthermore, these false identiﬁcations
are as likely whether an innocent person is wearing identical distinct clothing to that worn
by the perpetrator or merely similar clothing. A similar pattern of results was found for the
dissimilar, yet plausible looking innocent suspect. In this situation, the false identiﬁcation
rate with the similar-distinct clothing was signiﬁcantly higher than that obtained in the nonbiased condition. Together, these results suggest that the effect of distinct clothing bias on
identiﬁcation accuracy from show-ups is substantial. The fact that the dissimilar innocent
suspect was never identiﬁed unless he was wearing similar or identical clothing is a clear
indication of how powerful the clothing bias can be in identiﬁcation from show-ups.
Future research needs to be done which addresses issues not yet raised in this paper,
including the ability of witnesses to identify clothing from other similar looking items. For
example, would it be possible for a witness to distinguish between a lineup of white Tshirts? Or short-sleeved plaid dress-shirts? This could be tested for in any investigation
using clothing lineups to help determine if the item is unique enough to be distinguishable
from other similar items.
Another important issue that remains unexplored is whether a clothing bias will exist
when the witness’ description of the clothing is incorrect. In all bias research to date,
clothing bias has been manipulated by presenting innocent suspects in attire that matches
the clothing actually worn during the event (either an exact match or highly similar). When
dissimilar clothing is used (control conditions), it is selected to differ considerably from the
attire worn during the event. In real cases, police must rely on the witness’ description of
clothing. As the results in this paper indicate, witnesses are not perfect in their descriptions
of clothing. In real world cases this may lead to occasions when police detain a suspect
because his clothing matches an inaccurate description provided by an eyewitness. Only
further research will determine if the clothing bias effect is present in these situations.
The salience of the clothing worn during the event also raises several interesting issues.
Context may inﬂuence how salient clothing is to the witness. Strikingly salient clothing in
one context (e.g. a military uniform on a university campus) may not be salient at all in
another context (e.g. on a military base). This may present serious problems for police and
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courts, as it may be impossible to determine if clothing bias is likely to occur in a given case
because it will be difﬁcult to decide if the clothing worn by the criminal was distinctive. As
well, salience may vary with witness characteristics. Using the previous example, a
military uniform may be either more or less salient to a member of the military than to a
civilian.
As with all research, there are limitations that must be acknowledged. The current study
relied on a single confederate and thus lacks stimulus generalizability (Wells & Windschitl,
1999). Identiﬁcation procedures may interact with the appearance of confederates and
criminals in non-obvious ways. Our confederate was a large man. His size may have
inﬂuenced the witnesses either as a memory cue or via conscious inferences. Thus, the fact
that such a person is less common than men of slighter build may have increased the impact
of the clothing bias. Replication and extension of the ﬁndings with other confederates will
be necessary to alleviate this concern. Similarly, the high and low similarity innocent
suspects were speciﬁc individuals and the results may have differed if others had taken their
place. Again, only further research can determine how important the degree of similarity to
the criminal is in this situation.
In addition, the identiﬁcation procedure in the current study used photographs to present
the targets and innocent suspects, whereas, Flowe et al.’s (2001) results showed that the
majority of real-world show-up identiﬁcations were conducted live. Live presentation may
assist witnesses, helping them to realize that the clothing is not identical to the clothing
they saw and thus leading to an inference of innocence. Alternatively, live show-ups may
produce a more powerful effect if the reasoning process described earlier was being used
by real witnesses. If witnesses ask themselves ‘What are the chances that the police could
ﬁnd someone so quickly who matched my description?’, they may conclude that the
probability is lower when the person is presented live leading to a stronger inference of
guilt.
Another limitation of the current study is that the exposure to the target did not involve a
‘criminal act’, like the majority of laboratory studies that have been conducted over the past
20 years. However, the live, staged-crime thefts that are conducted in eyewitness
laboratories cannot be conducted safely in ﬁeld settings. The likelihood that witnesses in
ﬁeld settings would phone the police or alert security after a ‘theft’, or even chase after a
‘thief’ is great, and thus not a wise practice. It also could be argued that witnesses in
laboratory studies are usually made aware immediately after a staged event that no real
crime has occurred. Thus, their interactions with the target person are effectively no
different from the ﬁeld setting witnesses, with the exception that there is a speedy exit of
the target person in laboratory studies. Although there may be a small trade-off between
using laboratory staged crimes and ﬁeld studies, the exposure to the target is, for all
practical purposes, similar. In addition, not all crimes that occur in the real-world involve a
quick exit of the criminal or knowledge on the part of the witness that a crime has actually
occurred. For example, victims of fraud are not aware that their interaction with the person
committing fraud is actually a crime. In fact, they may only come to realize this weeks or
months after the event has occurred. This type of crime is very similar to the situation used
in this study.
Live crimes also can be actually or potentially violent and thus arousing or threatening to
the witness. Very few studies mimic this aspect of real crimes. On the other hand, the
available data do not support the conclusion that eyewitness accuracy is enhanced by threat
or violence (Steblay, 1992). Even potentially violent crimes can produce witnesses who
were neither threatened nor aroused. For example, a few years ago a colleague opened a
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door for a man who was limping. Only later, after the man had left the scene, did he learn
that the man was limping because he had a shotgun concealed in his pants. He had used the
shotgun to rob the bank they had entered together. Although low arousal identiﬁcation
situations are very common and worthy of study and potentially arousing crimes may not
generate arousal in all witnesses, the fact remains that the results of this research need not
generalize to witnesses who are aroused.
Finally, the distinction between common and distinct clothing is ill deﬁned, relying
exclusively on the judgement of the authors. To the extent that this reﬂects a concern about
the salience of the clothing within the context of the event and not just a property of the
clothing itself, further research on this issue may be difﬁcult. Salience has a tendency to be
deﬁned circularly; stimuli that are salient are those that have an effect and stimuli that do
not have an effect were not salient (e.g. Taylor & Fiske, 1978). On the other hand, the
different shirts did result in different patterns of correct and incorrect identiﬁcation
decisions and the pattern of effects reported seem to be interpretable in terms of salience or
distinctiveness.
In real world cases it will be difﬁcult or impossible to be certain that a clothing
description is accurate and to know if the clothing was salient to the witness (though
spontaneously providing a clothing description would suggest that it was). The results from
the current study suggest that clothing bias can have a powerful impact on the accuracy of
show-up identiﬁcation decisions. Although future studies should investigate the most
effective means of avoiding clothing bias, this problem could potentially be avoided by not
exposing the witness to the suspect’s clothing during an identiﬁcation procedure. One way
of doing this may be to cover the suspect from the neck down with a blanket or jacket. If a
photo is used, the picture could be restricted to the face only or by covering the clothing
before showing the photo to the witness. However, these suggestions are tentative, and one
must be cautious in conducting such a procedure prior to empirical investigations being
conducted which show that covering clothing information, and thus effectively covering
body cues (e.g. stature, weight), does not reduce identiﬁcation accuracy. Until a
satisfactory procedure is found and successfully tested, any showup procedure conducted
where clothing cues are visible may potentially fall prey to the clothing bias effect.
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Timing of Eyewitness Expert Testimony, Jurors’ Need for Cognition, and
Case Strength as Determinants of Trial Verdicts
Michael R. Leippe, Donna Eisenstadt, Shannon M. Rauch, and Hope M. Seib
Saint Louis University
In 2 experiments, college students read a murder-trial transcript that included or did not include
court-appointed expert testimony about eyewitness memory. The testimony either preceded or followed
the evidence, and the judge’s final instructions reminded or did not remind jurors about the expert’s
testimony. Expert testimony decreased perceptions of guilt and eyewitness believability when it followed
the evidence and preceded the judge’s reminder. This effect occurred whether the prosecution case was
moderately weak or moderately strong. Jurors’ need for cognition (NC) was curvilinearly related to
convictions in a strong case. Low and high NC jurors convicted less than did moderate NC jurors. Greater
scrutiny by high NC jurors may make them more likely to consider evidence for the weaker side.

1982). This characteristic of jurors may have implications for how
prosecution and defense evidence is interpreted and weighted
because NC correlates with how carefully and systematically jurors will consider the evidence. Because they will very carefully
scrutinize the evidence, for example, very high NC jurors may
more readily find a reasonable doubt in a reasonably strong prosecution case—an asymmetry in evidence evaluation that, in this
case, would favor the defense.

Jurors are asked to perform the difficult tasks of understanding,
evaluating, and integrating evidence on both sides of the important
issue of whether a criminal defendant is guilty. The defendant’s
liberty (and sometimes life), as well as the service of justice,
depends on whether jurors are more persuaded by the incriminating evidence and arguments presented by the prosecution or the
exculpatory evidence and arguments advanced by the defense.
Psycho-legal researchers have devoted considerable attention to
the nature of jury decision making and the factors that influence it
(cf. Hastie, 1993a; Kerr & Bray, 1982). The research reported here
sought to contribute to this literature by gaining new insights into
two important aspects of evidence evaluation. The first of these
involves eyewitness evidence and whether expert testimony about
eyewitness evidence alters jurors’ reactions to it. Research suggests that eyewitness identifications strongly influence jurors, perhaps more strongly than they should under some circumstances
(see, e.g., Leippe, 1994, 1995; Wells, 1984). Because eyewitness
testimony is most commonly presented as incriminating evidence,
its potency may represent an asymmetry in the comparison of
prosecution and defense evidence, one that favors the prosecution.
The present study examined how and under what conditions expert
testimony that seeks to educate jurors about human memory in
eyewitness contexts might alter the incriminating value of eyewitness evidence (Leippe, 1995).
The second aspect of interest concerns the individualdifferences variable of need for cognition (NC; Cacioppo & Petty,

Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory
Scientific knowledge continues to accumulate about eyewitness
memory, factors that affect eyewitness reports and identifications,
and the degree to which people appreciate these influences. The
reasons for the high level of sustained research attention to eyewitness testimony are manifold and certainly include fascination
with the myriad psychological processes involved in forming a
memory, reporting it, and having it believed. Equally or more
influential is a set of reasons that converge into a recipe for
miscarriages of justice. First, eyewitness testimony powerfully
influences legal decisions, from charging someone with a crime to
finding a criminal defendant guilty. In the courtroom, eyewitness
accounts are among the most common and influential forms of
testimony (Leippe, 1995; Loftus, 1983; Woocher, 1977), and frequently (i.e., perhaps in close to 80,000 trials in the United States
per year; Goldstein, Chance, & Schneller, 1989) eyewitness evidence is the primary evidence against the defendant. Second, at
least some of the impact of eyewitness testimony may be undue, as
there is evidence that jurors tend to overbelieve eyewitnesses (e.g.,
Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; Wells, 1984), have insufficient understanding of the factors that affect memory (e.g., Kassin &
Barndollar, 1992; Lindsay, 1994), and are overly swayed by eyewitness confidence, which is not very diagnostic of accuracy and
apt to be inflated by the time the eyewitness reaches the courtroom
(cf. Leippe, 1980, 1995; Wells & Murray, 1984; Whitley & Greenberg, 1986). Third, eyewitness identification and memory may be
highly prone to error (e.g., Buckhout, 1974; Haber & Haber, 2001;
Leippe, Wells, & Ostrom, 1978). These factors combine to create
realistic concern about convictions derived from false identifications. The legitimacy of this concern has been advanced signifi-
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cantly with the advent of DNA testing. As of 2000, of the 62 cases
in which individuals convicted and imprisoned for felonies were
later exonerated by DNA evidence, 52 (including 8 with death
sentences) involved mistaken eyewitness identifications (Scheck,
Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2000). Mistaken identifications, resulting in
loss of liberty or even life, are thus a realistic worry and underscore
the practical importance of research that may be informative about
how to reduce their commission or convictions based on them.
One approach to reducing false identifications is to educate law
enforcement officials about how to collect eyewitness evidence in
ways that do not “pull” for false identifications, inflated confidence, or both in identifications (e.g., suggestive questioning,
repeated questions, biased lineup instructions, and poorly constructed lineups). An important step along these lines has been
made with the 1999 publication sponsored by the Department of
Justice of Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, a
“how-to” manual based on scientific research and the deliberations
of research psychologists, attorneys, and police officers (Wells et
al., 2000). Widespread adoption of the recommended procedures
for collecting eyewitness evidence is quite likely to reduce the
prevalence of false identifications that result, largely, from how
eyewitnesses are treated and tested. There are other causes of
eyewitness error, however, and a substantial likelihood that even
unreliable eyewitness testimony will be greeted with acceptance
and belief by jurors. Accordingly, expert testimony about eyewitness memory has also been promoted as a “remedy” and has been
admitted into courtrooms with increasing frequency in the past
decade (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001; Leippe, 1995).
Leippe (1995) defined eyewitness expert testimony as “the
delivery to a jury by a qualified research psychologist of information about research and theory on eyewitness behavior” (p. 910).
The major arguments in favor of expert testimony are that jurors
have insufficient knowledge about how memory works and the
factors that affect it, that jurors’ naive theories of memory lead
them to overbelieve eyewitness accounts, especially those that are
confidently delivered, and that scientific research has provided
reliable insights into eyewitness memory that can help jurors better
judge the veracity of eyewitness testimony. On the other hand,
critics of eyewitness expert testimony argue that, among other
problems, expert testimony may cause jurors to become overly
skeptical of eyewitness evidence, “overcorrecting” to the point of
underbelief.
A number of mock-juror and trial-simulation studies have been
conducted to assess the likely impact of eyewitness experts in the
courtroom. In a review of this research, Leippe (1995) counted 12
experiments that compared the presence versus absence of eyewitness expert testimony in one of three combinations of form and
context. One method has been to present a brief written summary
of a trial, including the main evidence, witnesses on both sides, and
a description of a psychologist’s expert testimony (e.g., Loftus,
1980; Maass, Brigham, & West, 1985). A second approach involves presenting a “minimal trial” consisting of a written summary of the crime and the case, as well as videotaped eyewitness
testimony (under direct and cross-examination) and expert testimony (e.g., Fox & Walters, 1986; Wells, 1986). Finally, expert
testimony has also been studied as part of a videotaped mock trial
(e.g., Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1989; Lindsay, 1994). The expert
testimony in most of the studies, regardless of method, was limited
to a general overview of what scientists know about eyewitness
memory and behavior, typically with a gentle implication that
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eyewitnesses err more often than one would suspect. A few studies
had expert testimony that spoke directly to eyewitness factors in
the case at hand, without offering an ultimate opinion about
accuracy. Across all of these variations, however, the dominant
result— evident in 10 of the 12 studies—was heightened skepticism about the eyewitness testimony, leading to a decrease in
guilty verdicts, decreased belief in the eyewitness, or both. Eight of
the experiments allowed some test of sensitivity—whether the
expert testimony made mock jurors more (or less) likely to take
into account what the expert testimony suggested were valid (or
invalid) cues to accuracy. Heightened sensitivity was found in two
of the eight tests.
Thus, the most common finding is that expert testimony about
eyewitness memory heightens jurors’ skepticism about eyewitness
evidence. Given the apparent tendency to overbelieve eyewitnesses, this may not be an inappropriate outcome, especially if the
prosecution’s case relies primarily on eyewitness evidence, which
itself is limited (e.g., there is only one eyewitness). In the present
research, we used a trial simulation to seek further insight into the
skepticism effect, particularly about some of the trial conditions
under which it might be especially likely to occur.

The Strength of the Prosecution’s Case
One such condition of interest was the strength of the prosecution case in the absence of an identifying eyewitness. When the
prosecution has considerable circumstantial or physical evidence
in addition to an eyewitness identification, a decrease in guilty
verdicts that is due to increased skepticism regarding the eyewitness may not be an especially desirable effect of expert testimony.
Among the 64 eyewitness experts surveyed by Kassin et al. (2001),
19 indicated that one of the reasons they had declined a request to
testify was because they personally believed the defendant was
guilty. This may reflect, in part, a worry that they might cause
skepticism about the eyewitness evidence, which might spread
somehow to the rest of the case. For example, research on the
impact of a positive eyewitness identification has found that, in
some cases, it continues to have incriminating influence even when
it is discredited by assailing the visual capability of the eyewitness
(Loftus, 1974; Saunders, Vidmar, & Hewitt, 1983). One interpretation of this persistence is that identifying testimony creates an
interpretational bias such that more weight or attention is given to
other incriminating evidence, and this greater receptivity to the
prosecution’s case persists even if doubt is cast on the eyewitness
(Saunders et al., 1983). Perhaps a similar, but directionally reversed, effect can occur for expert testimony that implicitly or
explicitly calls eyewitness evidence into question. Jurors may
reason that, if a highly credible expert suggests that one piece of
evidence presented by the prosecution (the eyewitness) can be
doubted, perhaps other prosecution evidence can be doubted as
well. Consistent with this idea, Leippe, Seib, Eisenstadt, and
Alia-Klein (1998) obtained suggestive evidence that, indeed, expert testimony could “take down” a fairly strong prosecution case.
On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the impact of
eyewitness expert testimony will decrease as the strength of extraeyewitness, incriminating evidence increases. As the strength of
evidence increases, the ability to interpret it in a fashion that
fosters disbelief should decrease. Even if the weight given to the
eyewitness is decreased by expert testimony, an averaging model
of information integration (e.g., Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974;
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Moore & Gump, 1995) would suggest that the impact of this
discounting of the eyewitness would be increasingly diluted as the
amount of less assailable other evidence increases. Given the
strong likelihood that eyewitness evidence carries disproportionately larger weight, however, it might take a great deal of other
evidence to make up for the removal of the eyewitness from the
equation. Thus, unless the prosecution case is extremely strong,
eyewitness expert testimony that discredits the eyewitness should
reduce, somewhat, perceptions of guilt.

The Timing of the Expert Testimony
The impact of eyewitness expert testimony on evaluations of
both the eyewitness and other evidence may depend on when the
expert takes the stand. Expert testimony, theoretically, could be
presented either before or after the eyewitness testimony (and
other evidence) is presented. Among the dozen studies of expert
testimony reviewed earlier, the expert has preceded the eyewitness
in only two studies (Wells, Lindsay, & Tousignant, 1980; Wells &
Wright, 1983, reported in Wells, 1986). In neither of these studies
were the expert and the eyewitness embedded in a trial or trial
summary. Rather, the expert, presenting “psychological advice,”
and an actual eyewitness to an earlier staged crime, were presented
on a videotaped recording. The results were mixed. Wells et al.
(1980) found the typical skepticism effect of reduced belief in the
eyewitness, but no sensitivity effect was found in that both accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses were equally believed, even with
expert testimony. Wells and Wright, in contrast, found that expert
testimony promoted sensitivity but no skepticism effect— both
rare findings in this domain. Unlike previous research, the present
study examined the effects of preevidence eyewitness expert testimony in a “whole-trial” simulation and directly compared the
effects of pre- and postevidence expert testimony within the same
experiment.
In most North American trials, eyewitness expert testimony is
introduced toward the end of the trial, after the eyewitness has
testified and after the prosecution has presented its case. This is
because eyewitness experts most commonly are called by the
defense, which presents its case after the prosecution has rested.
Compared with an earlier preevidence presentation, such postevidence expert testimony has the advantage of recency. Coming late,
the testimony may be more likely to be spontaneously recalled
than other evidence when jurors deliberate and may be subject to
fewer compelling counterarguments, to the extent that it cannot be
followed by an opposing expert. These recency advantages would
be especially likely if the case is complex and tedious and jurors’
attention and comprehension suffer or they lapse into more heuristic (and less systematic) processing (Cooper, Bennett, & Sukel,
1996; Horowitz, Bordens, Victor, Bourgeois, & ForsterLee, 2001).
Expert testimony under these conditions might serve as a cue to
discount the already-heard eyewitness account. The advantage of
recency might also surface if memories and evaluations of the
eyewitness testimony can be retroactively influenced by new data
(i.e., the expert testimony; see, e.g., Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978).
On the other hand, the typical postevidence testimony of an
eyewitness expert might have diminished ability to influence evaluations of either the eyewitness or the other evidence. Jurors will
already have forged a story or theory of the crime at hand (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Because eyewitnesses have come and
gone off the witness stand, jurors are not able to apply online any

expert advice about diagnostic cues (e.g., reports of witnessing
conditions) or miscues (e.g., confidence) as eyewitnesses testify
(Leippe, 1995). From this perspective, postevidence expert testimony would seem unlikely to heighten either skepticism or sensitivity to credibility-relevant aspects of the eyewitness testimony.
The pros and cons of postevidence expert testimony, of course,
are reversed for expert testimony that precedes the evidence. If the
expert testimony precedes the evidence, it has the potential to
influence the crime theory developed by jurors as they receive the
early evidence. For example, if the expert’s advice or overview
compels jurors to be more skeptical of the eyewitness evidence, the
eyewitness(es)’ account of the crime and the perpetrator may play
less of a role in shaping the story. Instead, jurors might focus more
on how the conditions of witnessing or testing may have hindered
accurate identifications. In addition, if the expert precedes the
eyewitness, jurors might be able to apply any advice about cues to
memory accuracy as the eyewitness testifies. These advantages of
preevidence expert testimony, however, would seem to require that
expert testimony be explicit in terms of what is and is not diagnostic of accuracy in the eyewitness’s statements and behavior and
specific in terms of what aspects of the eyewitness testimony are
at issue. When the expert testimony is a more general overview
about what is known scientifically about eyewitness memory, as in
the present study (and in some actual trials), jurors may not be able
to apply much of what the expert says to their appraisal of the
eyewitness, and their theories may not be altered. In addition, of
course, the availability and discounting-cue advantages associated
with recency are lost if the expert testimony comes early and an
entire trial fills the interval between the expert’s information and
juror deliberation.
To compare the impact of pre- and postevidence testimony in
the present study, the eyewitness expert was presented as a courtappointed friend of the court in all conditions, as this would seem
to be the only way in which an eyewitness expert could advise a
jury in an actual trial before evidence was heard. Moreover,
because it is not permissible to discuss evidence before it is
presented, the expert gave only a general overview of what is
known about eyewitness memory, never mentioning the specific
case or singling out the factors relevant to the case at trial.

Mere General-Knowledge Expert Testimony
In fact, as noted earlier, most previous studies of eyewitness
expert testimony have presented mock jurors primarily with such
“general-knowledge testimony,” typically a “minilecture” that
overviews the methods and findings of the scientific study of
eyewitness memory (Leippe, 1995). Only a few studies have
presented expert testimony specifically tailored to the case at hand.
A moderate skepticism effect has been the rule, regardless of the
specificity of the testimony. By presenting expert testimony that
was completely limited to a general overview and that did not
single out any problematic witnessing or testing factors in the case
at hand, we sought to provide a stringent test of the capacity of
eyewitness expert testimony to create skepticism and reduce perceptions of guilt. That is, especially when the case for guilt is
relatively strong, in that it includes multiple pieces of physical and
circumstantial evidence, the finding that even a general discussion
by a psychologist about eyewitness memory reduces convictions
would strongly suggest that the mere presence of an eyewitness
expert implies to jurors that there is some reason to doubt the
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eyewitness and, as a result, may reduce the persuasive impact of
the prosecution’s case, even when, arguably, it should not.

The Impact of a Judge’s Reminder
A traditional “safeguard” against the inappropriate impact of
eyewitness evidence is for judges to include in their end-of-trial
instructions to the jury guidelines about how to judge the credibility of eyewitness testimony. Perhaps the most common of these
are the pattern instructions laid down in United States v. Telfaire
(1972; cf. Greene, 1988). However, judges also can and do prepare
and present their own instructions, which may include their own
intuitions as well as observations about the case at hand. Indeed,
the senior author of this article, Michael R. Leippe, was once asked
by a judge in a federal case to help him write the instructions he
would provide to the jury in a specific case (in lieu of the author
being allowed to give expert testimony at trial). In general, mockjury research suggests that judges’ instructions, if they have any
effect at all, increase juror skepticism about the eyewitness evidence (cf. Leippe, 1995). They do not appear to increase sensitivity
to eyewitness factors that might be diagnostic, perhaps partly
because instructions modeled after Telfaire and the Neil v. Biggers
(1972) criteria present some incorrect information about eyewitness memory (Brigham, Wasserman, & Meissner, 1999; Wells &
Murray, 1983). A different role for judges’ instructions was examined in the present research. Because of the discretion they
enjoy, and especially if they call the expert themselves, judges
could use their final instructions to remind jurors of the expert’s
testimony, summarizing the expert’s points and suggesting that
jurors apply them in their evaluation of eyewitness credibility.
Such a reminder and summary would be close to the “last words”
heard about the evidence before deliberation and would come from
a trustworthy and impartial authority figure. Thus, to the extent
that the mere presence of eyewitness expert testimony serves as an
implicit suggestion to distrust the eyewitness evidence against the
defendant, a judge’s reminder is likely to enhance this exonerating
influence for two reasons: The reminder is temporally close to
deliberation (recency) and enhances the credibility of the cue
(expert) to discount the eyewitness. In effect, a judge may be
authorizing or legitimating heightened skepticism about an
eyewitness.

Predictions for Expert-Testimony Effects
Given the pervasiveness of the skepticism effect of eyewitness
expert testimony in past research, at least weak predictions regarding two factors can be made for the present study. First, expert
testimony should lead to decreased perceptions of guilt and decreased believability of the eyewitness no matter when it is presented, regardless of whether there is also a judge’s reminder to
consider what the expert said (Hypothesis 1). Second, this heightened skepticism effect should occur whether the prosecution case
in addition to the eyewitness evidence is relatively weak or relatively strong (Hypothesis 2).
Should the impact of expert testimony be especially large in any
specific expert testimony condition? We believe so, given the
content of the expert testimony and the nature of the eyewitness
evidence in the trial scenario under study. As noted previously, the
expert testimony in the present research was general-knowledge
expert testimony, in which no reference was made to any specific
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factors that might be relevant to the case at trial. In addition, the
single eyewitness to the crime in the case was not a remarkably
strong or weak eyewitness. There were no outstanding aspects of
his testimony that would automatically constitute a “fatal flaw” to
his credibility. As in many actual trials that involve expert testimony, the issue that brought forth the eyewitness expert was the
fact that he was the sole eyewitness, not that he was an especially
“bad” eyewitness. Under these circumstances of generalknowledge testimony, and what we might call “reasonable-butlimited eyewitness evidence,” it seems most likely that the
skepticism-arousing effects of expert testimony would be strongest
when the expert testimony is made salient after the evidence is
presented, and as near as possible to the end of the trial, and when
the late-breaking expert testimony is bolstered by a judge’s reminder to use the expert testimony. In other words, the largest
skepticism effect should occur in a postevidence-testimony-withreminder condition (Hypothesis 3). The reasoning behind this
specific hypothesis is threefold.
1.

General-knowledge testimony should not facilitate the
primacy advantages described earlier, especially when
the eyewitness evidence has no fatal flaw. Generalknowledge testimony provides few guidelines for evaluating and comparing specifics about the eyewitness.
Thus, the amount of a priori skepticism created about the
eyewitness may be limited and, to the extent that the
expert does not point to specific problems with the forthcoming eyewitness testimony and the testimony itself has
no fatal flaw, the eyewitness may hold up reasonably
well on dimensions described in general terms by the
expert. As a result, jurors may form a not-too-skeptical
impression of the eyewitness early, and this impression
may persist through to the end of the trial, while the
expert testimony may lose its salience over time.

2.

If it is not facilitative of primacy influences, the major
remaining role of general-knowledge expert testimony
should be to serve as a general cue to be skeptical of
eyewitness evidence. This role is best served when the
expert testimony comes late in the trial, after all evidence
is presented and just before jurors must decide the case.
Under these circumstances, the expert testimony should
be maximally salient and accessible as jurors begin their
deliberation. In addition, these circumstances permit a
backward application of the skepticism cue to the eyewitness evidence. Newly alerted that there may be cause
to be skeptical of the eyewitness testimony, jurors may
worry about whether they initially overbelieved the eyewitness. As a result, they may attempt to “correct for
bias” (Wegener & Petty, 1997), the bias in this case of
overbelieving the eyewitness that is implied by the expert’s general overview. It should be easier to make this
“correction” and be more skeptical when the expert testimony follows (vs. precedes) the evidence, in that it is
probably easier to “see” reasons to doubt eyewitness
testimony when it is being reviewed in memory than
when it is being reviewed online. Interpretations of remembered events (i.e., the eyewitness’s statements) are
less bound by reality constraints than are interpretations
of the events as they occur.
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3.

Exercising such enhanced skepticism requires authorization. Receiving the expert testimony after the trial evidence may facilitate the ability to apply it retrospectively
to the eyewitness evidence. Actually doing so in an
especially skeptical manner, however, should depend on
the judge’s reminder, which, in such close temporal proximity to the expert testimony, communicates a tacit suggestion to be skeptical about the eyewitness evidence and
serves to authorize the application of the expert testimony
in this skepticism-enhancing way.

In summary, we hypothesize that the exonerating effects of
eyewitness expert testimony will be especially strong when the
trial situation includes two circumstances that facilitate interpretation and use of general expert testimony as a cue to be skeptical
of the guilt of the eyewitness. The recency of the expert testimony
will help mock jurors remember to apply it in judging retrospectively the eyewitness evidence and enhance the likelihood that the
application will turn up reasons for skepticism. The judge’s reminder will provide authorization to apply the expert testimony in
a critical manner.

Jurors’ Need for Cognition
An additional focus in this research was whether jurors would
be differentially influenced by case evidence as a function of their
level of NC (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao,
1984). NC refers to the extent to which people enjoy and spontaneously exert effort in thinking. Past research has found relatively
wide variability on this dimension and established that high NC
individuals are more likely to exert cognitive effort in evaluating
complex stimuli they encounter, including persuasive communications about social issues, videotaped events, social-interaction
vignettes, advertisements, and, in fact, evidence from courtroom
trials (see Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996, for a review).
For example, a number of studies have demonstrated that high NC
individuals have a more differentiated reaction to strong-argument
and weak-argument messages than do low NC individuals, suggesting that they processed the messages more systematically so as
to discern their strength (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983;
Smith & Petty, 1996).
On the face of it, these findings suggest that, in a courtroom
trial, NC should moderate the overall impact of prosecution case
strength. Higher NC jurors should be more persuaded to convict
than their lower NC counterparts when the prosecution case for
guilt is strong and less likely to convict when the prosecution case
is weak. However, the nature of the decision faced by jurors may
complicate this picture. In a trial, there are two sides to consider,
even though one side (e.g., the prosecution) may have the stronger
case. Exceptionally high cognitive elaboration may result in
greater recognition of the merits of the weaker side, leading some
very careful scrutinizers to perceive lower likelihood of guilt in a
strong case for guilt and greater likelihood of guilt in a weak case
than they would have, had they elaborated less. Thus, at extremely
high levels of elaboration, the discrimination of moderately strong
and moderately weak cases for guilt may be less in terms of
differences in conviction rates because the side with less evidence
(either the prosecution or the defense) has a stronger impact than
it would if elaboration had been less. Because NC is correlated

with elaboration likelihood and high effort at integrating information from opposing communications (Petty, Tormala, Hawkins, &
Wegener, 2001), this suggests a curvilinear relationship between
NC and the degree of discrimination of strong and weak cases for
guilt, at least when the strong case is not overwhelmingly incriminating and the weak case is not entirely without merit (Hypothesis
4). Compared with those who are low in NC, jurors with moderately high NC should discriminate more (in terms of judgments of
guilt) between a relatively strong and a relatively weak prosecution
case because their level of elaboration makes them more aware of
the relative strength of evidence of the two sides. However, jurors
with extremely high NC should discriminate less than jurors with
moderately high NC because their even higher level of elaboration
will make them more aware that, despite relative differences in
strength of evidence, the side with less evidence, nevertheless, has
evidence.
The moderation of guilt judgments among those very high in
NC would seem especially likely when the prosecution case for
guilt is relatively strong. In North American criminal trials, jurors
are asked to convict only if they find the defendant to be guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. The reasonable doubt standard creates
a high burden of proof for the prosecution and a decision criterion
in which, in theory, a single credible argument to doubt guilt
should be sufficient to acquit the defendant. It is not surprising,
then, that jurors have been found to exercise a leniency bias (i.e.,
a bias toward acquittal) in cases in which reasonable evidence
exists on both sides (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988). Given the high
burden of proof associated with the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard, exceptionally careful scrutiny by jurors in a trial in which
the prosecution evidence is strong but not wholly unimpeachable is
likely to lead many such jurors to find some basis for reasonably
doubting the guilt of the defendant and, in turn, voting for acquittal. Thus, very high NC individuals may be more likely than
moderately high NC individuals to uncover defense evidence or
arguments that configure into a reasonable doubt, and therefore to
show, in essence, a leniency effect.
Note that we are not suggesting here that, in the moderatelystrong-case-for-guilt scenario, very high NC jurors will assign a
different criterion or value in defining what constitutes reasonable
doubt. High NC jurors, for example, might require a higher degree
of certainty that the defendant committed the crime than lower NC
jurors (e.g., 70% vs. 50%) and, thus, be more likely to acquit in a
prosecution case that conveys a high, but not high enough, level of
certainty for them (e.g., 65%). Instead, our hypothesis is that,
unless the prosecution case is wholly unassailable, high NC jurors
will be more likely to see a basis for doubt in the evidence because
they will analyze it more closely. Thus, even if their criterion of
reasonable doubt is the same as that of less contemplative jurors,
their interpretation of the same evidence will lead to a lower level
of certainty of guilt that may fall below the criterion. It is well
established that the same evidence can be argued and structured for
presentation in different ways by lawyers, with resultant differences in how jurors evaluate the evidence (Schum, 1993). Similarly, it would seem, the same evidence can be structured differently in the active, interpretational minds of jurors, as research on
how certain attitudinal and personality differences are related to
juror decisions suggests (see, e.g., Ellsworth, 1993, and, as an
example involving NC, Kassin, Reddy, & Tulloch, 1990).
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Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, college students were exposed to a courtroom
trial of a robbery/murder case in the form of a transcript that
included the attorneys’ arguments, judge’s instructions, and direct
and cross-examination of the key witnesses, including the single
eyewitness to the crime. The strength of the prosecution’s case, in
terms of amount and clarity of evidence, was manipulated such
that some mock jurors read a trial containing a stronger prosecution case and others read a trial with a weaker prosecution case.
The trial also included or did not include the question-and-answer
testimony of a psychologist called by the court to “describe what
science can tell us about the factors that affect the reliability of
eyewitness reports,” and, when included, this expert testimony was
introduced either before or after any evidence or witnesses were
presented. In addition, the judge, in his final instructions, either did
or did not include a reminder and summary of what the expert said.
The hypotheses tested in Experiment 1 may be summarized as
follows:
Hypothesis 1: Eyewitness expert testimony should lead to
decreased perceptions of the defendant’s guilt and of the
eyewitness’s believability (i.e., a skepticism effect) whether it
precedes or follows the evidence and whether it is accompanied by a judge’s reminder. That is, compared with the
no-expert control condition, perceptions of guilt and believability should be lower in all expert-testimony conditions.
Hypothesis 2: The skepticism effect should occur similarly
whether the noneyewitness prosecution case is relatively
strong or relatively weak. Thus, there should be no interaction
between case strength and type of expert testimony on perceptions of guilt and eyewitness believability.
Hypothesis 3: The largest skepticism effect should occur
when expert testimony follows the evidence and is accompanied by a judge’s reminder. Compared with the other three
expert-testimony conditions (preevidence/reminder, preevidence/no reminder, and postevidence/no reminder), as well
as, of course, the no-expert condition, perceptions of guilt and
eyewitness believability should be lower in the postevidence/
reminder condition.
Hypothesis 4: In judging guilt, mock jurors with moderate NC
should discriminate between the relatively strong and relatively weak cases more than either low NC or high NC mock
jurors. Thus, an interaction between NC and prosecution case
strength should be found on measures of perceived guilt:
When the case is relatively strong, perceived guilt will be
higher among moderate NC mock jurors than among mock
jurors with low or high NC; when the case is relatively weak,
perceived guilt will be lower among mock jurors with moderate NC, compared with their low and high NC counterparts.

Method
Participants and Design
Three hundred and eighty-five male (n ⫽ 156) and female (n ⫽ 229)
undergraduates at a large Midwestern university participated to earn credit
toward a psychology course requirement. They were assigned randomly to 1
of 10 conditions corresponding to a 2 (case strength: stronger or weaker
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prosecution case) ⫻ 5 (type of expert testimony about eyewitness memory:
preevidence/no-judge’s-reminder, preevidence/judge’s-reminder, postevidence/
no-judge’s-reminder, postevidence/judge’s-reminder, or no-expert) factorial
design.1,2 Fourteen participants, relatively evenly distributed across conditions,
did not properly complete the dependent measures; their data were not
analyzed.

Procedure
Participants privately read the transcript of a robbery/murder case and
completed dependent measures in group sessions ranging in size from 5 to
50 participants. Participants were seated far enough apart so that they could
not see other participants’ materials or interact with them in any manner.
The experimenter distributed booklets containing instructions and a transcript of the case of State of Missouri v. David Lucas (a fictitious case with
elements drawn from actual cases familiar to us). The booklets were
distributed from a shuffled pile of booklets that included transcripts for all
conditions. The instructions indicated that the study was concerned with
how people react to evidence and testimony in criminal court cases.
Participants were asked to “take the role of a juror who is receiving this
information in court and will later deliver a verdict concerning the guilt or
innocence of the defendant” and to “try to evaluate all of the evidence and
consider how it operates together.” Reading of the transcript was selfpaced. They were implored to “attend to the case as if you were actually
serving as a juror.” Per instructions, after participants had read the trial
transcript, they closed their booklet and placed it aside on their desk. The
experimenter came to a given participant’s desk, collected the transcript
booklet, and handed the participant a second booklet containing the dependent measures and, on the last page, the NC Scale. Participants were
debriefed, thanked, sworn to secrecy, and dismissed after they completed
all measures.
Core trial and transcript. The transcript concerned the trial of a
robbery/murder case involving a holdup at knife point at night on a
deserted street that led to a fatal stabbing. The sole eyewitness was an adult
male who observed the crimes from a second-floor bedroom window.
Participant jurors initially learned what allegedly happened through reading the first sentences of the prosecution’s opening arguments. The transcript consisted of critical excerpts from the trial, including (a) opening
prosecution arguments; (b) opening defense arguments (which were
waived until after the prosecution presented and rested its case); (c) closing
arguments by the defense followed by the prosecution; (d) direct and
cross-examination of the eyewitness (the prosecution’s first witness) and
several other witnesses; and (e) the judge’s opening statements, introduction of the eyewitness expert, and final instructions to the jury. The trial
transcripts were approximately 6,500 – 8,000 words, depending on
condition.
Prosecution case strength. Whereas the eyewitness evidence was identical in all conditions, circumstantial evidence was varied to create a
stronger and a weaker prosecution case. Evidence presented in the stronger
case implicated the defendant on several scores. For example, the money

1

The percentage of participants who were women did not differ significantly across the conditions of the experiment, 2 (9, N ⫽ 371) ⬍ 1,
ranging from 51% to 66%.
2
The eight conditions in which expert testimony was presented also
conform to a 2 (case strength) ⫻ 2 (timing of expert testimony: pre- or
postevidence) ⫻ 2 (judge’s reminder: present or absent) between-subjects
factorial design. Because a data analysis plan centered on this three-way
factorial would have difficulty incorporating the no-expert level of type of
testimony, which is involved in major hypotheses of the study, we opted
for a data-analytic approach based on the 2 ⫻ 5 design. Analyses of the
major dependent variables that included the timing and judge’s reminder as
separate, crossed factors, revealed no outcomes that added to or altered the
conclusions drawn from the 2 ⫻ 5 analyses presented later.
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found in the defendant’s clothing nearly equaled what was stolen, the
blood on the defendant’s clothing was a type shared by only 20% of
the population yet it matched the victim’s blood type, there was clear
bodily evidence on the defendant of a struggle (e.g., swollen eye, scraped
knuckles), and the defendant’s alibi witness was vague about the time
interval he claimed to have known the defendant’s likely whereabouts. In
contrast, evidence in the weaker case was more questionable on each score
in terms of how incriminating it was. The money found in the defendant’s
clothing was less than half the amount stolen, the blood type found on the
defendant’s clothing was shared by up to 65% of the population, no
evidence of a bodily struggle was presented, and the defendant’s alibi
witness claimed times of knowing the defendant’s whereabouts that would
have left only a barely sufficient amount of time to go to the crime scene,
commit the crime, and return to the location specified by the alibi witness.
Timing and nature of expert testimony. In the preevidence expert
conditions, eyewitness expert testimony was delivered from the witness
stand immediately following the prosecution’s opening arguments, before
any evidence, including the eyewitness, was heard. In the postevidence
expert conditions, the testimony was delivered immediately after the final
defense witness, after all evidence, including the eyewitness, and both sides
of the case had been presented. In the no-expert control conditions (for both
the stronger and the weaker case), no expert was called at all; instead,
before closing arguments, the judge briefly noted that jurors are the sole
judges of witness credibility. In both the preevidence and postevidence
expert conditions, the eyewitness expert, a male experimental psychologist,
employed as a professor at a major research university, was called by the
judge as a friend of the court, who introduced him with the following
instructions:
Because an eyewitness’s report is a crucial part of the evidence in this
case, I have called forth an expert on eyewitness memory to describe
what science can tell us about the factors that affect the reliability of
memory reports. The jury is advised that the professor will be discussing a general theory of memory and research findings that illustrate the theory. He will not, nor can he, speak directly to the
credibility of the witnesses in this case. Nor has he personally interviewed the witnesses. The jury is solely responsible for judging the
credibility of eyewitnesses. The court asks that you use this scientific
information provided by the expert as you see fit while considering
the eyewitness reports that you will have heard.
The judge proceeded to question the expert, first asking him to describe
his educational and occupational background and areas of professional
expertise, as well as, in a series of questions, requesting that the expert
describe “the general theory of memory and the important factors in
eyewitness identification.” In his testimony, the expert did not make any
reference to the case at trial, nor did he focus his testimony explicitly on
any eyewitness variable at issue in the case. Instead, the expert summarized
the active, integrative nature of human memory and the stages of perception, encoding, storage, and retrieval. He also briefly described the scientific procedures used to study eyewitness memory, the greater problems of
remembering once-seen faces versus familiar ones, the weak link between
eyewitness confidence and accuracy, the curvilinear relationship between
stress and memory accuracy, weapon focus, the forgetting curve, effects of
physical conditions of witnessing, and the importance of proper and unbiased lineup construction and instructions. The expert pointed out that
staged crime studies have “shown that, depending on conditions, anywhere
from 15% to 85% of the witnesses may choose a wrong person from a
lineup.” He concluded his testimony by recommending that
a person attempting to judge whether an eyewitness had identified the
criminal or an innocent suspect should avoid placing too much faith in
the eyewitness’s confidence . . . and, instead focus more on the

situational factors present during witnessing, questioning, and lineup
administration that may have helped or hindered memory.
The judge’s final instructions and reminder about the eyewitness expert.
In all conditions, the transcript ended with final instructions from the judge,
which included definitions of the charge (murder in the second degree) and
of reasonable doubt, as well as the admonition that jurors are the “sole
judges of the credibility of each witness and of the importance of his or
her testimony.” In the reminder condition, the judge supplemented these
instructions by reminding jurors of the eyewitness expert, stating the
following:
Among other things, I believe it is important for you to take into
consideration the following things which [the expert] noted: (a) memories are not necessarily permanent and may change as new information is combined with older information in memory; (b) recognition of
faces seen only once and briefly is difficult; (c) an eyewitness’s level
of certainty in the courtroom is not always a good indicator of the
eyewitness’s accuracy; (d) most important, as jurors, you should pay
the most attention to how good the viewing conditions were when the
memory was formed and how good and fair a test of memory was
provided when the eyewitness made his or her identification. Please
consider these points in judging the credibility of the eyewitness
identification.
Neither this statement nor any mention of the eyewitness expert appeared in the no-reminder condition.
Dependent measures. Participants were first asked to indicate “the
verdict you would cast your vote for” by checking either “guilty” or “not
guilty.” They were then asked to rate their certainty about their verdict on
an 11-point scale (1, 4 [extremely, moderately uncertain]; 8, 11 [moderately, extremely certain]) and to write down the “most important reason”
for their verdict. Then, on 11-point scales, participants rated the likelihood
that the defendant committed the crime (1, 4 [extremely, moderately
unlikely]; 8, 11 [moderately, extremely likely]); the strength of the evidence
against the defendant (1 [not at all]; 6 [somewhat]; 11 [extremely strong]);
and the believability of the testimony of the eyewitness, the defendant, and
two witnesses who did not observe the crime (the eyewitness’s wife and the
defendant’s neighbor, who was an alibi witness; 1 [not at all]; 6 [somewhat]; 11 [extremely believable]).3
NC Scale. Finally, participants completed the 18-item NC Scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984). The items on the NC Scale are statements (e.g., “I
would prefer complex to simple problems”) that respondents rate on a
5-point scale of self-descriptiveness (1 [extremely uncharacteristic of me];

3

A subset of the participants in the experimental conditions were additionally asked to rate the credibility of the eyewitness expert (1 [not at all
credible]; 11 [extremely credible]) and the extent to which their verdicts
were influenced by the expert (1 [not at all]; 11 [extremely]). The booklet
page containing these items was inadvertently omitted in several data
collection sessions. Analysis of the responses to these items for those who
did receive them yielded few findings of interest. In analyses in which case
strength, timing, reminder, and trichotimized NC scores were independent
variables, significant results were largely limited to a few higher order
interactions that were not readily interpretable. In general, the expert was
rated as highly credible in all conditions (overall M ⫽ 9.60) and moderately
influential (overall M ⫽ 6.99).
In addition, after providing the scalar ratings relevant to guilt and the
evidence, all participants were asked to list in writing, first, thoughts about
the evidence that supported a guilty verdict and, second, thoughts about the
evidence supporting a not-guilty verdict. Examination of the thought listings (as counted and coded by two raters whose ratings were averaged) of
100 participants (10 randomly selected from each condition) revealed few
effects of interest in the present article. These are reported in a footnote to
the results.
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5 [extremely characteristic of me]). Items are scored or reverse scored so
that higher scores indicate greater preference for thinking. Examples of
items are as follows: “Thinking is not my idea of fun” (reverse scored); “I
find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours”; “I usually end up
deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally”; and
“I only think as hard as I have to” (reverse scored).4

Results
Manipulation Checks and Analysis Plan
A check was first made of two aspects of the experimental
design and procedure. First, guilty verdicts and strength of evidence (against the defendant) ratings of participants who read
transcripts depicting the stronger case were compared with those
of participants who read transcripts depicting the weaker case. As
anticipated, those who read the stronger (vs. weaker) case were
more likely to vote guilty (56.3% vs. 33.5%), 2(1, N ⫽ 371) ⫽
19.32, p ⬍ .001,  ⫽ .23, and rated the strength of evidence
against the defendant as stronger (Ms ⫽ 7.02 vs. 5.66), t(368) ⫽
5.53, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ .58.5,6 Thus, the manipulation of the strength
of the prosecution’s extra-eyewitness case was successful in creating perceptually different cases: one perceived as relatively
strong (rated on the higher side of the 11-point scale) and one
perceived as relatively weak (on the lower side of the 11-point
scale).
The second preliminary consideration was whether NC, presumably a trait (vs. state) variable, was affected by trial variations,
which preceded its assessment. A 2 (case strength) ⫻ 5 (type of
expert testimony: preevidence/no-reminder, preevidence/reminder,
postevidence/no-reminder, postevidence/reminder, or none) analysis of variance (ANOVA) of NC scores revealed no significant
effects (all ps ⬎ .12 and s ⬍ .15).
All of the major dependent variables were subjected initially to
a 2 (case strength) ⫻ 5 (type of expert testimony) ⫻ 3 (NC: low,
moderate, or high) between-subjects ANOVA. The third variable
was based on a tertiary split of NC scores, which divided participants as closely as possible into three groups separated by the
33rd and 67th percentiles. NC scores lower than 59 were classified
as low, and NC scores higher than 67 were classified as high.
Scores in-between these values were classified as moderate. The
mean NC score was 62.9, the median was 64, and scores ranged
from 27 to 86.

Effects of Type of Expert Testimony and Case Strength
Perceptions of guilt. Table 1 presents the percentage of guilty
votes in the 10 trial conditions, as well as condition means for
guilt-certainty scores (see below) and ratings of the likelihood that
the defendant committed the crime. As can be seen, the greater
likelihood of a guilty verdict when the prosecution case was
stronger (vs. weaker) was evident across all types of expert testimony. In addition, for both the stronger and the weaker cases, the
lowest percentages of guilty verdicts and the only ones that differed appreciably from the percentages in no-expert conditions
occurred in the postevidence/reminder conditions (stronger case:
41% vs. 58%; weaker case: 21% vs. 42%.) The same pattern is
evident for the other two measures.
To examine more formally the effects of expert testimony, a
measure of “guilt-certainty” was created by multiplying certaintyin-verdict ratings by ⫹1 when the verdict was guilty and by ⫺1
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when it was not guilty (cf. Kassin et al., 1990). These guiltcertainty scores and ratings of likelihood of commission were very
highly correlated, r(369) ⫽ .78, and were, therefore, combined to
form a composite measure of perceived guilt by averaging the
standard scores on each measure (the means of this composite
measure are presented in Table 1).7 The perceived guilt measure
was then subjected to a 2 (case strength) ⫻ 5 (type of expert
testimony) ⫻ 3 (NC) ANOVA, which revealed a significant main
effect of case strength (MSTRONGER ⫽ .35, MWEAKER ⫽ ⫺.37),
F(1, 341) ⫽ 27.79, p ⬍ .001,  ⫽ .27, a near-significant effect of
expert testimony, F(4, 341) ⫽ 2.26, p ⫽ .063, and a significant
Strength ⫻ NC interaction, F(2, 341) ⫽ 4.58, p ⬍ .02,  ⫽ .26.
This interaction effect is discussed later, when attention shifts to
the NC variable. Of immediate interest, first, is the utter absence of
a Strength ⫻ Type-of-Expert Testimony interaction (F ⬍ 1,  ⫽
.0), which is consistent with Hypothesis 2, that the effects of expert
testimony would not vary as a function of the strength of the
prosecution case. Second, there is the overall main effect of type of
expert testimony, which appears to be due, basically, to decreased
perceptions of guilt in the postevidence/reminder condition relative essentially to all other types-of-expert-testimony conditions.
Examination of Table 1 indicates that perceptions of guilt were
quite similar to the no-expert condition in the preevidence expert
conditions and the postevidence/no-reminder condition. Thus, Hy4
The NC Scale is a highly reliable instrument. In seven studies reviewed
by Cacioppo et al. (1996), Cronbach alphas exceeded .84. Multiple studies
have found split-half and test–retest (intervals ⬎ 6 weeks) reliabilities
averaging .83 and .77, respectively. The construct validity of the scale is
evidenced by findings that NC scores predict level of effortful engagement
on many tasks, including information recall in memory, discernment of
argument quality in persuasion studies, and knowledge gained from exposure to current issues and other everyday stimuli (see Cacioppo et al., 1996,
for a review of more than 100 empirical studies involving measurement of
NC).
5
Estimates of the effect size of ANOVA tests involving scaled variables
were estimated by eta, where  ⫽ the square root of [dfN(F)/dfN(F) ⫹ dfD].
Effect size estimates for pairwise contrasts of two means on scaled variables were obtained using Cohen’s (1988) d statistic, which is the ratio of
the numerical difference between the means and the pooled standard
deviation of scores in the two groups being compared. In the case of
comparisons of two proportions (i.e., chi-square tests), effect sizes were
estimated by the phi-coefficient ( ⫽ square root of 2/n). Friedman
(1968) described effect sizes of less than .30 as small effects, between .30
and .50 as moderate effects, and greater than .50 as large effects.
6
Small differences in degrees of freedom across statistical tests of
different variables reflect the fact that a few participants failed to circle a
response to one or two questions.
7
The Pearson correlations among all of the scaled dependent measures
were computed for the entire sample (N ⫽ 371). Perceived guilt (composite
score) and ratings of likelihood of commission, strength of evidence, and
eyewitness believability were all highly positively correlated with each
other (.56 ⱕ r ⱕ .90). These variables were moderately negatively correlated with ratings of the defendant’s believability (⫺.66 ⱕ r ⱕ ⫺.44),
moderately positively correlated with ratings of the believability of the
eyewitness’s wife (.27 ⱕ r ⱕ .48), and not significantly correlated with
ratings of the believability of the alibi witness (.04 ⱕ r ⱕ .10). Certainty
in verdict had a small but significant correlation with perceived guilt (r ⫽
.16) and strength of evidence (r ⫽ .12), and a small negative relationship
with believability of the defendant (r ⫽ ⫺.11). The only other significant
correlation was positive between believability of the eyewitness’s wife and
of the alibi witness (r ⫽ .34).
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Table 1
Verdicts, Guilt-Certainty, Ratings of Likelihood the Defendant Committed the Crime, and
Composite Perceived Guilt in the Conditions of Experiment 1
Type of expert testimony
Preevidence
Dependent measures
Percent guilty verdicts
Stronger case
Weaker case
Guilt-certainty (a) [Verdict (⫺1 or ⫹1) ⫻
Certainty Rating (11-point scale)]
Stronger case
Weaker case
Likelihood of commission (b)
Stronger case
Weaker case
Perceived guilt composite [average of (a) and (b) z
scores]
Stronger case
Weaker case
Condition n
Stronger case
Weaker case

pothesis 1, that perceptions of guilt would be depressed in all
expert-testimony conditions, was not borne out. However, in support of Hypothesis 3, perceptions of guilt were lowest in the
postevidence/reminder condition. Two contrast tests to evaluate
Hypothesis 3 revealed that, as predicted, the perception of guilt in
the postevidence-testimony/reminder condition (M ⫽ ⫺.41) was
significantly lower than the average perceived guilt in the other
three expert-testimony conditions (Ms ⫽ .12, .11, and .05),
t(366) ⫽ 2.65, p ⫽ .008, d ⫽ .36, and also significantly lower than
that in the no-expert control condition (M ⫽ .13), t(366) ⫽ 2.25,
p ⫽ .025, d ⫽ .39.8
The eyewitness’s believability. Overall, the eyewitness was
somewhat believed (M ⫽ 6.98 on the 11-point scale). A 2 ⫻ 5 ⫻
3 ANOVA of believability ratings of the eyewitness revealed only
one significant effect, a Strength ⫻ NC interaction, F(1, 341) ⫽
4.90, p ⬍ .01,  ⫽ .17; all other ps ⬎ .12 and s ⬍ .15, to be
described and discussed later. All eyewitness believability was not
affected overall by type-of-eyewitness testimony, a test of the
postevidence/reminder versus no-expert-control contrast proved
significant, t(366) ⫽ 1.99, p ⬍ .05, d ⫽ .33, with the eyewitness
rated as less believable when there was an expert (postevidence)
and a reminder (M ⫽ 6.64) than when there was no expert (M ⫽
7.40). This is noted here because it is consistent with hypothesized
effects of expert testimony (Hypotheses 1 and 3) and replicates a
significant outcome in Experiment 2.
The believability of the defendant and other witnesses. It is of
interest to examine whether type of expert testimony about eyewitness evidence influenced perceptions of individuals other than
the eyewitness who took the stand. In fact, it did not. A 2 ⫻ 5 ⫻
3 ANOVA of believability ratings of the defendant revealed only
a main effect of case strength—the defendant was rated as more
believable in the weaker (vs. stronger) case condition, Ms ⫽ 6.08
and 5.32, F(1, 341) ⫽ 15.63, p ⬍ .001,  ⫽ .21. ANOVAs
revealed no significant or interpretable effects on the believability

No
reminder

Postevidence

Reminder

No
reminder

Reminder

None

.61
.37

.64
.32

.56
.35

.41
.21

.58
.42

2.28
⫺2.00

2.56
⫺2.38

2.28
⫺2.00

⫺1.02
⫺4.56

1.26
⫺0.97

7.83
6.77

7.84
6.38

7.62
6.32

7.07
5.71

7.97
7.00

.49
⫺.26

.52
⫺.39

.44
⫺.35

⫺.08
⫺.80

.39
⫺.09

36
35

45
37

39
37

41
34

31
36

ratings of two other witnesses: the eyewitness’s wife and a neighbor of the defendant who provided alibi-relevant information.9
These witnesses, overall, were considered moderately believable
(Ms ⫽ 8.43 and 8.38).
The eyewitness as the “most important reason” for the verdict.
To gain further insight into how perceptions of the eyewitness
were affected by expert testimony and case strength, we examined
the evidence mock jurors cited as most important to their verdicts.
8
Analyses of the thoughts that 100 mock jurors listed about evidence
supporting guilt and evidence supporting innocence (see footnote 3) included a 2 (case strength) ⫻ 5 (type of expert testimony pre/no-reminder,
pre/reminder, post/no-reminder, post/reminder, or none) ANOVA of the
proportion of all evidence thoughts that supported a guilty (vs. a not-guilty)
verdict. (A three-way ANOVA that included NC as a variable would not be
interpretable owing to extremely small cell sizes.) This revealed that the
proportion was higher in the strong case (M ⫽ .68) than in the weak case
(M ⫽ .51) condition, F(1, 90) ⫽ 15.15, p ⬍ .001,  ⫽ .38. In addition,
thoughts about the eyewitness comprised an average of 32.5% of all
evidence thoughts listed. A 2 ⫻ 5 ANOVA of the proportion of evidence
thoughts that involved the eyewitness revealed no main effect of either case
strength or type-of-expert testimony, ps ⬎ .28, s ⬍ .18. The interaction
was significant, F(1, 90) ⫽ 2.67, p ⫽ .037, s ⫽ .33, but largely uninterpretable (i.e., relative to the other nine conditions, a larger proportion of
evidence thoughts concerned the eyewitness in the weak-case/prereminder
condition; M ⫽ .46 vs. a range of .25 to .36 in the other conditions).
9
The one significant effect on these measures was an interaction of type
of testimony and NC on the ratings of the alibi witness, F(8, 341) ⫽ 2.07,
p ⫽ .038, 0 ⫽ .21. This interaction is not interpretable, as it involved small,
seemingly random differences between the NC groups in the ordering of
mean ratings across the five type-of-testimony conditions (e.g., low NC
participants rated the wife numerically highest in the no-expert condition,
whereas the numerically highest ratings were in the postevidence-expert/
no-reminder and preevidence- expert/no-reminder conditions among moderate and high NC participants, respectively).
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The eyewitness was listed as the most important reason or as
among the most important reasons for their verdict by almost
exactly half of the mock jurors (50.7%).10 A dichotomous score
was created by assigning a one to reasons that listed the eyewitness
and a zero to reasons that did not. A preliminary 2 ⫻ 5 ⫻ 3
ANOVA of these dichotomous scores was conducted, which revealed significant main effects of case strength and type of expert
testimony, but no other effects. The main effects were subsequently analyzed using chi-square tests. The eyewitness was mentioned as a most important reason more often when the prosecution
case was weaker (57.0%) than when it was stronger (44.8%), 2(1,
N ⫽ 371) ⫽ 5.51, p ⬍ .02,  ⫽ .16. Across the five types-oftestimony conditions, overall 2(4, N ⫽ 371) ⫽ 9.58, p ⬍ .05,  ⫽
.16, the eyewitness was mentioned most frequently in the postevidence/reminder condition (64.0%). Chi-square tests corresponding
to the contrast tests associated with Hypothesis 3 revealed that the
frequency in this condition was significantly higher than in the
other three expert-testimony conditions combined (range: 40.9%–
47.4%), 2(1, N ⫽ 304) ⫽ 8.18, p ⬍ .01,  ⫽ .16, and higher, but
not significantly so, than in the no-expert control condition
(55.2%), 2(1, N ⫽ 142) ⫽ 1.13, p ⫽ .28,  ⫽ .09. This suggests
that when it followed the evidence and was highlighted by the
judge, the expert testimony made the eyewitness evidence seem
more salient and important.
It was also the case that verdicts were significantly related to
whether the eyewitness was cited as the main reason for the
verdict— but primarily in the expert-testimony conditions. In the
expert-testimony conditions, the eyewitness was the most important reason for 38.8% of the guilty votes, as opposed to 59.2% of
the not guilty votes, 2(1, N ⫽ 304) ⫽ 14.39, p ⬍ .001,  ⫽ .20.11
In the no-expert conditions, the percentages were 48.4% and
61.8%, respectively.
Only 6.9% of the mock jurors in the expert-testimony conditions
mentioned the eyewitness expert as the most important reason for
their verdicts. A preliminary 2 ⫻ 4 ANOVA on the dichotomous
variable (0 ⫽ did not mention; 1 ⫽ mentioned) revealed only a
marginal effect of type of testimony. Chi-square tests confirmed
that the overall effect of type-of-expert testimony approached
significance, 2(3, N ⫽ 304) ⫽ 6.40, p ⫽ .09,  ⫽ .14. Consistent
with Hypothesis 3, that the expert in the postevidence/reminder
condition would have the greatest impact—this overall effect
reflected a significantly higher frequency of mentioning the expert
in the postevidence/reminder condition (12.0%) relative to the
other three expert-testimony conditions combined (range: 1.4%–
7.3%), 2(1, N ⫽ 304) ⫽ 4.02, p ⬍ .05,  ⫽ .12.
Mock jurors who mentioned the eyewitness were significantly
more likely to mention the eyewitness expert than were mock
jurors who did not claim the eyewitness testimony as the primary
reason for their verdict (9.9% vs. 3.9%), 2(1, N ⫽ 304) ⫽ 4.27,
p ⬍ .04,  ⫽ .12.

Effects of Strength of Prosecution Case and NC
Perceptions of guilt. As noted previously, the 2 ⫻ 5 ⫻ 3
ANOVA of perceived guilt revealed, in addition to main effects of
strength and type of expert testimony, a significant Strength ⫻ NC
interaction. This interaction is depicted in Figures 1 and 2 for the
percentages of guilty verdicts and for the perceived guilt variable
(statistical analyses both of which yielded the same results), respectively. This interaction is most clearly revealed by looking at
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Figure 1. Percentages of mock jurors who made an individual verdict of
guilty as a function of juror need for cognition (tertiary split) and strength
of the prosecution’s circumstantial/physical-evidence case.

the percentages of guilty verdicts. As can be seen in Figure 2,
moderate NC, in support of Hypothesis 4, was associated with
stronger discrimination of stronger and weaker cases (66% vs.
22% guilty) than was either low (57% vs. 41%) or high (44% vs.
36%) NC. With perceived guilt as the dependent variable, tests of
the simple effects of case strength at each level of NC revealed
that, whereas case strength did not significantly influence either
low or high NC mock jurors, Fs(1, 341) ⫽ 3.50 and 2.29, ps ⫽ .07
and .15, ds ⫽ .33 and .25, respectively, the stronger (vs. weaker)

10
The questions posed to mock jurors, specifically, was “Why? [referring to the just previously checked choice of guilty or not guilty]. Please
write down the MOST IMPORTANT REASON for your verdict [caps in
questionnaire booklet].” Despite this instruction that was meant to ask for
a single reason, a substantial number of mock jurors listed several items.
11
When they mentioned the eyewitness, most of the mock jurors who
voted not guilty noted that they doubted the eyewitness’s credibility
because of poor witnessing conditions or perceived inconsistencies in his
testimony (e.g., “It was too dark and the witness was too far away to clearly
see David Lucas” and “He didn’t mention anything about tattoos. He said
the murderer was wearing a sleeveless shirt which would have allowed
anyone to see the tattoos”). Mock jurors who voted guilty, in contrast, most
often cited the eyewitness as one of several pieces of incriminating evidence or noted that his testimony was consistent with the other evidence
(e.g., “There was lots of good evidence against him; for example, the blood
on his jacket was the same as Perez’s and Willie’s testimony” and “The
eyewitness may not have had the most accurate account of what happened
but it made sense— he recalled more and more as he testified that fit the
evidence”). About one third of the guilty voters noted that the witnessing
conditions were favorable (e.g., “Willie witnessed the crime at close
distance and in good lighting”) or that the eyewitness’s identification was
impressive (e.g., “The eyewitness account seems reliable—all his recountings of the story matched up and he did not take long to identify the man
in the lineup”).

B-154

534

LEIPPE, EISENSTADT, RAUCH, AND SEIB

of both low (Ms ⫽ 7.08 and 7.02) and high (Ms ⫽ 6.75 and 7.14)
NC participants did not differ as a function of case strength.

Discussion

Figure 2. Mean scores on the perceived guilt index as a function of juror
need for cognition (tertiary split) and strength of the prosecution’s
circumstantial/physical-evidence case. Higher numbers reflect greater perceived guilt.

case led to greater perceptions of guilt by moderate NC mock
jurors, F(1, 341) ⫽ 29.51, p ⬍ .001, d ⫽ .97.12
As a further test of Hypothesis 4, that the perceptions of guilt of
high NC mock jurors would be less sensitive to case strength, we
examined the interaction of NC and strength when low NC participants were excluded and found it to be significant, F(1, 341) ⫽
8.54, p ⬍ .01,  ⫽ .18. Dissection of this 2 ⫻ 2 interaction
revealed that, as expected, compared with their moderate NC
counterparts, high NC mock jurors had significantly lower perceptions of guilt when the prosecution case was relatively strong,
t(365) ⫽ 2.23, p ⬍ .03, d ⫽ .40, and significantly higher perceptions of guilt when the case was weaker, t(365) ⫽ 1.92, p ⫽ .05,
d ⫽ .36.
As noted previously, the 2 ⫻ 5 ⫻ 3 ANOVA revealed no Type
of Expert Testimony ⫻ NC interaction (F ⬍ 1,  ⫽ .12), suggesting that variations in expert testimony did not differentially affect
mock jurors at different levels of NC.
Perceived strength of evidence. A 2 ⫻ 5 ⫻ 3 ANOVA of
ratings of the strength of the evidence against the defendant
revealed a significant main effect of case strength, F(1, 340) ⫽
32.13, p ⬍ .001, 0 ⫽ .29, a significant Strength ⫻ NC interaction,
F(2, 340) ⫽ 5.81, p ⬍ .01,  ⫽ .18, but no other reliable effects.
Overall, the evidence was rated as stronger in the strong (vs.
weaker) case condition. However, in a fashion that closely parallels the perceived guilt results and confirms Hypothesis 4, the
stronger-versus-weaker difference in ratings was larger among
moderate NC participants (Ms ⫽ 7.82 vs. 5.28) than among either
low NC (Ms ⫽ 6.76 vs. 5.92) or high NC (Ms ⫽ 6.37 vs. 5.73)
participants.
The eyewitness’s believability. The significant Strength ⫻ NC
interaction on the believability of the eyewitness noted earlier also
closely parallels the same interaction on perceived guilt that was
consistent with Hypothesis 4. Whereas the believability ratings of
moderate NC participants were strongly affected by case strength
(MSTRONGER ⫽ 7.53, MWEAKER ⫽ 6.12), the believability ratings

The results of Experiment 1 suggest some interesting answers to
the questions of asymmetry in evidence evaluation posed at the
outset of this article. First, it does indeed appear that having
individuals on a jury who have especially high need for cognition
is an advantage to the defense when it faces a relatively strong case
for guilt. Up to a point, increasing NC was associated with greater
discernment of case strength and a corresponding increase in
perceptions of guilt in the strong case condition. Beyond that point,
however, the relationship reversed, and the mock jurors highest in
NC evinced lower perceptions of guilt in the stronger case condition than did mock jurors with moderate NC. Presumably, their
very careful consideration of the evidence led to recognition of
whatever reasonable doubts there were in the case. When the case
for guilt was weaker, the opposite occurred and very high (vs.
moderate) NC mock jurors saw greater evidence of guilt—an
advantage for the prosecution.
Second, whatever advantage the prosecution has in terms of
jurors’ trust in their eyewitnesses, it appears somewhat negated by
the testimony of an eyewitness expert, under some circumstances.
Eyewitness expert testimony served to significantly lower perceptions of guilt and believability of the eyewitness, but only when the
expert’s testimony came after the other trial evidence had been
presented and the judge included a reminder and summary of the
expert’s testimony in instructions to the jury. This pattern confirms
our prediction that postevidence expert testimony coupled with a
judge’s reminder would create a greater skepticism effect and be
more exonerating than the other combinations of timing and presence or absence of a reminder. However, the absence of any effect
of the other combinations represents a greater dampening of the
12
An alternative approach to analyzing the effects of NC in conjunction
with the manipulated variable of case strength would be to treat NC as a
continuous variable in a multiple regression analysis. Doing so with the
present data does not change the results and their interpretation. A regression analysis was conducted in which an interaction factor was created by
multiplying each participant’s case strength condition (dummy coded ⫺1
and ⫹1) and his or her specific NC score. When this factor was regressed
on perceived guilt, the beta was highly significant (␤ ⫽ .254), t (369)⫽
5.04, p ⬍ .001, reflecting the interaction posited in Hypothesis 4. In
addition, we dissected this interaction by conducting two additional regressions that break the interaction effect into two linear components. In both
analyses, case strength, NC score, and the interaction factor were simultaneously regressed onto perceived guilt. In Analysis 1 (N ⫽ 236), only the
low and moderate NC participants (NC score ⬍ 67) were included; in
Analysis 2 (N ⫽ 245), only moderate and high NC participants (NC
score ⬎ 58) were included. In both analyses, case strength (ts ⬎ 2.01, ps ⬍
.05) and the Strength ⫻ NC interaction (ts ⬎ 2.40, ps ⬍ .015), but not NC
score (ts ⬍ 1), significantly predicted perceived guilt. NC, of course, did
not predict perceived guilt overall, because the relationship, as hypothesized, depends on case strength. More important, a positive beta (1.24) was
obtained for the interaction term in Analysis 1, indicating that (as is evident
in on the left side of the Figure 1 presentation based on trichotomized NC
scores) the difference in perceived guilt as a function of case strength
increased as NC scores increased from low to moderate. A negative beta
(⫺1.64) was observed for the interaction term in Analysis 2, reflecting the
decrease in the difference as a function of case strength as NC increased
from moderate to high (right side of Figure 1).
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expert’s influence than we had anticipated. We return to this
dampening effect later. Nevertheless, the skepticism/exonerating
effect did occur under the conditions that we argued were most
favorable to it. Two important aspects of the exonerating impact of
expert testimony under these conditions are that it (a) occurred
even though the testimony was quite general and did not speak
specifically to the eyewitness evidence in the case and (b) was
more or less equally evident whether the prosecution case was
relatively weak or relatively strong. Taken together, these aspects
are somewhat disconcerting in that they suggest that general,
educational testimony about eyewitness psychology may work in
the defense’s favor (i.e., a prodefense asymmetry), even when it
perhaps should not (i.e., an otherwise strong prosecution case).
The inference that the postevidence-with-judge’s-reminder
expert testimony reduced perceptions of guilt in the strong case
was based on the significant overall effect of this type of expert
testimony collapsing across the two levels of case strength and
on the fact that there was absolutely no hint of an interaction
between case strength and type of expert testimony. Specific
contrast tests that compared perceived guilt and percentages of
guilty verdicts within the stronger-case/postevidence-expert/
reminder condition against those in the stronger/no-expert condition were only marginally significant ( ps ⫽ .15 and .16,
respectively). This may reflect a lack of power in Experiment 1
to detect as reliable a difference of the size we obtained. Indeed,
if we assume that, for the stronger case, the true size of the
specific effect (i.e., strong/postevidence/reminder vs. strong/
no-expert control) of having a postevidence expert coupled with
a reminder corresponds to the effect we obtained (i.e., a decrease of 17 percentage points in guilty verdicts from the
no-expert control baseline of 58%), the power of Experiment 1
to detect this difference as significant at ␣ ⫽ .05 was only 0.27.
Yet, as argued later, the obtained difference in rates of voting
guilty indeed may be a meaningful one. Moreover, the likelihood that the difference in perceptions of guilt is merely a
chance finding seems slim, given that, as revealed by a contrast
test, the postevidence-with-reminder expert’s effect of decreasing the eyewitness’s believability was not only significant overall (as reported earlier) but also significant within the strongcase conditions only (Ms ⫽ 7.74 vs. 6.66), F(1, 361) ⫽ 3.94,
p ⬍ .04, d ⫽ .47. Accordingly, one goal of Experiment 2 was
to replicate the conditions of this comparison, in an effort to
increase power (when the replication is combined with the
Experiment 1 data) and to search for firmer statistical evidence
for the expert effect in a strong prosecution case.
A second observation about the stronger case condition is
that, apparently, the case was not especially strong. In the
no-expert control condition, only a relatively small majority
(58%) of the mock jurors voted guilty. Apparently, in spite of
the numerous pieces of evidence that implicated the defendant,
there was plenty of reasonable doubt about his guilt. As a result,
Experiment 1 may not have provided a truly good test of the
important practical question of whether eyewitness expert testimony can reduce perceptions of guilt even when there is
compelling noneyewitness evidence that incriminates the defendant. In Experiment 2, the stronger case was strengthened
further by adding more incriminating evidence to the arsenal of
the prosecution. Would the trend for the eyewitness expert to
reduce perceptions of guilt be found when the prosecution case
was especially strong?
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The second experiment was limited to two conditions: a strongcase/no-expert control condition and the strong-case version of the
expert condition that produced the lowest perceptions of guilt in
Experiment 1 (viz., the postevidence/reminder condition). We
hypothesized that, as found in Experiment 1, perceptions of defendant guilt and of eyewitness believability would be lower in the
expert condition (Hypothesis 5). In both conditions, the prosecution’s case was bolstered through the addition of circumstantial
and physical evidence that pointed squarely at the guilt of the
defendant.

Method
Participants and Design
Sixty-eight male and female undergraduates at a large Midwestern
university participated to earn credit toward a psychology course requirement. They were assigned randomly to either an expert testimony (53%
men) or a no-expert testimony (59% men) condition.

Procedure and Materials
Participants in two group sessions privately read and provided impressions of the same basic trial as in Experiment 1. The two conditions studied
in Experiment 2 consisted of the stronger prosecution case that included a
postevidence expert witness and a judge’s reminder (expert condition) and
the stronger prosecution case in which there was no expert witness (noexpert condition). Additional evidence and another witness for the prosecution were incorporated into both conditions with the intent of making the
prosecution’s case even stronger than it was in Experiment 1. Through the
questioning of witnesses and commentary in the closing arguments of both
sides, it was communicated that, in addition to the other incriminating
evidence, the victim’s wallet was found in a trash can on the same block
that the defendant lived and that DNA test results, presented by a forensic
scientist, indicated a 94% certainty that the blood sample found on the
defendant’s jacket was that of the victim. Other than these changes, the
case materials and the dependent measures (scaled measures only) were
exactly the same as those used in the corresponding stronger case conditions of Experiment 1.

Results
Consistent with our intentions, the prosecution case appears to
have been successfully strengthened. Overall, the mean strengthof-evidence rating was 8.02 on the 11-point scale. Among the 34
mock jurors in the no-expert condition, 74% voted guilty (compared with 58% in the corresponding condition—no expert/stronger case— of Experiment 1). In the expert condition of Experiment
2, 59% voted guilty. This reduction of guilty verdicts from 74% to
59% owing to expert testimony was directionally consistent with
Hypothesis 5, but did not reach statistical significance, 2(1, N ⫽
68) ⫽ 1.64, p ⫽ .20,  ⫽ .16.
The remaining dependent variables were subjected to 2 (presence or absence of expert testimony) ⫻ 3 (NC: low, moderate, or
high) ANOVAs, with levels of the latter variable determined by a
tertiary split of NC scores (M ⫽ 63.6, Mdn ⫽ 64, range ⫽ 44 – 85)
into low (NC score less than 60), moderate (NC score between 61
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and 68), and high (NC score higher than 68).13 The only significant effect obtained was on ratings of the eyewitness’s believability. Consistent with Hypothesis 5 and with the results of Experiment 1, mock jurors who received expert testimony judged the
eyewitness as less believable than did those who did not receive
expert testimony (Ms ⫽ 6.56 vs. 7.79), F(1, 61) ⫽ 6.92, p ⬍ .02,
d ⫽ .63.
Relevant to the relationship between NC and the tendency to
find reasonable doubt in a relatively strong case, an interesting
pattern was evident in guilty votes in the no-expert condition. Even
though the prosecution case was quite strong, high NC mock jurors
were significantly less likely to vote guilty (50%) than were mock
jurors who were either moderate or low in NC (83%), 2(1, N ⫽
34) ⫽ 4.03, p ⬍ .05,  ⫽ .34. Thus, as in Experiment 1 (i.e.,
Hypothesis 4), those mock jurors with the highest NC scores were
the least swayed toward guilt by a relatively strong case for guilt.

Combined Results
It is noteworthy that a difference in verdicts between the noexpert and postevidence-expert/reminder conditions of close to the
same size in percentage points was found for both a moderately
(Experiment 1) and more than moderately (Experiment 2) strong
prosecution case. The difference fell short of conventional significance levels in both experiments taken singly, but given the
consistency of the difference across the two replications, this
would seem to reflect a lack of statistical power and not a case of
a merely chance outcome. Not only were the differences in the two
experiments remarkably similar, but they co-occurred with effects
of expert testimony on eyewitness believability that were significant in both experiments. Moreover, the observed differences in
guilty verdicts are not trivial ones. The presence of postevidence
eyewitness expert testimony (coupled with a judge’s reminder)
reduced the rate of guilty verdicts from nearly three in five (58%)
to almost as low as two in five (41%) in Experiment 1 and by 15
percentage points (74%–59%) in Experiment 2. If we combine the
two studies, two of every three jurors (66%) would have entered a
deliberation room preferring to convict if there was no eyewitness
expert, whereas one of every two (49%) would have preferred
conviction after receiving the testimony of an eyewitness expert
(and a judge’s reminder) in a case that was otherwise identical. A
test comparing these percentages for the combined samples (n ⫽
72 from Experiment 1 and n ⫽ 68 from Experiment 2), which has
substantially more power than tests of only the single samples,
revealed that this difference was, in fact, statistically significant,
2(1, N ⫽ 140) ⫽ 4.02, p ⬍ .05,  ⫽ .17. The difference was
significant in another way as well. Research suggests that juries
entering deliberation evenly split (e.g., six leaning toward guilty,
six leaning toward acquittal) are considerably more likely than not
to acquit, whereas two-thirds splits (e.g., eight–four) in favor of
guilty are more likely to convict than to acquit (MacCoun & Kerr,
1988; Stasser, Kerr, & Bray, 1982).

General Discussion
It appears from our results that expert testimony that provides
only a general overview of theory and research on eyewitness
memory can be sufficient under some circumstances to decrease
both belief in the eyewitness and the likelihood of a guilty verdict.
This occurred when the prosecution case aside from the eyewitness

testimony was relatively weak and also when the prosecution case
was considerably stronger. The exonerating influence of the expert
witness, however, did not occur anytime the expert took the stand.
In the trial used in the present research, the expert’s influence was
limited to the trial condition in which the expert gave testimony
after all other evidence had been presented and the judge reminded
jurors about the expert testimony by summarizing its points during
final instructions. In the absence of either of these features, the
expert testimony had little or no impact on guilty votes or any
other juror impressions. Overall, then, it appears that expert testimony may have an impact under a limited set of conditions, and
when it does have an impact, that impact serves to reduce the
advantage to the prosecution of having eyewitness evidence.
On a very different dimension, we found support for our hypothesis that highly thoughtful jurors, as evidenced by very high
NC scores, could represent an advantage for the defense when it
has the weaker case because their careful scrutiny of evidence
would likely find reasonable doubt in even relatively strong prosecution cases. By breaking the NC variable into three categories—
low, moderate, and high—rather than the more typical mediansplit breakdown that divides respondents into lower and higher
groups, Experiment 1 uncovered a curvilinear relationship between
NC and perceptions of guilt. Consistent with the usual expectation
regarding NC, moderately higher NC mock jurors perceived more
guilt in a strong prosecution case than did those with low NC
scores. However, NC mock jurors who scored in the highest third
of NC scores perceived less guilt than did moderate NC mock
jurors when the prosecution case was relatively strong, judging the
overall weight of the evidence against the defendant to be weaker.
A similar finding was obtained in the no-expert-testimony condition of Experiment 2, in which the prosecution case was even
stronger. The highest NC mock jurors were the least likely to vote
guilty.
We also found the opposite of this leniency effect among the
highest NC mock jurors. These very thoughtful individuals proved
helpful to the prosecution when its case was the somewhat weaker
one, in that they found more evidence for guilt than did moderate
NC mock jurors in whatever the prosecution did have in the
weaker case condition.
Before discussing these results, we should note that there may
be limits to the generality of our findings associated with the fact
that ours were simulation studies that used a written (vs. live or
videotaped) presentation of the trial, only excerpts of the trial
(albeit lengthy, realistic ones), and only college students as mock
jurors. Moreover, no serious consequences (e.g., the imprisonment
of the defendant) were expected to be associated with mock jurors’
decisions, and jurors did not deliberate. With these caveats in
mind, we should also note that the material that mock jurors did
receive, including opening arguments, the question-and-answer
exchanges involved in direct and cross-examinations, closing arguments, judge’s instructions, and, of course, the expert testimony,
quite closely resembled—at least in verbal content—what they
might have heard in an actual trial. In addition, as Cooper and Hall
(2000) have observed, research suggests that college-student and
community/jury-eligible samples respond quite similarly to simulated trials involving eyewitness testimony (cf. Cutler, Dexter, &
13

As in Experiment 1, NC scores did not vary by experimental condition, t(65) ⫽ 0.07.
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Penrod, 1990; Nunez, McCoy, Clark, & Shaw, 1999) and that
predeliberation verdict choices of individual mock jurors are relatively strong predictors of deliberated final verdicts (Bray & Kerr,
1979; Hastie, 1993a). Moreover, in a recent comprehensive review
of jury-simulation studies that compared different samples of
mock jurors (e.g., college students vs. jury-eligible community
citizens) and manipulated the medium of trial presentation (e.g.,
live, video, audio, written transcript, or written summary), Bornstein (1999) concluded that there is “little research that has obtained differences between different mock juror samples or different media” (p. 75). Thus, there are reasons to believe that our
results have a reasonable level of practical generality, in addition
to offering conceptual insight and directions for further research.

Expert Testimony: Type, Timing, and a Two-Step Process
of Impact on Jurors
The results regarding eyewitness expert testimony, in part, are
consistent with the typical finding of past research; namely, that
such testimony may result in decreased belief in the guilt of the
defendant. In past studies that have found this exonerating effect,
the expert testimony has comprised a prominent and salient portion
of the trial or witness information received by the triers-of-fact and
has almost always followed the eyewitness testimony. The current
results make especially good sense in light of these aspects of past
research, given that the exonerating effects of the expert testimony
occurred only when the expert testimony occurred late in the trial
(after the eyewitness) and the judge offered a reminder and review
of the expert’s statements in final instructions—in other words,
when the expert testimony was prominent and salient to mock
jurors as they considered a verdict. When the expert testimony is
less salient during verdict consideration, its effects may be muted.
A novel feature of Experiment 1 was that it directly compared
the effects of pre- and postevidence expert testimony. As far as we
know, it was the first whole-trial jury simulation to present the
eyewitness expert in advance of the evidence and the eyewitness.
Accordingly, the failure of the preevidence expert to affect mock
jurors’ perceptions and verdict is especially noteworthy as a new
finding. As discussed later, however, it would be premature to
conclude that preevidence expert testimony is unlikely to ever
have an impact on jurors.
Interestingly, it was not only the preevidence expert testimony
that produced no skepticism effect, but postevidence expert testimony that was not followed by a judge’s reminder was also
inconsequential. Although it was predicted that there would be less
of a skepticism effect in this no-reminder condition than in the
postevidence/reminder condition, we did not expect there to be no
decrease in guilt perceptions when a reminder was absent. On the
face of it, this null result is inconsistent with other studies, which
generally have observed a skepticism effect when presenting expert testimony after the eyewitness evidence. The reason for the
discrepancy, however, may be found in the salience dimension that
we have highlighted. In past studies, the eyewitness expert has
invariably been quite prominently featured to mock jurors. This
was true even in the videotaped trial used by Cutler and his
colleagues (e.g., Cutler et al., 1989), in which the eyewitness
expert gave elaborate testimony and was subjected to considerable
cross-examination in which he noted limitations of research and
conclusions. In contrast, the expert in the present studies was
presented and questioned without much fanfare and specificity.
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Salience, leading to heightened availability during decision
making, is central to our conceptualization of how and when
eyewitness expert testimony may impact jurors. In general, the
results support a recency interpretation of how eyewitness expert
testimony is likely to have an impact on jurors. When the time
comes to translate what they have learned at trial into a decision
regarding guilt, jurors are more likely to spontaneously recall the
expert testimony if it—and a reminder about it— came late (vs.
early) in the trial and therefore closer in time to their deliberation.
In turn, to the extent that the expert testimony signified a cause for
skepticism about the eyewitness evidence, that evidence should be
at least partially discounted or given less weight in jurors’
decision-making calculus. In the present case, the judge’s reminder
just before deliberation served, in part, to increase the likelihood of
activation of the expert testimony to a threshold point at which it
was applied to the case. This repetition, in essence, of expert
testimony in close temporal proximity—the expert’s on-the-stand
minilecture and the judge’s reminder/summary of it—may have
been necessary for sufficient likelihood of activation of memory
for the expert testimony and its implications. Consistent with this
idea, in a study of the effects of expert testimony about child
sexual abuse, Kovera, Gresham, Borgida, Gray, and Regan (1997)
found that guilty verdicts were only influenced in the anticipated
direction (increased convictions) in a “repetitive testimony” condition in which the expert provided a summary of research findings
and then reiterated this summary.
Alternatively, or in addition to an effect on accessibility through
repetition, the testimony-plus-reminder sequence in the present
studies may have worked in two steps. The recency of the expert
testimony may have made more available to jurors what to apply
in judging retrospectively the eyewitness evidence, and the judge’s
reminder may have provided an authorization to apply it. This
two-step notion is especially plausible given the fact that neither
the postevidence presentation of the expert testimony nor the
judge’s reminder was sufficient by itself to lead to a reduction in
perceptions of guilt or believability of the eyewitness. That is,
expert testimony had no exculpatory effects in either the
postevidence-expert/no-reminder or the preevidence-expert/reminder conditions. Salience/availability and authorization, therefore, both seem to be required. The combined impact of these two
factors may reflect attempts to “correct for bias” on the part of
mock jurors (Wegener & Petty, 1997). On hearing the expert
testimony, mock jurors may have become worried that they were
overly swayed by the eyewitness, and this worry may have been
acted on by a downward adjustment in the credibility accorded the
eyewitness testimony only when the judge’s instructions gave
authoritative credence to that worry about a pro-eyewitness bias. In
this regard, it is important to note that specific memory for the
eyewitness’s testimony may have faded by this time to the point
where it could be now remembered as weak along a number of
dimensions the expert discussed. In contrast, the eyewitness testimony may have held up better on those dimensions in the preevidence conditions when it could be evaluated online after hearing
the expert testimony.
The role of salience is also evident in the responses mock jurors
gave when questioned about the most important reason for their
verdict. The eyewitness was significantly more likely to be mentioned in the postevidence-expert/reminder condition than in the
other conditions, and, typically, the mention of the eyewitness was
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accompanied by a critique of the eyewitness testimony that resembled factors the expert mentioned (see footnote 11 for examples).
As noted earlier, our results do not rule out entirely the possibility that preevidence eyewitness expert testimony will influence
trial verdicts. It is possible, for example, that receiving expert
testimony beforehand is likely to affect judgments of eyewitness
testimony primarily when the eyewitness testifies live and provides nonverbal expressions of confidence and other demeanor
that might be discounted based on what the expert said. Preevidence expert testimony might also be effective when it is made
explicitly relevant to the facts of the case at trial or to the on-stand
demeanor or statements of the eyewitness. Indeed, in a study of
expert testimony about the battered woman syndrome, preevidence
testimony that focused on the emotional reactions of victims and
situational factors that make escape perceived as impossible was
found to have a stronger effect on verdicts than postevidence
testimony (Schuller & Cripps, 1998). Finally, there was much
other evidence and numerous witnesses in the trial used in the
current research. Perhaps if the eyewitness evidence had been
more “front and center”—as the main and pivotal evidence in the
trial—preevidence expert testimony would have aroused more
skepticism about the eyewitness.
Of course, the very fact that the eyewitness evidence existed
amid a plethora of other evidence makes it somewhat remarkable
that any eyewitness expert testimony significantly reduced judgments of guilt. Additionally, the fact that it was general-knowledge
testimony and that the expert was presented as a friend of the court
(i.e., not as part of an adversarial strategy by the defense) make the
exonerating effect in the postevidence/reminder condition all the
more remarkable. At this point, the conclusion must be that general, non-case-specific eyewitness expert testimony, if it is salient
and endorsed by the judge, somehow cues jurors to be more
skeptical of eyewitnesses, the prosecution case in general, or both.
An important focus of further research should be to build on these
findings by discerning what about the expert testimony communicates this message and how it enters the decision-making calculus of jurors. For example, does it alter the incriminating value of
the eyewitness evidence or the weight attached to it? Alternatively,
or in addition, does it “raise the bar” for the evidence necessary to
convict?
It bears mentioning that the court-appointed aspect of the expert
testimony in the present studies is an uncommon quality of eyewitness expert testimony in actual trials. For a number of reasons,
including the adversarial nature of North American justice systems, the preferences of litigating attorneys given an adversarial
system, and the difficult logistics of governing ex parte communications with court-appointed experts, eyewitness experts are
usually retained and called by one side (usually the defense) of the
case. Despite its rarity, inclusion of a court-appointed eyewitness
expert is permissible under the law, and a number of psycho-legal
researchers have studied and recommended such a nonadversarial
practice (see, e.g., Cooper & Hall, 2000; Cutler et al., 1990;
Leippe, 1995; Lindsay, MacDonald, & McGarry, 1990). The relevant issue here is the extent to which the present findings using
court-appointed testimony generalize to the situation in which the
expert is called by the defense and placed in, at least, a perceived
adversarial role. In reviewing the research on the effects of eyewitness expert testimony, Leippe noted that “across studies, both
types of expert created similar levels of skepticism” (p. 949), an
observation that bodes well for ready generalization. On the one

hand, Cutler et al. found that mock jurors made less use of
court-appointed expert testimony in that, unlike mock jurors who
heard an adversarial expert, their verdicts were insensitive to
variations in the quality of witnessing and testing conditions that
the expert mentioned as important. Cutler et al. conjectured that
mock jurors were less likely to systematically process and learn
from the court-appointed expert because, owing to their knowledge
that the judge had appointed the expert, they accepted the message
without scrutiny. Presumably, through their superficial processing
and assumption of the expert’s credibility, mock jurors registered
only a “take-home” message that calling such an expert means
there is reason to be skeptical of the eyewitness evidence. If this
were in fact the case, it suggests that the skepticism effect may be
greater for court-appointed compared with adversarially presented
eyewitness experts. A countervailing force on skepticism, however, is that an adversarial expert called by the defense is probably
more likely to slant his or her testimony toward matters that
suggest problems with the specific eyewitness evidence in the case
at hand, thereby increasing skepticism. Thus, it could be that the
present results overestimate, underestimate, or appropriately estimate (e.g., if the countervailing forces mentioned cancel each other
out) the impact on jurors’ skepticism an adversarial (vs. a courtappointed) expert might have when the expert follows the eyewitness evidence (as must necessarily be the case for an adversarial
expert). This is an empirical question that future research could
pursue.
In terms of practical implications, perhaps the most important
finding is that general-knowledge eyewitness expert testimony
served, under some conditions, to reduce perceptions of guilt even
when the prosecution’s case was rather strong and included considerable evidence in addition to the positive eyewitness identification of the defendant. This result gives some credence to the
concern that eyewitness expert testimony can have the unwanted
effect of creating sufficient juror skepticism about the entire case
that leads to an acquittal in the face of strong circumstantial
evidence. To be sure, we have yet to test for this impact of expert
testimony in an extremely strong prosecution case, and it can be
argued that an increase in overall skepticism in a moderately
strong case is not so inappropriate. Yet, if our results do reflect a
tendency that extends to strong extra-eyewitness cases in general,
it puts the onus on judges to decide whether to admit eyewitness
expert testimony in light of how much other incriminating evidence besides the eyewitness(es) that the prosecution is prepared
to offer. Such decisions are often not easy given the subjectivity of
evidence and the fact that all evidence is not fully “in play” until
the trial is underway. Nevertheless, it would seem appropriate to
add case strength to the factors that need to be factored into the
admission of an eyewitness expert into the courtroom (cf. Leippe,
1995). At the same time, the significant impact of expert testimony
in rather strong cases may also have implications for whether a
general overview of scientific findings about eyewitness memory
should become a standard feature of trials that involve eyewitnesses. If such a practice is ever to be implemented, there first
needs to be more research into how useful information about
evaluating eyewitness evidence can be presented without sending
an implicit message to distrust the actual eyewitness(es) and with
effective instructions that make clear that other evidence may exist
that is independent of the eyewitness evidence. It is not yet known
if these objectives can be accomplished.
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NC and Reasonable Doubt
The moderating role of jurors’ NC in the present research is
interesting for both theoretical and practical reasons. At the conceptual level, the curvilinear relationship between jurors’ NC and
guilt judgments in Experiment 1 suggests that NC may interact
with processing goals in producing judgments that require thoughtfulness. Thus, if the goal is to make a decision about what is the
best attitude to have based on the available evidence, increasing
thinking about a strong persuasive message with largely unassailable arguments should lead to linear increases in the persuasive
impact of that message as a function of increasing NC. This is the
typical result of persuasion studies in which recipients’ NC has
been examined (cf. Cacioppo et al., 1996), although these studies
have been limited in obtaining evidence for a linear-only effect
because recipients have been divided into only two groups (higher
and lower NC). However, if, for example, recipients are asked to
adopt an “editorial” or “critical” set to be sensitive to any flaws in
the arguments or to try to refute the arguments, the NC/persuasion
relationship might well turn out to be curvilinear, with the high NC
recipients evincing less attitude change than moderate NC recipients in response to a strong but imperfect message. NC might
correctly reflect enjoyment of thinking and thus predict cognitive
effort in thinking-dependent tasks, but this may not always imply
a greater likelihood of making an attitudinal judgment that is most
validly sensitive to the data at hand.
At the practical level of the jury, the current results suggest
that selecting for those individuals who display the highest
levels of enjoyment of thinking—those who seem highest in
NC—would generally be a good strategy for the defense counsel facing a superior prosecution case. High NC individuals, it
seems from our data, are more likely to find reasonable doubt in
a pretty strong case for guilt, owing to the greater cognitive
effort they put into studying the evidence. However, achieving
this defense advantage through jury selection carries some
danger. First, it may not be easy to discern high NC individuals
from moderately high ones—and the latter were most swayed
toward guilty verdicts by a stronger case in the present research.
In effect, when the prosecution case is at least moderately
strong, moderately high NC jurors may be advantageous to the
prosecution and very high NC jurors advantageous to the defense. Second, just as they may be more likely to uncover
reasonable doubt, extremely high NC jurors may also be more
likely to see through irrelevant or strained defense arguments.
Third, if the defense is mistaken about the strength of the
prosecution’s case, and it is actually pretty weak, the highest
NC jurors may see it as a stronger case than will moderate NC
jurors. Finally, as implied earlier, the reactions of high NC
jurors may depend on the decision rule they are working with.
In a criminal case that uses a reasonable doubt standard, high
(vs. lower) NC jurors may be less swayed by a relatively strong
case. However, in a civil case that uses a preponderance of
evidence standard, they may be more swayed by a relatively
strong case because they are more likely to discern the strength
of the case and can discount any of the greater doubts they are
likely to notice, so long as such evidence does not become
preponderant.
Our interpretation of the NC results centers on evidence scrutiny
and the discovery and construal of exculpatory evidence as rea-
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sonable doubt. It is possible that, instead, or in addition, the NC
results reflect a relationship between jurors’ NC and definitions of
reasonable doubt. Possibly, extremely high NC individuals require
a great deal of certainty that the defendant is guilty before they will
convict. This account, however, would have difficulty explaining
why high NC mock jurors acquitted less (vs. more) often than
moderate NC jurors when the case for guilt was weak. Still, this
rival hypothesis might be addressed in future research that assesses
directly how individuals who differ in NC subjectively define
reasonable doubt (cf. Hastie, 1993b).

Conclusions
We began this article by noting two apparent asymmetries in the
psychology of evidence evaluation. Eyewitness testimony tends to
impress jurors in a fashion that provides an advantage to the
prosecution. The reasonable doubt standard may lead jurors who
are internally motivated to think about the evidence (high NC) to
be biased toward acquittals in relatively strong cases for guilt, and
thus provide some advantage for the defense. Our results confirm
the second of these biases and offer no remedy other than selecting
for less thoughtful jurors or trying to build an iron-clad case for
guilt. Regarding the first bias, it appears that postevidence eyewitness expert testimony endorsed by the judge may lessen the
prosecution-favorable impact of eyewitness testimony. Interestingly, having a pretty strong case in addition to the eyewitness
does not seem to help the prosecution protect the high credibility
of their eyewitnesses or their case from eyewitness expert testimony of this sort.
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On the "General Acceptance"
of Eyewitness Testimony Research
A New Survey of the Experts
Saul M. Kassin
V. Anne Tubb and Harmon M. Hosch
Amina Memon

In light of recent advances, this study updated a prior
survey of eyewitness experts (S. M. Kassin, P. C. Ellsworth,
& V. L. Smith, 1989). Sixty-four psychologists were asked
about their courtroom experiences and opinions on 30
eyewitness phenomena. By an agreement rate of at least
80%, there was a strong consensus that the following
phenomena are sufficiently reliable to present in court: the
wording of questions, lineup instructions, confidence malleability, mug-shot-induced bias, postevent information,
child witness suggestibility, attitudes and expectations,
hypnotic suggestibility, alcoholic intoxication, the crossrace bias, weapon focus, the accuracy-confidence correlation, the forgetting curve, exposure time, presentation
format, and unconscious transference. Results also indicate that these experts set high standards before agreeing
to testify. Despite limitations, these results should help to
shape expert testimony so that it more accurately represents opinions in the scientific community.

I

n recent years, and with increasing frequency, psychologists have served as expert witnesses in trials that
contain possible erroneous eyewitness identifications.
To assess the extent to which there is "general acceptance"
of various eyewitness phenomena within the scientific
community (a criterion for the admissibility of scientific
evidence, initially enunciated in Frye v. United States,
1923), Kassin, Ellsworth, and Smith (1989) surveyed 63
eyewitness experts for their views on the reliability of 19
propositions. Their survey revealed that whereas certain
research findings were judged to be reliable by most experts (e.g., the effects of exposure time, lineup instructions,
the wording of questions, preevent expectations, postevent
information, and the accuracy-confidence correlation),
others did not elicit high levels of consensus (e.g., the
effects of stress, event violence, gender, weapon focus,
hypnotic retrieval techniques, and training in eyewitness
observation).
By providing empirical evidence of the consensus
within the community of experts, this survey has proved
useful to judges ruling on the admissibility of expert witnesses; psychologists needing to determine the appropriate
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contents of their testimony; and cross-examiners seeking to
discredit experts who overstate, understate, or in other
ways misrepresent the literature. In light of the kinds of
substantive disputes likely to erupt in the courtroom
(Leippe, 1995; Penrod, Fulero, & Cutler, 1995), the net
effect, it was hoped, was to encourage expert testimony that
more accurately reflects the consensus of opinions within
the scientific community.
The time has come for Kassin et al.'s (1989) survey of
experts to be updated. Since its publication, there has been
a surge of new and important research developments in the
area (for reviews, see Cutler & Penrod, 1995; Ross, Read,
& Toglia, 1994; Sporer, Malpass, & Koehnnken, 1996;
Thompson et al., 1998; Wells, 1993). There has also been
a surge of activity directed at the application of eyewitness
research findings within the legal system. In 1996, the
National Institute of Justice reported on 28 wrongful convictions, cases in which convicted felons were exonerated
by DNA evidence after varying numbers of years in prison.
Remarkably, all of these cases contained one or more false
identifications (Connors, Lundregan, Miller, & McEwen,
1996). More recently, the number of DNA exoneration
cases had climbed to 62 (including 8 individuals who had
been sentenced to death)—52 of which contained identifications from 77 confident but mistaken eyewitnesses
(Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2000). In response to these
newly documented miscarriages of justice, a group of eyewitness researchers—as part of an initiative of the American Psychology-Law Society (Division 41 of the American

Editor's note. David Faigman served as action editor for this article.
Author's note. Saul M. Kassin, Department of Psychology, Williams
College; V. Anne Tubb and Harmon M. Hosch, Department of Psychology, University of Texas at El Paso; Amina Memon, Department of
Psychology, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Scotland.
We thank LavEarl Moore for help in compiling lists of experts and
posting questionnaires and the University of Texas at El Paso Research
Incentive Program for supporting this research.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Saul
M. Kassin, Department of Psychology, Williams College, Bronfman Science Center, Williamstown, MA 01267. Electronic mail may be sent to
skassin@williams.edu.

405

May 2001 • American Psychologist
Copyright 2001 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0O03-066X/01/S5.O0
Vol. 56, No. 5, 405-416
DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.56.5.405

B-201

Psychological Association)—wrote a scientific review article that contained specific procedural rules for how to
minimize errors made in the collection of eyewitness identifications (Wells et al., 1998). In 1999, the National Institute of Justice—at the request of former Attorney General
Janet Reno—assembled a multidisciplinary working group
of police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and research psychologists, who published a "how to" manual, the first of its
kind, entitled Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement (for a discussion of how these guidelines were
developed, see Wells et al., 2000).
In addition to recent activity in the eyewitness arena,
there have also been significant changes in the legal criteria
by which judges admit or exclude expert testimony at trial.
At the time the 1989 survey was conducted, most courts
had relied heavily on the Frye test—that scientific testimony is admissible only if it is based on a theory or
research finding that has "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs" {Frye v. United States, 1923,
p. 1014). This criterion—which was specifically applied to
eyewitness research in United States v. Amaral (1973)—
provided the motivational impetus for the original survey
of experts.
Since that time, the evidentiary landscape has changed
in significant ways. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court urged trial
judges to serve as more active gatekeepers by ascertaining
whether an expert proffers testimony that is scientific and
will assist the trier of fact. The Court thus shifted from the
prior emphasis on general acceptance to the broader question of whether the testimony would be based on information that is not only relevant but reliable and valid—and
obtained through sound scientific methods.' The Court then
extended this opinion in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael et al. (1999), in which it stated that Dauberfs
basic principles and the gatekeeping function assigned to
trial judges may also be applied, albeit flexibly, to engineers and other nonscientific experts who proffer "technical" or "other specialized knowledge."
The Daubert ruling applies only to federal courts.
Indeed, although many states followed suit, some did so
only in part, and still others retained their existing standards—with 17 states continuing to use the Frye test
(Berger, 2000; Faigman, Kaye, Saks, & Sanders, 1997). In
addition, as the majority opinion in Daubert makes clear,
trial judges may still consider opinions within the community of experts in determining the admissibility of expert
testimony ("general acceptance can yet have a bearing on
the inquiry"; Daubert, 1993, p. 2797). Thus, as Leippe
(1995) noted, Kassin et al.'s (1989) survey can have an
important bearing on the extent to which different propositions about eyewitness testimony, on an item-by-item
basis, are deemed reliable enough to be presented at trial. In
Daubert, the U.S. Supreme Court majority asserted with
confidence "that federal judges possess the capacity to
undertake this review" (p. 2796). Lacking the training and
experience necessary to evaluate psychological theories,
research methods, error rates, and even the quality of
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peer-reviewed journals, judges would thus benefit greatly
from the opinions of experts, whose collective wisdom
presumably takes such considerations into account.
The present study was conducted with three goals in
mind. First, we sought to update expert opinions on the classic
eyewitness propositions tested in the original survey. In discussing the forensic usefulness of their results, Kassin et al.
(1989) noted that as research accumulates, and as the effects
of known factors are modified, expert opinion is likely to
change. Their survey thus needs to be updated periodically
to account for new research developments. To illustrate the
point, Kassin et al. (1989) noted that when their data were
collected, there was little direct evidence for the proposition that "the presence of a weapon impairs a witness's
ability to accurately identify the perpetrator's face." No
doubt aware of this issue, their experts split about 50-50 on
the reliability of this statement. Yet, shortly thereafter, this
weapon focus effect was demonstrated in several independent studies (see studies analyzed in Steblay, 1992).
Our second objective was to assess expert opinions on
relatively new phenomena not previously tested. After the
initial survey, for example, new studies were conducted on
such topics as child witnesses (Ceci & Brack, 1995; Poole
& Lamb, 1998), repressed and/or false memories of trauma
(Loftus, 1993; Pezdek & Banks, 1996; Read & Lindsay,
1997), the effects of alcohol (Yuille & Tollestrup, 1990),
the processes by which eyewitnesses make identifications
(Dunning & Stern, 1994; Sporer, 1993), sequential versus
simultaneous presentations of photographic arrays and lineups (R. C. L. Lindsay, Lea, & Fulford, 1991; Wells, 1993),
the malleability of confidence and other retrospective reports of the eyewitnessing experience (Luus & Wells,
1994; Shaw, 1996; Wells & Bradfield, 1998, 1999), factors
that moderate the correlation of accuracy and confidence
(Kassin, Rigby, & Castillo, 1991; D. S. Lindsay, Read, &
Sharma, 1999; Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Robinson & Johnson, 1999; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995), and the
commonsense assumptions about eyewitnesses held by laypersons and members of the legal profession (Devenport,
Penrod, & Cutler, 1997; Kassin & Barndollar, 1992; Stinson, Devenport, Cutler, & Kravitz, 1996, 1997).
Our third goal was to reestimate the level of expert
witness activity occurring in today's criminal and civil
courtrooms. To compare these data with those obtained in
the 1989 survey, we posed the same set of questions. Thus,
we asked respondents to indicate separately how often they
had been asked to testify, had agreed to testify, and had
actually testified at trial as an eyewitness expert for the
plaintiff or the defense. In an open-ended question, we also
asked respondents to indicate whether they had ever declined a request to testify and the reasons for that decision.
' In Daubert, the Supreme Court offered four questions as potentially
helpful—though not necessary or definitive—to this inquiry: (a) whether
the theories or methods used by the expert to formulate an opinion can be
tested, (b) whether they have been subjected to peer review, (c) whether
there is a measurable error rate, and (d) whether the theories or methods
are generally accepted within the expert's community.
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In light of the criteria articulated in Daubert, we also asked
respondents to indicate for each item whether their opinion
was based on published, peer-reviewed, scientific research.

Method
The Experts
The following sources and resources were used to generate
a list of experts: the membership rosters of Division 41 of
the American Psychological Association, also known as the
American Psychology-Law Society; the Society of Applied Research on Memory and Cognition; and the attendee
lists of the 1995 and 1997 European Association of Psychology and Law biennial meetings. We identified members of these associations who had conducted eyewitness
research. This list was then supplemented by a PsycINFO
search for individuals who had published an article, book
chapter, or other paper on eyewitness identifications during
the previous 10 years. Finally, the names of eyewitness
experts were solicited from subscribers to the PSYCHLAW
listserve, an electronic communication network.
Questionnaires were mailed to a total of 197 prospective respondents. Of these respondents, 53% were employed in the United States. The others were from the
United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Australia, the Netherlands, Spain, New Zealand, Israel, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, and France. Six individuals returned the questionnaire, saying they did not have time to complete it or no
longer considered themselves to be experts. In 5 other
instances, the envelopes were sent to the wrong name, to an
incorrect address, or to individuals who had died. From the
remaining population of 186 prospective participants, 64
returned data in usable form, yielding a 34% response rate.
With regard to their areas of specialization, 34 respondents
described their primary area as cognitive psychology, 17 as
personality/social, 6 as child/developmental, and 3 as clinical/counseling. Four respondents identified themselves by
combinations of two or more specific areas.
For confidentiality purposes, we did not require respondents to identify themselves on their questionnaires, so
it was not possible to precisely assess the ways in which
our sample resembled and differed from the population of
186 eligible participants. We do know that 62 of the 64
respondents had a Ph.D. in psychology (4 had also earned
a J.D.; 1 had only a D.S., and another had only an M.A.) as
did all but 3 members of the total population. We also
compared the numbers of eyewitness publications selfreported by respondents with the actual publication numbers for the list of all prospective participants, as derived
from PsycINFO, and we found that respondents constituted
a highly prolific subgroup (M = 17.98) of the total population (M = 7.92), Z = 3.66, p < .001. It appears that the
experts in our study could be described as a blue-ribbon
group of leading researchers. The specific magnitude of the
difference cannot be known, however, because the respondent data were based on self-reports—not on actual publication numbers.

The Questionnaire
Our questionnaire contained 30 statements concerning the
accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Seventeen of the 21
items from the 1989 survey were retained. To minimize the
length of our instrument, 2 of the original items (pertaining
to sex differences and the tendency to overestimate event
durations) were dropped, and the 2 items on cross-race
identifications were combined into a single generally stated
principle (in the original instrument, cross-race effects on
Black and White witnesses were separately assessed). In
light of the research literatures and controversies that developed in the 1990s, 13 new items were added. These
items addressed simultaneous versus sequential lineups,
prelineup exposure to mug shots, child witnesses, the diagnostic value of identification reaction times, the repression of traumatic experiences, and the recovery of repressed memories. The complete set of 30 statements is
presented in Table 1.
Five questions accompanied each statement. First, respondents were asked to characterize the reliability of the
proposition described. As in the original survey, there were
seven response alternatives: (a) "the evidence suggests the
reverse is probably true," (b) "the evidence does not support it," (c) "the evidence is inconclusive," (d) "the evidence tends to favor it," (e) "the evidence is generally
reliable," (f) "the evidence is very reliable," or (g) "I don't
know." Next, respondents were asked to indicate, yes or no,
whether they thought the phenomenon "was reliable
enough for psychologists to present it in courtroom testimony" The third question asked, yes or no, "Under the
right circumstances, would you be willing to testify in court
that this phenomenon is reliable?" Fourth, we asked respondents to reflect on whether their opinion on the issue
was "based on published, peer reviewed, scientific research." Fifth, we asked respondents for their opinion on
whether "most jurors believe this statement to be true as a
matter of common sense."
Following the specific questions on the 30 eyewitness
phenomena, respondents were asked several questions concerning their personal backgrounds and experiences. Specifically, we asked about their professional credentials (degrees obtained, primary areas of specialization, memberships in the American Psychological Association and the
American Psychological Society), relevant scholarly
achievements (number of eyewitness publications in scientific journals, law reviews, books, chapters, and magazines
or newsletters), and courtroom experience (the estimated
number of times they were asked to testify, the number of
times they agreed to testify, and the number of times they
actually testified). For this last set of questions, we asked
respondents to specify how often they had been called on
criminal or civil cases and whether it was by the prosecution (plaintiff) or the defense. In parallel with Kassin et
al.'s (1989) survey, two more general questions were then
asked: (a) "What do you see as the primary role of the
eyewitness expert: to educate the jury, assist a particular
party, or other (please specify)?" and (b) "In general, would
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Table 1
Eyewitness Topics and Statements
Topic

Statement

1. Stress
2. Weapon focus
3. Showups
4. Lineup fairness
5. Lineup instructions
6. Exposure time
7. Forgetting curve
8. Accuracy-confidence
9. Postevent information
10. Color perception
1 1. Wording of questions
12. Unconscious transference
13. Trained observers
14.
15.
16.
17.

Hypnotic accuracy
Hypnotic suggestibility
Attitudes and expectations
Event violence

1 8. Cross-race bias
19. Confidence malleability
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Alcoholic intoxication
Mugshot-induced bias
Long-term repression
False childhood memories
Discriminability
Child witness accuracy
Child suggestibility

27. Description-matched lineup
28. Presentation format
29. Elderly witnesses
30. Identification speed

Very high levels of stress impair the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.
The presence of a weapon impairs an eyewitness's ability to accurately identify the
perpetrator's face.
The use of a one-person showup instead of a full lineup increases the risk of
misidentification.
The more members of a lineup resemble the suspect, the higher is the likelihood that
identification of the suspect is accurate.
Police instructions can affect an eyewitness's willingness to make an identification.
The less time an eyewitness has to observe an event, the less well he or she will
remember it.
The rate of memory loss for an event is greatest right after the event and then levels off
over time.
An eyewitness's confidence is not a good predictor of his or her identification accuracy.
Eyewitness testimony about an event often reflects not only what they actually saw but
information they obtained later on.
Judgments of color made under monochromatic light (e.g., an orange streetlight) are
highly unreliable.
An eyewitness's testimony about an event can be affected by how the questions put to
that witness are worded.
Eyewitnesses sometimes identify as a culprit someone they have seen in another
situation or context.
Police officers and other trained observers are no more accurate as eyewitnesses than is
the average person.
Hypnosis increases the accuracy of an eyewitness's reported memory.
Hypnosis increases suggestibility to leading and misleading questions.
An eyewitness's perception ana memory for an event may oe affected by his or her
attitudes and expectations.
Eyewitnesses have more difficulty remembering violent than nonviolent events.
Eyewitnesses are more accurate when identifying members of their own race than
members of other races.
An eyewitness's confidence can be influenced by factors that are unrelated to
identification accuracy.
Alcoholic intoxication impairs an eyewitness's later ability to recall persons and events.
Exposure to mug shots of a suspect increases the likelihood that the witness will later
choose that suspect in a lineup.
Traumatic experiences can be repressed for many years and then recovered.
Memories people recover from their own childhood are often false or distorted in some
way.
It is possible to reliably differentiate between true and false memories.
Young children are less accurate as witnesses than are adults.
Young children are more vulnerable than adults to interviewer suggestion, peer
pressures, and other social influences.
The more that members of a lineup resemble a witness's description of the culprit, the
more accurate an identification of the suspect is likely to be.
Witnesses are more likely to misidentify someone by making a relative judgment when
presented with a simultaneous (as opposed to sequential) lineup.
Elderly eyewitnesses are less accurate than are younger adults.
The more quickly a witness makes an identification upon seeing the lineup, the more
accurate he or she is likely to be.

Note. The first 1 8 items were retained from the original survey. In the present instrument, Item 14 was stated positively rather than negatively, and Item 1 8 combined
initially separate items for Black and White witnesses.
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In absolute numbers, our respondents were called on to
testify more frequently than in the past (Ns = 3,369 and
1,268, respectively), but they were less likely to agree to do
so (the agreement rates were 74% in 1989 and 41% in the
present survey, Z = 16.89, p < .001). When they did agree
to testify, a significantly greater percentage actually did so
than was the case in the previous survey (70% and 51%,
respectively), Z = 6.97, p < .001.
Consistent with the earlier finding that eyewitness
experts agreed to become involved more often in civil than
criminal cases (the 1989 agreement rates were 91% and
71%, respectively), we found that the agreement rate was
higher (76%) when experts were sought by civil plaintiffs
than by civil defendants, criminal prosecutors, and criminal
defendants (43%, 48%, and 40%, respectively; ps < .001).
In contradiction to the charge that eyewitness experts are
liberally biased toward criminal defendants, it is important
to note that respondents were just as likely to agree to assist
the prosecution as they were the defense in criminal cases,
Z = 0.47, ns.
There are two possible explanations for the finding
that experts are less agreeable today than in the recent past.
One is that today's experts testify as often in absolute terms
but that they agree proportionally fewer times because they
receive so many more requests—about three times more
per expert. A second possibility is rooted in the fact that our
experts were more active and productive researchers than
those in Kassin et al.'s (1989) sample, and so perhaps they
had less time or inclination to become involved as consultants in actual cases. Of the 49 experts who had been asked
to testify at some time, all of them reported that they had
declined a request for expert testimony on at least one
occasion. There were various reasons for this decision.
Nineteen respondents cited moral or ethical concerns (e.g.,
"I could not say what the attorney wanted me to say") and
the personal belief that the defendant was guilty of the
crime charged. Ten said they had declined to testify be-

you say that juries are better equipped to evaluate eyewitness testimony with or without the aid of a competent
expert (or is there no difference)?" Finally, we asked respondents to list any eyewitness topics about which they
had testified that were not covered in the questionnaire and
if they had ever declined to testify, to list the reasons for
that decision.

Results and Discussion
The Experts
As we noted earlier, the experts in our sample were a
prolific group with regard to research productivity. Ninetytwo percent had published one or more books, chapters, or
articles on the psychology of eyewitness identification. On
average, respondents had authored or edited 2.15 books,
6.54 chapters, 13.22 scientific journal articles, 1.42 law
review articles, and 5.38 magazine or newsletter articles.
In addition to being active researchers and writers,
many of our respondents were also actively involved in the
judicial system. Seventy-eight percent had been asked to
testify as eyewitness experts on at least one occasion—and
an estimated average of 3338 times. In those cases, they
said they agreed to testify an estimated 78% of the time.
And in cases in which they did agree, they actually testified
an estimated 92% of the time. In an estimated 29% of these
latter cases, our respondents were countered in court by an
opposing expert.
Consistent with the results of the 1989 survey, the
requests for expert testimony were not equally distributed
across parties in criminal and civil proceedings. As presented in Table 2, our experts were asked to testify more
often in criminal cases (n = 3,150; 93% of all requests)
than in civil cases (n = 220; 7% of requests). By far, the
lion's share of requests for expert assistance were from
criminal defendants (n = 3,016; 89% of all requests).
It is striking to compare the number of experts who
agreed to testify with those who did so in the 1989 survey.

Table 2
Estimated Number of Times Respondents Were Asked
to Testify,Agreed to Testify,
Actually Testified, and Were Opposed in Court
Civil

Criminal
Prosecution
Acfion

Asked to testify
Agreed to testify
Actually testified
Opposed
Total yield

n

134
65
56
25

%

48°
86b
45=
42 d

Defense
n

3,016
1,193
837
30

Plaintiff
%

40°
70b
4=
28d

n

62
47
27
9

%

76°
57b
33=
44 d

Defense
n

158
68
40
12

%

43°
44 b
30=
25d

Total
n

3,370
1,373
960
76

%

41°
70b
8C
28d

a

Agreement rate (i.e., percentage of times experts agreed to testify when asked). b Percentage of experts who after
agreeing to testify actually did so. c Percentage of experts whose testimony was opposed in court.
Percentage of
experts initially asked who ultimately testified.
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cause they were busy or were pressed for time. Eight
declined because they did not feel competent to address the
specific phenomenon pertinent to the case (many of these
requests were for testimony on the effects of hypnosis on
the recovery of repressed memories). Other reasons for not
testifying were that the phenomenon in question was not
important relative to Other evidence (e.g., the defendant's
fingerprints) or was not sufficiently reliable or that the
respondent did not think that expert testimony would assist
the trier of fact.
To examine individual differences in generalized assessments of eyewitness phenomena, we next compared
respondents who were (a) high versus low in research
productivity and (b) high versus low in courtroom experience (both categorizations were derived by median split).
For each respondent, we summed across the 30 eyewitness
items the number of affirmative responses they gave to the
critical question, "Do you think that this phenomenon is
reliable enough for psychologists to present in courtroom
testimony?" A two-way analysis of variance (Research
Productivity X Courtroom Experience) on these 0-30
scores revealed a nonsignificant tendency for respondents
with a high number of publications to judge more phenomena as "reliable enough" compared with those with a lower
number of publications, F(l, 54) = 3.03, p < .10 (Ms =
20.86 and 18.28, respectively). There was no significant
difference on this measure as a function of courtroom
experience, F(l, 54) < 1 (Ms = 20.03 and 18.96 for
high- and low-frequency experts, respectively), nor was
there a significant interaction between the two factors,
F(l, 54) < 1.
A similar two-way analysis of variance was conducted
on the critical question, "Would you be willing to testify
that this phenomenon is reliable?" Again, for each respondent, we summed across all items the number of affirmative
responses, yielding scores that ranged from 0 to 30. On this
measure, a significant and interesting main effect for research productivity indicated that high-publication respondents were willing to testify about more items than were
low-publication respondents (Ms = 18.08 and 12.99, respectively), F(l, 54) = 4.87, p < .05. There were no
significant effects for courtroom experience, F(l, 54) =
1.45, p < .25, and no interaction, F(l, 54) < 1.

Judgments of Eyewitness Phenomena
For each of the 30 eyewitness propositions, we sought to
assess (a) how the experts as a group characterized the
reliability of the phenomenon; (b) whether they saw the
phenomenon as sufficiently reliable to present in court; (c)
whether they would personally be willing to testify about it;
(d) whether they saw their opinion on reliability as being
based on published, peer-reviewed, scientific research; and
(e) whether they thought that jurors were aware of the
phenomenon as a matter of common sense. Table 3 presents the complete distribution of responses on the reliability question for each of the propositions. More important
from a practical standpoint, Table 4 shows for each item
the percentage of experts who answered "yes" to the "re-
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liable enough," "would you testify," "research basis," and
"juror commonsense" questions.

Comparisons with 1989 survey. For the 17
propositions that were retested, we compared the reliability
assessments of our respondents with those initially provided by Kassin et al.'s (1989) experts. The most striking
aspect of these comparisons was the degree of consistency
in the two samples. As shown in Table 5, there were no
significant shifts in most of the original items, and for
some, the numbers were virtually identical. Thus, as before,
most experts saw as sufficiently reliable expert testimony
on the wording of questions (98%), lineup instructions
(98%), attitudes and expectations (92%), the accuracyconfidence correlation (87%), the forgetting curve (83%),
exposure time (81%), and unconscious transference (81%).
Also as before, there was less, if any, consensus on the
effects of color perception in monochromatic light (63%),
observer training (61%), high levels of stress (60%), the
accuracy of hypnotically refreshed testimony (45%), and
event violence (37%).
Our experts saw two phenomena as significantly more
reliable than did those who took part in the initial survey.
These increases were obtained for the weapon focus effect
(87% and 57%), ^ ( 1 , N = 112) = 13.61, p < .001, and
hypnotic suggestibility effects (91% and 69%), x*(l, N =
118) = 9.67, p < .005. The increased levels of acceptance
for these latter propositions make sense in light of the
substantial bodies of research in these areas over the ensuing decade. For example, Steblay (1992) conducted a metaanalytic review of the weapon focus effect and concluded
that it is reliable across a wide range of settings—a conclusion that has been further corroborated in more recent
studies (e.g., Pickel, 1999). In a similar manner, a great
deal of recent theory and research has shed light on hypnosis in general (Kirsch & Lynn, 1995) and on the risk of
suggestibility effects on reported memories (Malinoski &
Lynn, 1999; McConkey & Sheehan, 1995). Thus, as noted
elsewhere with regard to the first survey (Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1994), it appears that our experts were
highly responsive to changes—and nonchanges—in the
status of the scientific literature.
Propositions not previously tested. One of
the main purposes of the present study was to assess expert
opinion on important and recent eyewitness phenomena
that were not previously tested. As described in Table 1, we
tested 13 new propositions (Items 18-30). Table 4 shows
that, in this subset of items, 6 were viewed by at least 80%
of experts as reliable enough to be presented in court: that
eyewitness confidence is malleable and influenced by factors unrelated to accuracy (95%), that exposure to mug
shots of a suspect increases the likelihood of his or her
selection from a subsequent lineup (95%), that young children are more vulnerable than adults to suggestion and
other social influences (94%), that alcohol impairs eyewitness performance (90%), that eyewitnesses find it relatively
difficult to identify members of a race other than their own
(90%), and that the risk of false identification is increased
by the use of a simultaneous as opposed to sequential

May 2001 • American Psychologist

B-206

Table 3

Distribution of Reliability Judgments forthe 301 Propositions

Topic

1. Stress
2. Weapon focus
3. Showups
4. Lineup fairness
5. Lineup instructions
6. Exposure time
7. Forgetting curve
8. Accuracy-confidence
9. Postevent information
10. Color perception
1 1. Wording of questions
12. Unconscious transference
13. Trained observers
14. Hypnotic suggestibility
15. Attitudes ana expectations
16. Event violence
17. Confidence malleability
18. Cross-race bias
19. Hypnotic accuracy
20. Alcoholic intoxication
21. Mug-shot-induced bias
22. Long-term repression
23. False childhood memories
24. Discriminability
25. Child accuracy
26. Child suggestibility
27. Description-matched lineup
28. Presentation format
29. Elderly witnesses
30. Identification speed

1

2
0
3
5
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
8
0
0
28
0
0
3
0
14
2
0
3
1
0
0

2

2
0
3
5
0
1
4
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
7
0
0
28
1
0
21
2
25
11
0
3
0
6
2

3

4

5

6

7

13
3
6
4
0
7
5
3
2
1
0
3
29
4
0
17
0
1
5
1
0
28
7
15
10
2
4
2
8
7

17
14
10
7
3
11
7
15
2
2
1
20
13
5
10
11
5
16
0
13
12
7
22
4
12
11
8
6
17
19

19
27
16
15
17
14
18
16
16
7
14
16
2
22
26
5
18
19
0
20
31
3
14
1
17
22
15
20
11
11

4
15
15
11
36
25
24
24
42
10
48
22
1
26
27
1
37
25
0
19
19
0
16
2
11
27
10
20
4
2

5
4
10
14
5
2
3
1
0
43
0
1
17
5
0
14
2
2
2
9
1
0
3
3
1
2
19
13
17
22

Note. Evaluations of the research evidence were coded as follows: 1 = the reverse is probably true, 2 = no support.
3 = inconclusive, 4 = tends to favor, 5 = generally reliable, 6 =-- very reliable, and 7 = / don't know.

presentation format (81%). Three additional propositions
were endorsed by at least two thirds of our experts, these
being that identification accuracy is increased by having
foils that match the witness's description of the culprit
(71%), that young children are less accurate witnesses than
adults (70%), and that the memories people recover from
childhood are often false or distorted in some way (68%).
Finally, 4 of the new items were patently not endorsed
by a majority of experts. On the notion that elderly witnesses are less accurate than younger adults, opinion was
split on the "reliable enough" question (50%). Eliciting
consensus in a negative direction—that the research evidence was not reliable enough to be presented in court—
most of our experts did not endorse the propositions that
identification speed is predictive of accuracy (40%), that it
is possible to differentiate between true and false memories
(32%), or that traumatic experiences can be repressed for
many years and then recovered (22%). It is quite clear that
respondents made distinctions among the phenomena we

had assessed, seeing some but not others as reliable enough
for presentation to a judge and a jury.

How Reliable Is "Reliable Enough"?
Over the years, psychologists with opposing views on the
role of eyewitness experts in court have debated the question of how clear and convincing a body of research must
be before it is worthy enough to be offered in court. To
address this issue, we compared each respondent's assessment of each proposition with his or her judgment of
whether that proposition was reliable enough for testimony.
Table 6 reports percentages of experts who judged each
topic to be reliable enough and who would themselves
testify about it. Data across respondents and items were
combined to identify the percentages of experts who believed that psychologists should testify—and that they
would testify—at varying levels of reliability.
This analysis revealed that experts were internally
consistent in their assessments. Only 4% were willing to
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Table 4
Discrete Judgments and Opinions Concerning the 30 Eyewitness Topics Tested
Topic

Wording of questions
Lineup instructions
Confidence malleability
Mug-shot-induced bias
Postevent information
Child suggestibility
Attitudes and expectations
Hypnotic suggestibility
Alcoholic intoxication
Cross-race bias
Weapon focus
Accuracy-confidence
Forgetting curve
Exposure time
Presentation format
Unconscious transference
Showups
Description-matched foils
Child accuracy
Lineup fairness
False childhood memories
Color perception
Stress
Older witnesses
Hypnotic accuracy
Identification speed
Trained observers
Event violence
Discriminability
Long-term repression

Is it
reliable?

Would you
testify?

Research
basis?

Common
sense?

98
98
95
95
94
94
92
91
90
90
87
87
83
81
81
81
74
71
70
70
68
63
60
50
45
40
39
37
32
22

84
79
79
77
83
81
70
76
61
72
77
73
73
68
64
66
59
48
59
54
52
27
50
38
34
29
31
29
25
20

97
95
95
97
98
100
94
90
76
97
97
97
93
93
93
92
85
82
91
78
87
37
98
77
89
75
76
79
89
87

25
39
10
13
17
73
31
19
95
65
34
5
29
97
0
19
30
30
78
48
25
41
37
66
55
61
73
14
52
79

Note. Numbers represent the percentage of experts who responded "yes" to each question. Topics are rank ordered
according to their scores on the key question, "Do you think this phenomenon is reliable enough for psychologists to
present in courtroom testimony?"

testify when they felt that a body of research was "inconclusive." When they believed there was "no support" for a
proposition, 27% said they were willing to testify, presumably to say just that. Respondents were split when, as they
saw it, the evidence "tends to favor" the issue or when it
"suggests the reverse is probably true" (45% and 44%,
respectively). Yet the vast majority of experts were willing
to testify when they perceived the research evidence to be
"generally reliable" (77%) or, better yet, "very reliable"
(91%).

Role of Eyewitness Experts
Central to debates on the nature, scope, and role of expert
scientific testimony is the question of whether experts
should serve as advocates for a party in the dispute or adopt
a more neutral posture in an effort to educate the jury, as
one might expect of a court-appointed expert. Thus, we
asked whether the primary role of an eyewitness expert is
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to assist a particular party, educate the jury, or serve some
other function. Among our 64 respondents, 49 (77%) said
that their primary purpose was to educate the jury, compared with only 3 (5%) who sought to assist a particular
party, and 4 (6%) who cited a combination of purposes. An
additional 8 (13%) respondents cited other reasons, most
notably: to educate trial judges, to train police officers on
how to increase identification accuracy while minimizing
error, and to influence legal policy on how eyewitness
identification evidence should be collected.
A principle criterion for the admission of expert testimony is that it assist the trier of fact. Accordingly, Kassin
et al. (1989) proposed a Bayesian-like test: that expert
testimony be admitted to the extent that it offers to revise
what jurors already believe as a matter of common sense
(i.e., by informing them of research findings not intuitively
known or correcting misconceptions not supported by research). As one can see in Table 4, respondents made sharp

May 2001 • American Psychologist

B-208

General Discussion
Table 5
Comparison of Reliability Judgments,
1989 and Present
Reliable enough to testify?
Topic

Stress
Weapon focus
Showups
Lineup fairness
Lineup instructions
Exposure time
Forgetting curve
Accuracy-confidence
Postevent information
Color perception
Wording of questions
Unconscious transference
Trained observers
Hypnotic suggestibility
Attitudes ana expectations
Event violence

1989

Present

71
57
83
77
95
85
83
87
87
66
97
85
59
69
87
36

60
87*
74
70
98
81
83
87
94
63
98
81
61°
91*
92
37

a

This item was reverse coded to make the present data comparable with those
of 1989.
* p < .05 (Significant difference in judged reliability).

distinctions among items along this dimension. For example, some phenomena were seen as falling well within the
realm of common sense and as known by the average
person (e.g., exposure time), whereas others were seen as
highly nonintuitive (e.g., the low accuracy-confidence correlation). In a single question, we asked respondents to
speculate as to whether juries were generally better
equipped to evaluate eyewitnesses with or without the aid
of a competent expert (a no-difference alternative was
included). As in the 1989 survey, the result on this item was
clear: Sixty-one respondents believed that eyewitness, experts generally have a positive impact on juries (95%), and
3 said there was no impact (5%). Not a single respondent
thought that juries were adversely affected.

New Developments and Future Issues
To explore new areas in the eyewitness landscape not
specifically covered in our survey, respondents were asked
if they had ever testified on issues other than those tested.
In response to this question, several new areas were mentioned. The most frequently cited issue concerned voice
recognition and the extent to which "earwitnesses" can
identify people from the sound of their voice (Yarmey,
Yarmey, & Yarmey, 1994). Other issues cited concerned
the effects on identification accuracy of disguise, retention
interval, multiple exposures to a given suspect, cowitnesses, duration estimates, object recognition abilities, distinctive perpetrator characteristics, and use of the cognitive
interview with child witnesses.

It has been more than 10 years since the publication of
Kassin et al.'s (1989) original survey of eyewitness experts.
Since that time, the field has expanded, with more researchers publishing more articles on more performance-relevant
variables than in the past (most notably, this literature
includes such explosive "new" topics as repressed and
recovered memories and suggestibility effects in children).
Since that time, parts of the American legal system—
following the U.S. Supreme Court's opinions in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire
Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael et al. (1999)—have altered the
criteria that they use to admit scientific expert testimony.
Since that time, researchers have identified dozens of settled cases in which innocent people convicted of capital
and noncapital crimes have been exonerated by DNA testing (Connors et al., 1996; Scheck et al., 2000). Also since
that time, the U.S. Department of Justice—with primary
input from research psychologists—published guidelines
for law enforcement on how to minimize error in the
collection and preservation of eyewitness identification evidence (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999; see Wells et al., 2000). In short, the eyewitness landscape has changed a great deal in recent years,
making it necessary to update judges, lawyers, and psychologists on the consensus that exists within the scientific
community.
The present study revealed some important consistencies and some changes in the opinions of eyewitness experts. Like those sampled in 1989, our respondents judged
many eyewitness phenomena as reliable enough for presentation in court. As indicated by an agreement rate of at
least 80%, there was a strong consensus, in descending
order, on the reliability of the following 10 originally tested
propositions: the wording of questions, lineup instructions,
postevent information biases, attitudes and expectations,

Table 6
Percentages of Experts Who for Each Assessment of
Reliability Judged the Topics to Be Reliable Enough
and Would Themselves Testify
Judgment

Opinion on reliability

Reverse is probably true
No support
Inconclusive
Tends to favor
Generally reliable
Very reliable

Reliable
enough?

Would you
testify?

56a
33b
7C
66Q
97d

44a
27b
4C
45a
77d

10CL

91e

Note. Within each column, percentages without a common subscript differ at
p < .05.
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hypnotic suggestibility, the accuracy-confidence correlation, weapon focus, the forgetting curve, exposure time,
and unconscious transference (by a two-thirds margin, respondents also endorsed the item on showups). Aware of
advances in the literature, our respondents, as a group,
viewed two propositions more favorably than in the 1989
survey—those pertaining to hypnotic suggestibility and
weapon focus. As before, however, they clearly did not
endorse the items pertaining to stress, event violence, hypnotic accuracy, observer training, and color perception
under monochromatic light (this last item elicited many "I
don't know" responses). In short, our respondents were
discriminating in their judgments and responsive to
changes over time in the research evidence.
We also examined 13 eyewitness propositions that
were not previously tested but that had drawn a great deal
of recent attention. Being the first expert opinion data
collected on these issues, the results were highly informative. Overall, six items were judged reliable by at least 80%
of respondents. In order of their endorsement rates, these
pertained to the malleability of confidence, exposure to
mug shots, suggestibility of young children, alcoholic intoxication, the cross-race bias, and simultaneous versus
sequential presentation format. By a lesser two-thirds consensus, respondents also judged as reliable the propositions
that lineup foils should match the witness's description of
the culprit, that young children are less accurate than
adults, and that recovered childhood memories are often
false. Again indicating that experts were discriminating in
their opinions, most agreed that long-term repression and
recovery and the related proposition that it is possible to
differentiate true and false memories are not reliable
enough for presentation in court. This result represents the
first poll of eyewitness experts on this controversial topic
(in this regard, it would be important to sample clinical
psychologists whose perspectives do not emanate from the
eyewitness area). In contrast to the consensus obtained on
these various propositions, there was very little agreement
(i.e., opinions were relatively split) on the new items pertaining to older witnesses and the correlation between
identification speed and accuracy.
In terms of how eyewitness experts perceive and manage their activity in the courtroom, three sets of results
indicate that they set relatively high standards for their own
involvement. First, by examining the association between
each respondent's perceptions of reliability and his or her
willingness to testify, we found that most said they would
agree to testify only on propositions they considered "generally reliable" and "very reliable." Second, across all
propositions, respondents were far more likely to see a
phenomenon as reliable enough for testimony (overall M =
19.60) than to indicate a personal willingness to testify
(overall M = 15.54). Third, respondents were discriminating in their decisions to serve as expert witnesses. In
comparison with the 1989 results, they were called on to
testify more often, but they were less likely to agree to do
so (the agreement rates were 74% in 1989 and 41% in the
present sample). Of 49 respondents who had been asked to
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testify, every single one had declined the opportunity on at
least one occasion—most often for moral or ethical reasons, a lack of time, or a perceived incompetence on the
relevant issues.
There are two potential limitations of the present
survey. One is that additional research published in years to
come will inevitably force experts to revise at least some of
their current assessments. Comparisons between the 1989
survey and our own offer the case in point. In the initial
survey, for example, only 57% saw the weapon focus effect
as reliable enough for expert testimony. Yet in light of the
publication of later studies and a meta-analysis, 87% of our
respondents judged this proposition in the affirmative. In a
related vein, new research developments will make it necessary to add topics to be surveyed. Kassin et al. (1989)
solicited opinions on 19 basic propositions. Our questionnaire contained 30 items, including 13 that were new. At a
later time, it will similarly become necessary to further
expand the scope of this inquiry.
It could be argued that the sampling of experts in this
survey constitutes a second limitation. To identify our
population of respondents, we sought individuals active in
the eyewitness area, which raises an issue that has long
plagued the Frye test, namely, that individuals with the
most expertise in an area may also have the greatest motivation to present it in a favorable light. Thus, in Kumho
Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael et al. (1999), the Supreme
Court anticipated that a trial judge might at times exclude
proffered expert testimony because the discipline lacks the
potential for reliability—despite a consensus within the
community of experts (the only disciplines the Court singled out as examples were astrology and necromancy).
This possible confounding of expertise and motivation
implies that perhaps our respondents should have been
drawn from a broader population of basic experimental
psychologists who study noneyewitness processes or do not
testify in court.
Such an approach may seem reasonable on its face,
but it would create a different and serious problem, namely,
that a broader sample of experimental psychologists would
lack a necessary degree of familiarity with parts of the
literature. Over the past quarter century, eyewitness research has become a specialized and highly technical area
of application built on the shoulders of the mock witness
paradigm and a focus on correctable "system variables"
(Wells, 1993). As a result, there are many essential nutsand-bolts concepts (e.g., simultaneous and sequential presentation formats, valid vs. blank lineups, biased vs. unbiased instructions, and description-matched vs. suspectmatched foils) that are simply not known to the generalists
among us.
Is there any evidence to suggest that our eyewitness
experts comprised a Frye sample tainted by self-motivated
interest? We do not think so. Indeed, close inspection of the
data offers four bases of reassurance. The first and simplest
is that 28 (44%) of our respondents had never testified in
court and so were not motivated in this regard (many were
asked and declined the opportunity). Second, there is no
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support for a stereotype that some might hold—that a
caricature-like distinction exists between pure scientists
and forensic consultants. Thus, when we correlated the
total number of publications per respondent with his or her
courtroom experience, we found that very few fit the pure
"scientist" or "consultant" profile. To the contrary, numbers of publications were positively—not negatively—associated with the number of times experts were asked to
testify, r(56) = .38, p < .002; had agreed to testify, r(56) =
.48, p < .001; and had actually testified, r(56) = .53, p <
.001. Third, as we reported earlier, we conducted an internal analysis to test the motivated self-interest hypothesis
that experts who frequently testify in court, compared with
those who do not, would endorse more of the 30 items
surveyed as "reliable enough for psychologists to present in
courtroom testimony." In fact, there was no significant
difference—a result that was corroborated by the more
specific comparison of the 35 respondents who had testified
at least once with the 28 who had never testified (Ms =
19.21 and 19.83, respectively). Fourth, although individual
respondents disagreed in their assessments of certain principles, and although some were generally more demanding
than others, the group as a whole was by no means uniformly accepting of all principles. Respondents discriminated quite reasonably among statements for which there
was a wealth of experimental support and those for which
there was not. And on an item concerning perceptions of
color under monochromatic light, 67% of respondents—
very few of whom were trained in vision—candidly admitted, "I don't know."
The present results should provide needed guidance to
judges (in their decision making at suppression hearings,
trials, Daubert hearings, and on appeal), lawyers (in their
examination of eyewitnesses and police who collect identification evidence), and psychological experts (who must
determine which phenomena are reliable enough to present
in court). The information contained herein should thus
help to sharpen the direct and cross-examinations of eyewitness experts and shape the content of their testimony so
that it more accurately reflects opinions within the scientific
community. From a paradigmatic standpoint, similarly
conducted expert surveys in other psychological domains
(e.g., expert testimony on rape trauma and other abuse
syndromes, the polygraph, parental competence in custody
disputes, legal insanity) also have the potential to make
important practical and forensic contributions.
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